The Babylonian Talmud (abridged)

REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE WIDTH AND HEIGHT OF AN ERUB CONSTRUCTED IN STREETS INHABITED SOLELY BY ISRAELITES, AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ERUB BY A CARAVAN.

MISHNA: If an entry be higher than twenty ells, it should be lowered. R. Jehudah said: "This is not necessary." If it be wider than ten ells, it should be made narrower, but if it have the appearance of a door, even though it be wider than ten ells, it need not be made narrower.

GEMARA: We have learned in a Mishna [Sukkah, I. a] that a booth which is higher than twenty ells is unfit for use, and R. Jehudah said, that it maybe used. Why does the Mishna in the case of an entry decree, that it should be remedied by lowering, while in the case of a booth it declares it unfit for use? Because in the case of a booth a number of other defects are mentioned in connection with the excessive height and each of those would require a special explanation as to how they were to be remedied, whereas in the case of an entry only two things are to be corrected, and the remedy for them is taught.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh: The difference of opinion between the sages and R. Jehudah is based upon the door and the porch of pillars in the temple. We have learned in a Mishna, that the door of the Temple was twenty ells in height and ten ells in width and that the porch was forty ells in height and twenty ells in width. The sages compare the entry with the door and R. Jehudah compares it with the porch of the Temple, which was also more or less a door; and why does R. Jehudah say, that the porch is also a door, because it is written [Ezekiel xv. 48], "the porch of the house," and that is equivalent to the door of a house. Why do not the sages hold the porch to be a door? Because, were it written, "the door of the porch," the porch might also be considered a door; but as it is written, "the porch of the house," it means the porch which opens towards the house, but not a door to the house.

How can it be that R. Jehudah bases his dictum on the porch of the house? The porch was twenty ells in width, and when the Mishna decrees that if the entry be wider than ten ells it must be made narrower, he does not dissent? (Why did he not say, that it was not necessary to lessen its width?) Said Abayi: In the following Boraitha he does dissent as we have learned: "If the width of the entry exceed ten ells it should be made narrower, but R. Jehudah says, it is not necessary." Why is this omitted in the Mishna? He disputes with the sages concerning the height, hence it is evident that he also disputes as to the width.

Again: How can it be that R. Jehudah bases his dictum upon the porch of the house? Have we not learned in a Boraitha, that if an entry exceed twenty ells in height, it must be lowered? R. Jehudah, however, says, that it may be made even forty or fifty ells in height, and Bar Kappara taught, that it may be even one hundred ells high. As for Bar Kappara, it is assumed to be an exaggeration; but as for R. Jehudah it cannot be considered merely an exaggeration, because he bases his dictum upon the porch of the house, and that was only forty ells in height. Why does he say "or fifty"? Whence his basis for such an assertion? Said R. Hisda: Rabh erred on account of the following Boraitha: "We have learned, an entry which is higher than twenty ells, thus exceeding the height of the door of the Temple, should be lowered." Now Rabh assumed, that if the sages base their teaching upon the door of the Temple, R. Jehudah bases his dictum upon the porch of the Temple, but this is not so! R. Jehudah does not consider the Temple at all, but uses as a basis the palaces of kings, the doors of which attain excessive heights.

What is the law concerning an entry, the cross-beam of which was partly above twenty ells in height and partly below, and also concerning the covering of a booth, part of which was over twenty ells in height and the other part lower than twenty? Said Rabba: "An entry is made invalid by it but a booth is not affected." Why does he say that a booth is not affected by it? Because we assume that part of the covering of a booth, which is above twenty ells, to be so frail that it does not matter. Cannot the same thing be said concerning the cross-beam of an entry? If this were said with reference to a cross-beam, then it will seem as if there is no foundation for the cross-beam, and it is suspended in mid-air. Is this not the same with a booth? If it be said, that that part of the covering of the booth is so frail that it amounts to nothing, it cannot serve as protection against the sun and there will be more sunshine than shade, and this would make the booth invalid? But, as such is not the case and the frailty of the covering is as a matter of fact only imaginary, it does cause more shade than sunshine, and the booth is not made invalid, why should it not also be the same with the cross-beam, the frailty of which is also only imaginary while in reality it is as firm as if fastened with nails? Said Rabha of Parzekaia: "If such a defect occur in a booth, which is intended for the personal use (of a man), it will be remedied through the thoughtfulness of the man (who is bound to keep the commandment properly), but a cross-beam of an entry which is intended for public use will be neglected, because one man will rely upon another to remedy the defect, as the proverb goes, that a pot used in common is never warm nor cold" (one relies upon another to keep it in its proper condition). Rabhina said: The booth being a fulfilment of a biblical commandment needs no further safeguard, for it will be kept under any circumstances; but the entry being a purely rabbinical institution must not leave any loopholes, by which the entire law may eventually be circumvened.

What is the law, finally? Rabba bar R. Ula said, "Both are invalid," and Rabha said, "Both are valid," why? Because the twenty ells refer to the space between the ground and the crossbeam or covering, respectively, and even if part of either be above twenty ells, the space is not changed in volume. Said R. Papa to Rabha: I know of a Boraitha confirming this statement: "An entry which is more than twenty ells high and thus is higher than the door of the Temple should be lowered, and the space between the ground and the ceiling in the Temple itself was twenty ells high." R. Shimi bar R. Ashi objected to this: "We have learned further on, how should we remedy the defect in the entry? The cross-beam should be laid below the limit of the twenty ells!" Do not learn in the Boraitha, "below" but "above" the limit of the twenty ells. The Boraitha, however, distinctly teaches "below"? This "below" refers to a booth which was less than ten spans high and which must be made higher so that the space between the ground and the ceiling should be no less than ten spans, in the same manner as it must not be higher than twenty ells.

Abayi said in the name of R. Na'hman: "The ell used at a booth and at an entry measures five spans, but the ell used at Kilaim is six spans." For what legal purpose does R. Na'hman relate this? This is taught for the purpose of determining the height of an entry and for measuring a breach in the wall of an entry. (If the breach be over ten ells wide, the entry is invalid, and the ell used for measurement is the one of five spans only.) Why is the width of a breach and the height of the entry only mentioned? There is also width to be considered in an entry, for did not R. Na'hman state, that an entry must not be less than four ells wide? What ells are these? If they are four ells of the lesser standard, R. Na'hman makes the ordinance more lenient? The ells in an entry, as a rule, are those of the lesser standard, but as for the width, those of the greater standard are used. Further, R. Na'hman said, that the ell used at a booth also measures five spans. For what purpose did he state this? For the measurement of the height of the booth and the crooked walls of the booth. There is also the width of the booth to be considered, however, and that should be four ells? Will not the ordinance regarding the width be made more lenient thereby of twenty spans only? The ells of a booth generally are of five spans, but as for width the ells measuring six spans are used. What does R. Na'hman intend to specify, by stating that the ells used at Kilaim measure six spans? He refers to seeds planted in the superficies of a vineyard and to a barren spot in a vineyard (as explained in Tract Kilaim). But there is a vineyard in which the vines are planted at less intervals than four ells and the opinions of the sages differ as to whether such a vineyard is called a vineyard in a legal sense (and if the ells be measured according to the statement of Na'hman it is made more lenient? Because if the four ells be of the lesser standard the commandment of Kilaim is not applied.) The statement of R. Na'hman is made for a rule but did not include the above vineyard. The ells of a vineyard are generally used of six spans, but not for the width. But Rabha said in the name of R. Na'hman: All ells measure six spans, but in Kilaim are measured with long spans and in entry and booth with short spans to make it more rigorously.

R. Hyya bar Ashi in the name of Rabh said: The several prescribed quantities (as mentioned in Tract Sabbath), the Chatzitzah (intervention of articles at bathing), and the ordinance concerning the walls of an entry and of a booth are ordinances given by Moses at the Mount Sinai. How can it be said, that these are Sinaic laws, they are biblical laws? For it is written [Deutr. viii. 8]: "A land of wheat and barley, and of the vine, and the fig-tree and the pomegranate; a land of the oil-olive and of honey." And R. Hanan said, that the whole verse refers to prescribed quantities: "By wheat is meant, what we have learned elsewhere in a Mishna [Negaim xiii. 9]: If a man clad in garments and shoes entered a house where leprosy was prevalent, he immediately becomes unclean, but his garments, shoes, etc., do not become unclean, until he remains there a length of time sufficient for the consumption of bread of the quantity of two eggs, wheaten bread but not barley-bread, and when eaten in a reclining position with some other dish. By barley is meant, what we have learned elsewhere [Ohaloth ii. 3]: If a bone of a corpse is the size of a (grain of) barley, it makes a body unclean, when touched or carried, but it does not make unclean the contents of a tent, if found therein. By vine is meant: If a Nazarite drink a quarter of a lug of wine he ceases to be a Nazarite and must bring a sin-offering. By fig-tree is meant, that one is guilty of carrying on the Sabbath, if he carries anything of the size or quantity of a dried fig. By pomegranate is meant, what we have learned elsewhere [Khelim xvii. 1]: Any vessel belonging to a household, if it have a hole as large as a pomegranate, is not subject to defilement any more. By a land of the oil-olive is meant a land where all prescribed quantities are of the size of an olive. [All prescribed quantities? What about those just mentioned? Say, a land where the majority of the prescribed quantities are of the size of an olive.] By honey is meant, that if a man ate anything the size of a fresh date on the Day of Atonement, he is guilty."

How can the passage be understood in this manner? No prescribed quantities are mentioned in the passage? We must say, therefore, that those laws are Sinaic, but the passage is merely a mnemotechnical basis for them. And Chatzitzah, is that not also biblical law? It (as) is written [Leviticus xv. 16]: "Then shall he bathe all his flesh in water." By all his flesh is meant, that nothing should intervene between his flesh and the water? The Sinaic law was necessary in order to stipulate, that there should even be no intervention between the hair and the water (not only between the flesh and the water). As was said by Rabba bar R. Huna: "If there was a knot in a single hair, there was certainly an intervention; but if three hairs were tied in a knot, there was certainly no intervention; but if two were tied together, the matter is doubtful to me." But even the ordinance concerning the hair is also biblical? For we have learned in a Boraitha, that by "all his flesh" is meant all attached to the flesh, and that includes the hair. The Sinaic law was necessary in order to stipulate the ordinances concerning the greater and lesser part of the hair, one who is particular with his hair and one who is not, as was said by the dictum of R. Itz'hak: "According to biblical law Chatzitzah is constituted only if the greater part of his hair was encrusted with loam or blood, etc., and the man is particular about his hair, but if he is not, it does not constitute intervention." The rabbinical laws, however, ordained as a precautionary measure, that if the larger part of his hair be encrusted even though he be not particular, it would constitute Chatzitzah, lest one who is particular would not consider it so, and they also ordained, that if the smaller part of his hair was encrusted and he is particular about his hair, it would constitute Chatzitzah, as a precautionary measure, for the sake of the one who has the larger part of his hair encrusted and is also particular about his hair.

The ordinances concerning the walls of a booth and an entry are also biblical? For the master said: "It is written, that the ark was nine spans high and the cover was one span thick, so the ark and cover combined were ten spans high, and this serves as a prescribed height for all walls." The Sinaic laws are necessary for the stipulation of the ordinances concerning Gud, Lavud, and crooked walls.

If the entry was higher than twenty ells and is to be lowered, how much lower should it be made? How much lower? As much as is necessary. The question here is, how much of the space below the cross-beam must be diminished in order to make the space only twenty ells high. R. Joseph said: "One span underneath the cross-beam is sufficient"; but Abayi said, four spans, and they differ merely as to the precautionary measure involved; the latter claiming, that one span may be impaired through stepping upon it, while the former holds that there is no danger of such a thing happening.

How is it if the entry was less than ten spans high and sufficient ground had to be excavated in order to make it the prescribed height? How much ground should be excavated? How much? As much as is necessary? The question, therefore, is not as to how much must be excavated in height, but in the width of the entry. R. Joseph said: "For the width of four spans," and Abayi said, "For four ells." (The reason R. Joseph says four spans in this case, while only requiring one span in the above case, is because in the first instance a wall for the entry already existed, and merely the space had to be diminished, but in this instance, if the wall is less than ten spans high, it cannot be considered a wall and by excavating the ground the wall will be made; hence four spans at least must be excavated in order to constitute such a wall, the wall of an entry. Abayi, however, holds that in this case four spans would be insufficient, and at least four ells are necessary, because an entry is not considered such, unless it is four ells wide.)

Said Abayi: "Whence do I know that four ells are required? From the statement of Rami bar Hama in the name of R. Huna, that if a beam protrude from one of the walls of the entry for a distance of less than four ells, it may serve as the side-beam of such entry and be valid, although it was not intended to serve for that purpose. If such a beam protrude for a distance of four ells or more, it is considered as part of the wall and cannot serve as a side-beam, but a new side-beam must be made in order to make the entry valid." (If a beam protrude from a wall of an entry and was even not intended to serve as a side-beam, it may be ever so small, it is considered as a side-beam for the entry and is valid. If it protrude, however, for a distance of four ells or more, and was not originally intended for a side-beam, it cannot serve the purpose, because the entire width of the entry is only supposed to be four ells and for that reason the protruding beam is considered part of the wall. Hence in order to make the entry valid, another side-beam must be constructed. From this it may be seen, that Abayi bases his opinion concerning the width of the entry upon the dictum of Rami bar Hama, that an entry must be four ells wide.) R. Joseph, however, declares, that the decree of Rami bar Hama does not conflict with his own decision; for it is true that a beam, if it be four ells wide is not considered a side-beam, because it has not the appearance of a side-beam; still the reason for this is not because the width of the entry itself should be four ells, but because the side-beam is too large, and, as for the entry itself, it is sufficient, if it be only four spans wide.

Again, Rami bar Hama said, that if the beam be four ells wide, another side-beam is necessary. Where should the latter be put? Should he add the side-beam to the original beam, the size will be increased (and it will not look anything like a side-beam)? Said R. Papa.: "It can be put on the other side of the entry." R. Huna bar R. Jehoshua, however, said, that the side-beam may be added to the original beam, but it should be made either higher or lower than the original beam (in order that it may appear as if it were added). The same R. Huna said also: "All this is said in a case of where the entry was eight ells in width (so that the protruding beam and the entry arc of equal width), but if the entry was only seven ells wide and thus the width of the entry is less than the protruding beam, even according to Rami bar Hama, the entry is valid without the addition of another beam, because the entry being narrower than the beam is considered the same as a door." This ordinance is made lenient from an inference of a rigorous ordinance, viz.: the ordinance concerning a court: If in a court one of the walls is entirely destroyed, nothing! may be carried therein on the Sabbath, and neither a cross-beam nor a side-beam placed at the remaining walls alters its character. However, if the wall destroyed was only partially ruined and the remaining portion is larger than the breach, things may be carried therein. Hence in the case of an entry where a side or cross beam suffices for the entire wall, if the wall is wider than the space of the entry proper, in so much greater a degree is the entry valid for all purposes. R. Ashi, however, says, that even if the entry was eight ells wide, no additional side-beam is necessary, no matter in which way the case is assumed: If it be assumed that the closed part of the entry is wider than the entry itself (through some inaccuracy in construction), then the entry is valid because of that fact, and if it be assumed that the space of the entry is wider, then the closed part which is constituted by the beam may be regarded as a legal side-beam and then the entry is certainly valid; but it might be assumed, that both the closed part and the space were exactly equal; in that event it would constitute a doubtful case based on a rabbinical law, and such a case is always decided with leniency.

Said R. Hanin bar Rabha in the name of Rabh: "If the wall of an entry was broken for a distance of less than ten ells at the side the entry is valid; but if the front of the wall was broken for four ells (assuming that the entry was originally twenty ells wide and in order to make it valid, ten ells had been closed up, and of the ten ells of the new wall, four had been broken) the entry is not valid." Why is the entry valid if the wall was broken for a distance of ten ells on the side, because the breach can be regarded as a door? Why should not the same case apply to the breach in the front? Say that can also be regarded as a door? Said R. Huna bar R. Jehoshua: "In this case the breach is supposed to be in the corner, and a door is not generally made in the corner." R. Huna, however, said, that the same distance applies to both the side and the front of wall. In either case if the breach exceeds four ells, the entry is not valid. And thus said R. Huna to R. Hanan bar Rabha. "Do not dispute with me, for it happened that Rabh came to the city of Damharia and he acted there in accordance with my decree." R. Hanan bar Rabha answered: "This is not sufficient evidence for me, because in that case Rabh acted in a manner that precluded the possibility of doing wrong (i.e., the people there were ignorant and had he given them a liberal interpretation of the ordinance, they would have taken advantage of it and disregarded the law in the future)."

Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak: "It seems to me that R. Huna was correct in his opinion from the following: It was taught: An entry made in the form of a right angle should, according to Rabh, be considered as an ordinary entry which is open on both sides and requires an apparent door on one side and a cross or side beam on the other side, but according to Samuel it must be considered as a closed entry (and at both sides needs only a side-beam). Now, let us see! Shall we assume, that even if the entry was wider than ten ells, Samuel still regards it as a closed entry, and only requires a side-beam at each side; (and this being impossible, therefore we must rather assume, that the entry was only ten ells wide, and still Rabh regards it as an open entry and declares, that it requires an apparent door; hence we see that the breach on the side of the wall must also not exceed four ells in order that it may be regarded as a door. (According to Rabh then, not even ten ells in front can be regarded as a door until an apparent door is added. How can it be said that if a breach measure ten ells at the side it is regarded as a door?) What rejoinder will R. Hanan bar Rabha make? R. Hanan will claim, that an entry made in the form of a right angle is used so much, that it appears like public ground (hence an apparent door must be made, but as for a court, which is not used as a thoroughfare, even ten ells may appear like a door).

The Rabbis taught: How are entries facing public ground combined by an Erub,? On one side an apparent door should be made and on the other a cross and side beam should be put up. Said Hananiah: The school of Shamai said, that doors should be made at both entries where they face the street, and when going out or entering, the man should close the door. The school of Hillel, however, said, that at one side a side and a cross beam should be made and at the other a door should be made. Commenting upon this, Rabh said, that the Halakha prevails according to the first Tana, and Samuel said, that it prevails according to Hananiah.

The schoolmen propounded a question: "Is a man, according to the opinion of Hananiah, quoting the school of Hillel, obliged to close the door or not?" Come and hear. R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel, that he is not obliged to close the door. R. Mathna added: I was placed in that position at one time and Samuel said to me, that it must not be closed.

There was an entry (as shown in the illustration) at the city of Neherdai, to which the rigorous ordinances of both Samuel and Rabh were applied and doors were ordered to be made. The rigorous ordinance of Rabh is the one pertaining to an entry which was made in the form of a right angle, and was declared by him to be regarded as an open entry and in this case there were two openings towards the street. [Did not Rabh say above that the Halakha prevails as the first Tana? In this case the rigorous ordinance of Samuel was applied, who said, that the Halakha prevails according to Hananiah. But did not Samuel say, that an entry made in the form of a right angle is to be considered as a closed entry, and requires only side-beams? In this instance again the rigorous ordinance of Rabh was applied and it was regarded as an open entry, and at an open entry, according to Hananiah, quoting the school of Hillel, doors are also required.]

May, then, the rigorous ordinances of two Tanaim be applied to one case? Have we not learned in a Boraitha, that at all times the Halakha prevails according to the school of Hillel, but he who wishes to act in accordance with the school of Shamai, may follow that school exclusively both in the lenient and the rigorous ordinances, and he who wishes to act in accordance with the school of Hillel may follow that school exclusively in both lenient and rigorous ordinances. He who only follows the more lenient ordinances of both schools is a sinner, and he who follows only the more rigorous ordinances of both schools is referred to by the passage [Ecclesiastes ii. 14] as "the fool walketh in darkness."

Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak: The entry made in Neherdai was made in accordance with the decision of Rabh solely, but did not Rabh say, that the Halakha prevails according to the first Tana? R. Huna said in the name of Rabh, that the Halakha in theory remains according to the first Tana, but it should not be carried out in practice. But according to R. Ada bar Ahabha, who said in the name of Rabh, that the Halakha prevails according to the first Tana and should be carried out accordingly, was not the entry in Neherdai made according to the more rigorous decisions of both schools of Shamai and Hillel? Said R. Shezbi: It is not allowed to act in accordance with too rigorous ordinances of two schools only when they conflict with one another (e.g., the ordinances concerning the back and the head as will be explained in Chulin). Wherever they do not conflict, however, they may be applied in one and the same case.

R. Joseph was sitting in the presence of R. Huna, and said: "R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh, that the first Tana and R. Hananiah differed only when the entry faced a market on both sides; but if on one side there was public ground and on the other was a valley which was considered unclaimed ground, all agree that an apparent door should be made on one side and a cross or side beam on the other side." R. Joseph then continued in the name of R. Jehudah alone and stated, that if the entry opened on one side into a vacant yard which in turn opened into public ground, nothing need be made at either end of the entry.

Said Abayi to R. Joseph: What R. Jehudah is supposed to have said himself was in reality a decree of Samuel, because were it a decree of Rabh, he would contradict himself in either of two instances; for R. Jeremiah bar Abba said in the name of Rabh: "If the wall of an entry opening into a courtyard be entirely destroyed, and the wall between the courtyard and the street was broken only for a distance of less than ten ells, the courtyard is not invalidated but the entry is." Why! Say rather that the entry in this case is equal to one that faces a vacant yard, and, according to R. Jehudah, needs nothing at either end. (Where the contradiction in either of the two instances occurs is as follows: If R. Jehudah means to state, that the entry needs nothing at either end because it is an open entry, that would contradict Rabh in one instance, as R. Jeremiah bar Abba relates, that the entry is invalidated because it is made an open entry. If we assume, however, that R. Jehudah holds an entry, opening into a vacant place, to be valid even if nothing is made at either end, because the place was vacant and there were no inhabitants who could invalidate the entry by refusing to combine in an Erub, but, if there were inhabitants in that place, the entry would have been invalid unless provided with the necessary appliances. Here, however, Rabh, according to R. Jeremiah bar Abba, invalidates the entry because it is an open entry and not because of the inhabitants, and hence there would be contradiction in the other instance.)

Said R. Joseph to Abayi: "I know not whose decree R. Jehudah cited, but it happened in the village of a shepherd, that there was an entry which opened into a vacant yard and R. Jehudah was asked whether it was necessary to provide the entry with an apparent door or beams, and R. Jehudah answered that it was not. If this is contradictory to the opinion of Rabh, then let it be attributed not to him but to Samuel, and there will be no contradiction." Now what R. Shesheth said to R. Samuel bar Abba or, according to another version, to R. Joseph bar Abba, namely: I will explain to you, that the decree of Rabh is not permanent. There are times when Rabh himself holds that the entry is valid, and this occurs, if the inhabitants of the courtyard and the entry made a joint Erub (common cause); but when such was not the case, he holds the entry to be invalidated, which proves to us, that the decree of R. Jehudah concerning the entry in the village of the shepherd may have also been in conformity with the opinion of Rabh, because the vacant yard had no inhabitants with whom the inhabitants of the entry could have made an Erub; for the decree of R. Jeremiah bar Abba in the name of Rabh does not invalidate the entry because it is made an open entry, but because there were no inhabitants in the vacant place with whom the inhabitants of the entry could combine in an Erub.

R. Joseph said: "When R. Jehudah declared, that an entry which opens into a vacant yard is valid even when nothing had been made at either end, he intended to state, that such was the case if the entry opened into the centre of the vacant yard, but if it opened into one side of the yard it is not valid." Said Rabba: "Even if the entry opened into the centre of the vacant yard, it is only then valid, provided it is not exactly opposite the opening of the yard into the street; if it is directly opposite, however, the entry is invalid. Said R. Mesharshia: "Even if the entry is not opposite the opening of the vacant place into the street, it is valid only if the vacant place was public property, but, if belonging to an individual (who might build on it and rent it to others), it will become equal to an entry which faces the sides of a vacant place and is not valid. Whence do you know, that there is a difference between public property and individual property? This is known from the narrative of Rabhin bar Ada concerning an entry which faced the sea (see Chapter X., Mishna 4).

There was another entry made in the form of a right angle and a mat was placed at the angle. R. Hisda said in reference to this: "This is neither in accordance with Rabh nor with Samuel. According to Rabh, who considers an entry of this kind as an open entry, an apparent door would be necessary, and according to Samuel, who considers it as an entry closed at one end, a side-beam would be necessary; and this mat is neither one nor the other, because it might be blown away by the wind and would leave nothing behind." If, however, the mat was fastened with a nail so that it could not be blown away, it is sufficient.

It was taught: An entry made in the form of a centipede (i.e., an entry containing a number of smaller entries which on one side faced a street and the principal entry also faced a street) should, according to Abayi, be provided with an apparent door, and the smaller ones should be provided with a side and cross beam where they face the street. Said Rabha to Abayi: "According to whose opinion is this? According to Samuel's, who holds, that such an entry is to be regarded as a closed entry; then why is an apparent door necessary? Secondly, we know that in the case of the entry made in the form of a right angle at Neherdai, the decision of Rabh was also respected." Therefore the decree of Rabha is, that apparent doors should be made at the smaller entries where they face the large entry, and the sides facing the street only need a side or cross beam.

Said R. Kahana bar Tachlipha in the name of R. Kahana bar Minyumi in the name of R. Kahana bar Malchiyu, quoting R. Kahana the master of Rabh [according to others, R. Kahana bar Malchiyu himself was the master of Rabh]: "An entry, one side of which was wide and the other narrow, should, if the wider side be less than four ells, be provided with a cross-beam laid obliquely, but if it measured fully four ells, the cross-beam should be laid on the narrow side." Rabha, however, said, that in either case, the cross-beam should be placed on the narrow side. "And," he continues, "I will state the reason for my opinion, and the reason for the previous opinion: In my opinion a cross-beam is necessary merely to serve as a sign, and if laid obliquely it cannot be seen and thus would not be a sign. According to the opinion of the previous teachers, the crossbeam serves as a wall, and if such is the case, a wall can be a wall even if placed obliquely." Said R. Kahana: "This being a decree by Kahanim, being myself a Kahan I will also venture to say something: The cross-beam must be placed obliquely if the oblique part does not measure more than ten ells." If it was more than ten ells, however, all agree that it must be placed on the narrow side only.

The schoolmen propounded a question: "May the space underneath the cross-beam be used?" Rabh, R. Hyya, and R. Johanan said, that it may be used. Samuel, R. Simeon ben Rabbi, and Resh Lakish said, that it must not be used. Said R. Hisda: All agree that if a side-beam is used, the space opposite the side-beam must on no account be used.

Rami bar Hama asked R. Hisda: "If one drove two posts on the outside of an entry and placed a cross-beam on top of them, how is the law concerning the entry?" He answered: According to those who hold that the space underneath the cross-beam may be used, the entry is invalid, but according to those who hold, that the space underneath the cross-beam must not be used, the entry is valid (i.e., those who hold that the space underneath the cross-beam must not be used regard the inside edge of the cross-beam as if it made a solid wall to the entry; hence the entry is valid because it is considered a closed entry, and if the posts and cross-beams are on the outside, the entry is nevertheless closed and valid; but those who hold that the space underneath the cross-beam must not be used, regard the outside edge of the cross-beam as the closing wall of the entry; hence there will be an open space between the entry and the outside posts and cross-beam, and the entry is made invalid). Rabha, however, said that even according to the opinion of those who hold that the space underneath the crossbeam must not be used, the entry is invalid because the crossbeam must be recumbent upon the entry proper and not upon the outside.

R. Zakai taught in the presence of R. Johanan: The space underneath the cross-beams and alongside of the side-beams is considered unclaimed ground (i.e., that one must not carry things in that space on Sabbath). Said R. Johanan to him: "Go and teach such things outside of the college." Said Abayi: "It seems to me. that R. Johanan's opposition to R. Zakai was only as far as the space underneath the cross-beam is concerned, but alongside of the side-beams it is prohibited to carry." Rabha, however, said: Even alongside of the side. beams it is also allowed to carry.

Said R. Huna bar R. Jehoshua to Rabha: "Thou dost not think, that it is prohibited to carry things alongside of the side-beams?" Did not Rabba bar bar Hana say in the name of R. Johanan, that an entry which was provided with a number of side-beams the space between each of which did not measure four spans, causes a difference of opinion between R. Simeon ben Gamaliel and the sages. According to R. Simeon, an object becomes "lavud" (attached) to another object even when the distance between them is four spans, but according to the sages, the distance must not exceed three spans. Hence in the case just mentioned (see illustration) according to R. Simeon all the beams are regarded as one by virtue of their being "lavud" to each other, and a man must not carry anything beyond the space alongside of the inside edge of the beam farthest from the opening of the entry, while, according to the sages, who regard only the beam nearest the opening of the entry essential and the others unnecessary, a man may carry things as far as the space alongside of the inside edge of the beam nearest the opening of the entry. In the space between the side-beams all agree that it is prohibited to carry. Now, if R. Johanan permitted the carrying of things alongside of the side-beams, how could he state the difference of opinion between R. Simeon and the sages in this case? For whether all the beams were considered as one or each separately, what difference would it make as long as things may be carried in the space between them? Hence we must say, that R. Johanan does not permit the carrying of things alongside of the beams? In this instance, Rabha might declare, that the entry is presumed to be one that opens into unclaimed ground. How would the case be if the entry opened into public ground? Would it be allowed according to R. Johanan to carry things between the side-beams? Shall the native remain on earth and the stranger be lifted up to the highest heaven? Yea; objects of like character assimilate, i.e., the space between the side-beams being unclaimed ground and the entry opening into unclaimed ground, the two are virtually combined, and as carrying in unclaimed ground is not allowed to commence with, it is also not allowed in the space between the beams.

R. Ashi said, however: The case referred to, viz., the entry containing many side-beams, is assumed to be one where the side-beams were erected for a distance of four ells and were less than four spans apart. If, according to R. Simeon, the beams are all "lavud" to each other, they would constitute a separate entry ill the principal entry, and in order to carry things in the space between the beams another side-beam would have to be erected for the newly made entry; but according to the sages, who do not consider the beams "lavud" to each other, another side-beam is not necessary. (This means to say: R. Johanan holds, that under any circumstances the space between the side-beams may be utilized (for carrying) and the difference caused by such an entry between R. Simeon ben Gamaliel and the sages is not as to whether things may be carried in the space between the beams or not, as stated before, but whether another side-beam is required in addition to those already erected or not.)

It was taught: If a side-beam was made to an entry which on the inside of the entry could be plainly seen but on the outside seemed to be on a par with the wall and hence not recognizable, it is regarded as a proper side-beam, but if it could be plainly seen on the outside, but on the inside it seemed to be part of the wall and could not be distinguished from the wall, it gives rise to a difference of opinion between R. Hyya and R. Simeon the son of Rabbi. One holds, that it may be regarded as a proper side-beam, and the other, that it cannot be so regarded.

It is correctly ascertained that R. Hyya is the one who holds that it may be regarded as a proper side-beam, from his decision as follows: "If one of the walls of an entry was partially removed (see illustration a), so that the lacking portion could be perceived from the inside of the entry but not from the outside of same, or if part of the wall was missing (see illustration b), so that it could be readily perceived on the outside of the entry but not on the inside, in either case the impaired wall is regarded as a side-beam."

Rabba bar R. Huna taught the same: "If a side-beam was recognized on the outside of an entry but could not be distinguished on the inside it is nevertheless regarded as a side-beam." Said R. Joseph to him: "I never heard such an ordinance proclaimed by thy father." Said Abayi to R. Joseph: "Didst thou not thyself teach this ordinance when we learned the following: Rami bar Abba said in the name of R. Huna, that a side-beam, which was affixed to the end of a wall so that it could be seen from the outside but seemed to be a continuation of the wall from the inside, is regarded as a side-beam, if measuring less than four ells and the entry may be used from the inside edge of such beam, but if the side-beam measured four ells, it is regarded as a separate entry, and thus the entry proper, not having any side-beam, is made invalid. Thou didst comment upon this and say, that from this teaching we may adduce three things. Firstly, that the space alongside of a side-beam must not be used; secondly, that four ells is the minimum measure of an entry; and, thirdly, that if a side-beam can be recognized on the outside but not on the inside of the entry, it is a proper side-beam." Finally, the Halakha concerning a side-beam recognizable from without but not within the entry prevails: that the side-beam is valid because such was the decision of R. Hyya, as is mentioned above.

"Should it be wider than ten ells, it must be made narrower." Said Abayi: We have learned in a Boraitha concerning this teaching, that R. Jehudah regarded this as unnecessary.

How much narrower should it be made? R. A'ha wished to state, in the presence of R. Joseph, that if the entry measured twenty ells, it should be reduced to thirteen and a third ells. He wished to infer this lenient measure from the more rigorous in the case of a well. The wells were built as illustrated, and the distance between the two enclosures on the same side was thirteen and a third ells; i.e., large enough to permit of the entrance and exit at the same time of two teams of oxen and was larger than the space occupied by the enclosures on the same side. Now, if in that case it was permitted to have the space larger than the space occupied by the enclosures, and thirteen and a third ells only were allotted to such space, an entry where the space must not be more than the enclosure should certainly not be over thirteen and a third ells wide? How can the two be compared? Perhaps the reason, that no more than thirteen and a third ells were allowed for the space of the wells was because a concession had already been made in permitting the space to be larger than the walled part and no further leniency was expedient. In the case of the entry, however, where no concession had as yet been made, let it be allowed to increase the width of the space beyond thirteen and a third ells (because it serves the purpose of a door)? Or on the contrary! A concession having been made in the case of the well, but no concession having been made concerning an entry, lot the law of the entry be enforced without any concession and make the prescribed width ten ells only. (Thus the question remains undecided.)

Levi taught a Boraitha as follows: "In an entry which is twenty ells wide it is sufficient if a stick be placed in the centre of such entry." He himself however decreed, that the Halakha does not prevail according to the Boraitha. What then should be done? Samuel said in the name of Levi: "A pole should be erected in the centre of the entry ten spans high and four ells wide, and a cross-beam placed on top of it parallel with the walls of the entry, which would then serve as a partition in the centre." Or it should be done as R. Jehudah declared: In an entry fifteen ells wide a pole should be erected two ells from one of the walls and a cross-beam extending three ells into the centre of the entry should be placed on top of the pole. (Thus the width will be lessened five ells, the two between the wall and the pole being regarded as a closed door. In the case of an entry twenty ells wide this may be done on both sides of the entry, or the pole maybe erected four ells from the wall and the cross-beam extended six ells.) If the people who make use of the entry, however, should use the space of two ells between the wall and the pole in preference to the wider opening of the entry, will not the principal entry be invalidated by the lack of a side-beam? Said R. Ada bar Mattue: It is an established fact that people will not use the smaller entrance in preference to the larger. Why is this case different from the one taught by R. Ami and R. Assi, for we have learned in a Boraitha: If there was a breach in the side of a wall close to the entry, it was taught in the name of R. Ami and R. Assi (page 5a in the original text), that if the strip of wall left was four ells wide, it matters not if the breach was ten ells; but if the strip is less than four ells, the breach must not exceed three ells, otherwise the entry is invalid. (Now if the strip is four ells, and the breach ten, the breach is regarded as a door, and it might be used in preference to the main entrance. In the former case, only such as will be nearer the side entrance will use it, but in this case, the main entrance will be used exclusively, because one will not unnecessarily go in a roundabout way.)

"But if it have the appearance of a door, even though it be wider than ten ells it need not be made narrower."

Now we see that an apparent door may be used where the entry is too wide and a cross-beam if it be too high, what would be the law if the reverse were made? Come and hear: We have learned: "If an entry be higher than twenty ells, it should be reduced, but if it have the appearance of a door, this is not necessary." What is the law concerning a cross-beam when the width of the entry was excessive? Come and hear: We have learned: "If an entry be higher than twenty ells it should be lowered and if it be wider than ten ells it should be reduced, but if it have an appearance of a door it is not necessary and if it have a cross-beam it is also not necessary." Could we not assume, that the cross-beam refers to the latter clause of that teaching (the excessive width of the entry)? Nay; it refers to the first clause of the teaching (the height).

R. Jehudah taught Hyya the son of Rabh in the presence of Rabh: "It is not necessary to reduce (the width of an entry if it have a cross-beam)." Said Rabh to R. Jehudah: "Teach him, that it should be reduced." Said R. Joseph: From this teaching of our Master we can learn, that a courtyard, of which the greater part of the walls consists of doors and windows and one of the walls contained a breach of over ten ells, the appearance of a door would not make it valid (i.e., things could not be carried in the courtyard on Sabbath). Why so? Because we see, that width exceeding ten ells makes an entry invalid, and space in excess of that occupied by the walls makes a courtyard invalid; now, we compare an entry which is wider than ten ells and is held by our Master to be invalid even if it have the appearance of a door, to a court which has a breach exceeding ten ells, and is also not made valid by an apparent door.

R. Johanan also holds in accordance with the teaching of Rabh, for Rabhin bar R. Ada in the name of R. Itz'hak said: It happened that a man of the valley of Beth Hurtan placed four piles in the four corners of his field and connected the four piles with branches at the top for the purpose of circumvening the law of Kilaim. When this was told to the sages, they allowed him to do so for the purpose intimated (i.e., the field was regarded as if surrounded by a wall, and he could sow other seeds on the outside of the seeming wall), and Resh Lakish said: "In the same manner as the sages permitted the man to do this for the purpose of circumvening the law of Kilaim, so also did they allow him to do it for the purpose of the Sabbath law. R. Johanan, however, said, that this was allowed only for Kilaim purposes but not for Sabbath." (Whence we see that R. Johanan holds with Rabh that an entry over ten ells in width is not remedied by a seeming door.)

R. Hisda said: "If a man made a seeming door in the side of a wall, it counts for nothing." And he said again: "A seeming door must be firm enough to be able to contain an actual door, even though it be only a door of straw."

Resh Lakish said in the name of R. Janai, that an apparent door must have a place fit for the attachment of hinges. What is meant by a place fit for the attachment of hinges? Said R. Ivia: A receptacle for same.

R. A'ha the son of R. Ivia found once the disciples of R. Ashi, and he asked them: "Did the master say anything about apparent doors?" and they answered him: "Nay; he said nothing."

A Boraitha stated: "By an apparent door is meant simply two poles set up perpendicularly one on each side and a pole across the top of the two." Must the pole above be attached to the two perpendicular poles, or is it sufficient if it is suspended above them? R. Na'hman said, they need not be attached, but R. Shesheth said they must be. R. Na'hman did in accordance with his own decision at the house of the Exilarch (R. Na'hman was a son-in-law of the Exilarch). Said R. Shesheth to his servant, R. Gada: "Go, take it down and put it away." He went, took it down, and put it away. The servants of the Exilarch found him doing so and arrested him for it. Then R. Shesheth went and stood on the outside of the prison and called out: "Gada, come out!" Gada came out and went with R. Shesheth.

R. Shesheth met Rabba the son of Samuel on the street; and he asked him: "Did the master teach anything concerning an apparent door?" Rabba answered: "Yea! We have learned concerning an arch, R. Meir decreed, that a Mezuzah (sign on the door-post) must be fastened to it, but the sages say, that it is not necessary." (The reason the sages say, that a Mezuzah is not necessary is because the zenith of the arch is not four spans wide, and no door is properly a door that is not at least four spans wide.) All agree, however, that if the arch is ten spans wide at its base (i.e., before the curve commences, then it is certain that for at least ten spans upwards the arch has a width of four spans), a Mezuzah is necessary, and Abayi said: "All agree, that if the arch is ten spans high and the base is less than three spans wide, or if the base is three spans wide but the arch is less than ten spans high, no Mezuzah is necessary (because a door cannot be less than ten spans high), but wherein do they differ? In a case where the base of the arch was less than four spans wide, and the arch itself ten spans high, but at the top of the arch the width could, by hollowing. out the wall, be increased to four spans' width, R. Meir holds that a Mezuzah is necessary, because the possibility of increasing its width renders it equivalent to having been increased, but the sages hold that a Mezuzah is not necessary, because it had not yet been increased in width." (Thence we see that R. Meir holds that the possibility of accomplishing an act renders it equivalent to having been performed, and, in consequence, he holds that if a pole was merely suspended above two poles it is the same as if it were placed on top of the poles.) Said R. Shesheth to him: "If thou shouldst meet the members of the house of the Exilarch, tell them nothing of the Boraitha concerning the arch."

MISHNA: To legalize (the carrying within) an entry, Beth Shammai hold that a side and cross beam are required, but Beth Hillel hold, that either a post or a beam is sufficient. R. Eliezer said, "Two side-beams are necessary." In the name of R. Ishmael, a disciple stated before R. Aqiba: "Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel do not differ as to an entry less than four ells in width, for both agree, that such an entry becomes legalized either through a cross-beam or a side-beam." Wherein do they differ? Concerning entries of more than four and up to ten ells in width. Regarding these, Beth Shammai hold, that both a side and cross beam are necessary, and Beth Hillel hold, that either a side or a cross beam is sufficient. R. Aqiba, however, said: "They (the two schools) differ in both instances."

GEMARA: According to whose opinion is the Mishna? It is neither according to the opinion of the first Tana nor to that of Hananiah (see page 10). Said R. Jehudah: The Mishna means to state the following: "To legalize a closed entry (one enclosed on three sides) Beth Shammai hold that a side and cross beam are necessary, while Beth Hillel hold, that either one is sufficient." Shall we assume that in order to constitute a private ground from a biblical point of view, according to Beth Shammai, four walls are necessary (because the entry by the addition of a side and cross beam would be turned into a seeming wall)? Nay; throwing to or from public ground in ground enclosed by three walls, makes one culpable from a biblical point of view, but carrying is permitted only in ground enclosed by four walls by the rabbinical law, according to Beth Shammai. Shall we assume that Beth Hillel hold, that three walls, according to biblical law, are necessary? Nay; from a biblical point of view, throwing to or from public ground in ground enclosed by two walls makes one culpable, but carrying is not permitted in ground unless enclosed by three walls by rabbinical law, according to Beth Hillel.

"R. Eliezer said, 'Two side-beams are necessary.'" The schoolmen propounded a question: "Did R. Eliezer mean to state, that two side-beams and a cross-beam are necessary or two side-beams alone?" Come and hear: It happened that R. Eliezer was going to R. Jose ben Preida, his disciple, in the city of Ublin, and he found him sitting in an entry provided with only one side-beam. Said R. Eliezer to him: 'My son, erect another side-beam.' Said his disciple to him: 'Must I then close the entry?' and he answered: 'Close it; what matters it if it be closed?' Now, from the words of the disciple, "Must I then close it?" we can infer, that it was already provided with a cross-beam, and, therefore, the disciple asked what more he must do, close it entirely? Then, if we assume that there was only a side-beam, why should the disciple have said, "Must I close it entirely?" Nay; the disciple may have simply meant to ask, must he close it up entirely with side-beams; and it may be, that there was no cross-beam there at all.

(In the same Tosephta) we are taught so: R. Simeon ben Gamaliel said: "Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel do not differ as to an entry that was less than four ells in width." According to both schools, for such an entry nothing at all need be provided. Wherein they do differ is an entry that is more than four ells wide and up to ten; Beth Shammai hold, that a side and cross beam both are necessary, and Beth Hillel hold, that either is sufficient. Did not our Mishna state that a disciple in the name of R. Ishmael stated before R. Aqiba: "Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel do not differ as to an entry less than four ells in width, for both agree, that such an entry becomes legalized either through a cross-beam or a side-beam"? Said R. Ashi: "R. Simeon ben Gamaliel means to state, that a side and cross beam are not necessary according to the opinion of Beth Shammai, nor two side-beams according to the opinion of R. Eliezer, but one of the two, either a side or cross beam according to the opinion of Beth Hillel" (i.e., by saying that for such an entry nothing need be, provided, R. Simeon ben Gamaliel means to state, that nothing added by Beth Shammai or R. Eliezer need be provided). An entry of how much less than four ells in width? Said R. A'hlai, according to another version R. Ye'hiel: "An entry of less than four spans need have nothing (and from four spans up to four ells, the side or cross beam is necessary)."

Said R. Assi in the name of R. Johanan: "A courtyard must have two enclosures." Said R. Zera to R. Assi: "Did R. Johanan indeed say so. Didst thou not thyself state in the name of R. Johanan, that the enclosures of a courtyard must measure at least four ells? And if thou wouldst explain R. Johanan's dictum to signify, that the enclosures would have to be four ells on each side of the angle, did not R. Ada bar Abhimi state before R. Hanina or before R. Hanina bar Papa, that a small courtyard need only have enclosures to the extent of ten ells all around and a large courtyard to the extent of eleven ells." (Now, if eleven ells are divided by four, that would make each of the four enclosures only two and three-quarter ells?) When R. Zera came from his sea-voyage he explained this in the following manner: If an enclosure was made straight on one side it must be four ells wide, but if made at an angle in the corner it is sufficient if ever so small a part be on each side. As for Ada's bar Abhimi statement above, it is in accordance with the decree of Rabbi (and not R. Johanan), who holds in accordance with R. Jose (that every side-beam must be three spans wide), as will be seen further on.

R. Joseph said in the name of R. Jehudah, quoting Samuel: "A courtyard need have but one enclosure." Said Abayi to him: "Did Samuel indeed say this? We know that Samuel said to R. Hananiah bar Shila: 'Thou shalt not perform any work in a courtyard that has not the larger part of a wall or two enclosures!'" Said R. Joseph: "I do not know whether Samuel said so or not, but I do know, that it happened in the village of the shepherds, that an arm of the sea flowed into a courtyard, and when R. Jehudah was asked what the law was concerning that courtyard, he replied: 'Only one enclosure is necessary.' 'Then Abayi rejoined: "Thou speakest of an arm of the sea; that is altogether different! The sages were very lenient with all things pertaining to water, as R. Tabla asked Rabh: 'What is the law concerning a ruin that had one suspended partition? May things be carried within it on Sabbath or not?' and Rabh answered: 'A hanging partition legalizes a place only where water reaches, because the sages were very lenient with all things pertaining to water.'"

In any event this would be a contradiction to R. Jehudah's statement in the name of Samuel, and to Samuel's statement to Hananiah. When R. Papa and R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua carne from college, they explained Samuel's decree thus: "On one side the enclosure must be at least four ells, but when made on a corner, ever so small a part of the enclosures on each side of the angle is sufficient." (Thus both statements may be correct. R. Jehudah's one enclosure refers to a straight enclosure and Samuel's two refer to an enclosure at each corner.)

The Rabbis taught: From an arm of the sea, which enters a courtyard, water must not be taken on Sabbath unless a partition has been made at the entrance at least ten spans in height. This is the case if the breach in the wall (where the sea entered) is more than ten ells in width, but if it was only ten ells, no partition is necessary.

Thus, you say, that water must not be taken from the arm of the sea, but things may be carried within the courtyard? Did not the breach in the wall open into ground that would invalidate the courtyard (i.e., unclaimed ground)? In this case fragments of the wall were left beyond the breach and they were inundated by the sea (but were originally ten spans high).

It was taught: R. Jehudah said: "An open entry which is not suitable for the purpose of combining in an Erub, if it was provided with a side-beam, anyone throwing a thing into it from public ground is culpable, but if the entry was provided at one end with a cross-beam, one who throws a thing into it from public ground is not culpable." (R. Jehudah holds, that from a biblical point of view three partitions are necessary to enclose a private ground, and a side-beam at the end of an entry is equivalent to a partition.) Hence R. Jehudah holds, that a side-beam is equivalent to a partition, and a cross-beam is only put up for appearance's sake. So is also the opinion of Rabba; but Rabha said that both are erected only for appearance's sake.

R. Jacob bar Abba made an objection to Rabha based on the following Boraitha: "If one throw a thing into an entry he is culpable, if the entry is provided with a side-beam, but if it is not provided with a side-beam, he is not culpable." This is explained thus: If the entry (was a closed one and) needs only a side-beam (for appearance's sake) one is culpable if he throws a thing into it; but if a side-beam alone would not legalize the entry, and something more is necessary, the thrower is not culpable.

Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh: "An entry that was equal in length and width cannot be legalized by a side-beam of small proportions," and R. Hyya bar Ashi in the name of Rabh said, that an entry as wide as it is long cannot be legalized with a cross-beam measuring only one span. Said R. Zera: "How well the decisions of the old sages agree! The reason for the above decision is, that an entry of equal length and breadth is not regarded as an entry at all, but is in reality a courtyard, and a courtyard cannot be legalized by a side or cross beam but must have a partition of at least four ells." Said R. Zera again: "If there is a difficulty in this decision the following would be the difficulty: Why do they not consider a side-beam a partition of some extent, and thus make it a medium of legalization?" It evidently slipped the memory of R. Zera, that R. Assi said in the name of R. Johanan: "The enclosures of a court must not be less than four ells."

Said R. Na'hman.. "There is a tradition to the following effect: Which is the entry that can be legalized by a side or cross beam? One, the length of which exceeds its width, and houses and courts open into it. Which is the court that cannot be legalized with a side or cross beam, but must have an enclosure which is not less than four ells? One that is square." Only if it be square, but if round is it not a court? He means to state this: If the length exceeded the width, although it be a court, it should not be considered such but must be regarded as an entry, and as such may be legalized with a side or cross beam. If the length, however, did not exceed the width? Then, no matter what its appearance was, it must be considered as a court. By how much must the length exceed the width? Samuel intended to state, that the length should be double the width. Said Rabh to him: "So said my uncle, 'Even if the length exceeded the width by a trifle.'"

R. Aqiba said: "They differ in both."

What does R. Aqiba teach us hereby? Is it not the same as the teaching of the first Tana? The difference between them is as stated by R. A'hli, according to another version R. Yekhiel, viz.: An entry of less than four spans need have nothing. But they did not specify who was of R. A'hli's opinion and who was not.

We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Aqiba said: "R. Ishmael never made such a statement, but the disciple said this upon his own authority and the Halakha prevails according to the disciple." Is this not a contradictory assertion? First, he says, that R. Ishmael could not have made such a statement, i.e., that the Halakha is not so, and then that the Halakha prevails according to the disciple? Said R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel: "R. Aqiba said this only in order to encourage his disciples, that they may pronounce decrees upon their own authority." R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak said: "R. Aqiba really said that R. Ishmael made no such statement, but the decree of the disciple was correct and should stand."

It was taught: R. Jehoshua ben Levi said: "In every case, where it is stated that a disciple said in the name of R. Ishmael before R. Aqiba, that disciple is R. Meir, who was a disciple of both R. Ishmael and R. Aqiba."

R. A'ha bar Hanina said: It is known to Him, Who said one word and the world was created, that in the generation of R. Meir there was not one who was his equal; but why do not the Halakhas prevail according to his decisions? Because his colleagues could never arrive at the conclusion of his decrees. If he decided that a thing which was unclean was clean, he proved it to them by a reason, and vice versa. We have learned in a Boraitha, that his name was not Meir but Neherai. Why was he called Meir? Because he enlightened the eyes of his colleagues in Halakhas. Where the name R. Neherai is mentioned, it refers to R. Nehemiah or to R. Eliezer ben Arach. Why do they call them Neherai? Because they clarified the vision of their colleagues in the Law.

Rabbi (according to some it was Rabh) said: Why am I more sagacious than my colleagues? Because I once saw the back of R. Meir, and if I could look upon his face I would be more sagacious still, as it is written [Isaiah xxx. 20]: "But thy eyes shall see thy teachers."

Said R. Abbahu in the name of R. Johanan: "R. Meir had one disciple, and his name was Symniachos, who could give forty-eight reasons for the uncleanness of unclean things and the same number of reasons for the cleanness of clean things."

Said R. Abba in the name of Samuel: Three years the school of Shammai and the school of Hillel disputed. One school said that the Halakhas prevail according to their opinion, and the other claimed that their decrees should stand. Finally a heavenly voice was heard to the effect that both schools disputed as to the words of the living God, but the Halakhas prevail according to the school of Hillel.

Now if it be true that both schools dispute as to the words of the living God, why should the school of Hillel be thus favored? Because the members of the school of Hillel were modest and patient, and would always repeat the words of the school of Shammai. Not alone this; but they also always gave the school of Shammai precedence when citing their teachings, as we have learned (in Tract Sukkah): Said Beth Hillel to Beth Shammai: "Did it not happen, that the eldest of the school of Shammai and of the school of Hillel went together to visit R. Johanan the son of Hachoranis, etc. (whence we see that the eldest of the school of Shammai were given precedence over those of the school of Hillel)." Thence thou canst learn, that everyone who maketh himself humble is raised up by the Holy One, blessed be He, and one who is arrogant is humbled by the Holy One, blessed be He. He who pursueth greatness, the greatness escapeth him, and he who avoideth greatness is sought by greatness. He who forceth time (i.e., he who perforce would become rich though fortune be against him), time oppresseth him, while he, who awaiteth his time, is assisted by time.

The Rabbis taught: Two years and a half Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disputed amongst themselves. One school declared, it were better that man had not been created as he was, while the other declared it was better that man had been created as he was, than not to be created at all. Finally they came to the conclusion, that it were better had man not been created, but since that had happened, a man should always examine his actions, and according to another version, a man should always consider the deeds he is about to perform.

MISHNA: The cross-beam in question must be wide enough to hold a half of a brick, three spans in length and in width. It is, however, sufficient, if the cross-beam be only one span wide, so as to hold the half of a brick lengthwise. The crossbeam must be wide enough to hold a half of a brick and sound enough to bear it. R. Jehudah saith: It must be wide enough, even if it be not sound enough.

If the cross-beam be of straw or reed, it is (legally) regarded as if it were of metal; if it be crooked, it is (legally) regarded as straight; if it be cylindrical, it is (legally) regarded as square. Anything (measuring) three spans in circumference, is one hand width.

GEMARA: Why does the Mishna say, that it is sufficient if the cross-beam be only one span wide; it should be one and a half, which is the width of a half brick? Because if the crossbeam be one span wide the other half span which it should measure, can be added by the addition of a little loam on each side.

Said Rabba bar R. Huna: The cross-beam alone must be sound enough to bear a half brick, but the supports upon which it rests need not be sound enough to bear both the cross-beam and the half brick (i.e., if the cross-beam was put up on sticks, the sticks need not be sound enough to support both the crossbeam and a half brick; for the cross-beam being the sign of the entry, it is only essential that it be sound enough to support a half brick, although in reality it never serves the purpose, while the sticks are not part of the sign and need not be put to such a test). R. Hisda, however, states, that the cross-beam must be sound enough to bear half a brick, and its supports must be sound enough to bear both the cross-beam and the half brick.

R. Shesheth said: If one put up a cross-beam over an entry, and hung a mat upon it, and this mat was distant from the ground three spans or more, it is considered, that there is neither a cross-beam nor a partition at the entry; no cross-beam, because it is covered up, and no partition, because goats can go through it.

The Rabbis taught: If a cross-beam was put up over an entry, but did not reach the opposite wall, or if two cross-beams were put opposite each other, but did not meet, should the distance between the cross-beam and the wall in the first instance, or between the two cross-beams in the second instance, be three spans or over, another cross-beam must be erected. If it be less than three spans no other cross-beam is necessary. R. Simeon ben Gamaliel, however, said, "If the distance be less than four spans, another cross-beam is not necessary, but if it be four spans or more, another cross-beam must be erected."

The same is the case with two cross-beams that were laid parallel, neither one of which was sound enough to bear a half brick: If both together measured one span in width, which is sufficient to bear a half brick, another cross-beam is not necessary, but if the two together measured less, another cross-beam must be erected. R. Simeon ben Gamaliel, however, said, that if the two cross-beams were sound enough for the length of three spans to bear a half brick, another cross-beam is not necessary; otherwise, it is necessary.

"If two cross-beams were put up across an entry, one of which was higher than the other, they are regarded as being on a level, provided the higher beam is not over twenty ells above ground and the lower one not less than ten spans above ground." Thus said R. Jose bar R. Jehudah. Said Abayi: "R. Jose bar R. Jehudah holds with his father in one instance only, that the two beams are regarded as being on a level, but he differs with him in the other, namely: that the higher beam must not be over twenty ells above the ground; for R. Jehudah declared in a previous Mishna, that even if it were over twenty ells in height, the entry is valid."

"R. Jehudah saith: It must be wide enough, even if it be not sound enough." R. Jehudah taught Hyya bar Rabh in the presence of Rabh: "It is sufficient, if the cross-beam be wide enough even if it be not sound enough." Said Rabh to him: "Teach him: 'It should be wide and strong enough.'" Did not, however, R. Ilai say in the name of Rabh: "It is sufficient, if it was four spans wide, even if it be not sound enough"? Four spans' width makes a difference.

"If the cross-beam be of straw or reed," etc. What does the Mishna mean to teach us by this decree? That we regard certain things in a different light? This has already been taught us previously. In the former teachings, however, one certain kind of cross-beams was dealt with, namely, of wood; hence we might assume, that with straw or reed it might be different. For this reason we are given to understand that straw or reed may be regarded as metal.

"If it be crooked, it is regarded as straight." Is this not self-evident? The Mishna wishes to impart to us the teaching of R. Zera as follows: "If the cross-beam was crooked only outside of the entry across which it was laid, or was crooked above twenty ells from the ground; or again, if the cross-beam was ten spans above the ground and the crooked part of it below the ten spans, the validity of the entry depends upon whether, if the crooked part of the cross-beam were removed, the straight part left would be distant three spans from the wall. If the distance is less than three spans the entry is valid, but if it be over three spans another cross-beam must be erected." Is this teaching also not self-evident? Nay; it is necessary that we be instructed to this effect, lest we presume that the crooked part on the outside of the entry carry with it the straight part on the inside and thus the entry is invalidated; hence we are given to understand, that such is not the case.

"If it be cylindrical, it is regarded as square." For what purpose was it necessary to add this? This was taught us on account of the last clause in the Mishna, which states, that anything, measuring three spans in circumference is one hand in width.

MISHNA: The side-beams in question must be ten spans high, be their breadth and thickness whatever they may. R. Jose saith: "They must be three spans wide."

GEMARA: Shall we assume that the Mishna, which is rendered anonymously, is in accordance with the opinion of R. Eliezer, who holds that two side-beams are necessary? Nay; the side-beams in question refer to side-beams necessary for all entries. If this be the case, why did not the previous Mishna state cross-beams instead of "the cross-beam"? The above Mishna means to state, that the side-beams concerning which there is a difference of opinion between the sages and R. Eliezer should be ten spans high, be their breadth and thickness whatever it may. How much is meant by "whatever it may"? R. Hyya taught: Even the breadth and thickness of a thread of a Saraball."

A Boraitha states: "If one made a side-beam in one half of an entry, he has only a half of an entry." Is this not self-evident? We might presume that because one must not use the whole entry, hence the half must also not be used, and we are taught, that the half may be used.

Rabha said: "If one made a side-beam for an entry and it was three spans distant from the ground or three spans away from the wall, it does not count; and even according to R. Simeon ben Gamaliel who holds an object to be 'lavud' (attached) although four spans distant, the side-beam is of no use, because R. Simeon ben Gamaliel's opinion applies to an object which is four spans distant at the top; but at the bottom, where goats can pass through, a trifle less than three spans is the maximum distance."

"R. Jose saith: 'They must be three spans wide.'" Said R. Jehudah the son of R. Samuel bar Shila in the name of Rabh: "The Halakha does not prevail according to R. Jose either where brine is concerned or where a side-beam is in question." Said the schoolmen to him: "Dost thou confidently assert this?" and R. Jehudah answered: "Nay." Said Rabha: "By the Lord! He said this of a certainty, and we accepted it from him." Why then did he say "nay"? Because, we have learned elsewhere, that wherever R. Jose made an assertion, he always had good reason for it (and R. Jehudah did not wish to dispute with R. Jose).

Said Rabha bar R. Hana to Abayi: "According to whom, however, does the Halakha prevail concerning the side-beams?" He answered: "Go and observe the custom of the people" (which is as much as saying, that the breadth and thickness of a side-beam can be whatever it may).

It was taught: A side-beam, that was standing of itself, i.e., that had not been especially erected, is, according to Abayi, valid, and, according to Rabha, not valid. If the side-beam was not depended upon to serve the purpose on the preceding day (before Sabbath), all agree, that it is not valid; but if it was depended upon for that purpose, Abayi declares, that it may be utilized, because it was depended upon on the preceding day, while Rabha holds that not having been erected for that purpose it must not be used. As for a partition, standing of itself, there is no difference of opinion, and all agree that even if it was not intended to serve as a partition, it may be used, and the reason they differ in the case of a side-beam is because each holds to his own theory: Abayi regards a side-beam as a partition, and a partition may be utilized under any circumstances, while Rabha regards a side-beam merely as a sign, and as such it must be especially prepared for the purpose before it may be used.

An objection was made: "Come and hear: If stones protruded from the fence around an entry and they were less than three spans apart, another side-beam for the entry is not necessary; but if they were three spans apart, another side-beam must be erected." Here the case is also, if the stones were so arranged purposely to commence with. If such be the case, is this not self-evident? We might assume that the stones were arranged in that manner with the intention of adding more to them, hence we are given to understand that this may be done.

Another objection was made: Come and hear: Rabh was sitting in a certain entry and R. Huna was sitting before him. Said Rabh to his servant: "Go and bring me a pitcher of water." Before his servant returned, the side-beam at the entry fell, and Rabh motioned to his servant to remain where he was. Said R. Huna to him: "Did not Master hold, that the tree standing in the entry may be regarded as a side-beam?" and Rabh answered: "That scholar is as a man who never understood a Halakha. Did we depend upon that tree to serve as a side-beam yesterday?" Now, we see, that according to Rabh, had the tree been depended upon on the preceding day to serve as a side-beam, it would have been valid. Shall we assume, that Abayi and Rabha differ concerning a side-beam standing of itself even if it was not depended upon on the preceding day, but if depended upon, both agree that it may be used. Nay; we cannot say this; because there was a pillar in the house of Bar Habo concerning which Abayi and Rabha differed all of their lives. (This is one of the six Halakhas that prevail according to Abayi, for generally Rabha is given precedence, as will be seen in the maxims of the Talmud.)

MISHNA: Side-beams may be made out of anything, even of such as are possessed of life. The latter, however, is prohibited by R. Meir. A living animal tied to the mouth of a grave in order to close it up communicates uncleanness (even after it has been removed). R. Meir, however, declares the animal clean. A letter of divorce for a woman may be written on a living animal, but R. Jose, the Galilean, pronounces the letter of divorce null and void (not legal).

If a caravan encamp in a valley and a fence be made around the camp out of the cattle's gear, it is permitted to carry things inside of the fence (on Sabbath), providing the fence be ten spans high and the open spaces therein do not exceed in extent the fence proper. Every open space which is ten spans wide is permitted (to be used as an entry), for it is considered as a door, but such open spaces as are more than ten spans wide must not be used.

GEMARA: It was taught: If the open spaces of the fence equalled in extent the fence proper, R. Papa said: "The fence is valid." R. Huna bar R. Jehoshua however said, "It is not valid." R. Papa held it to be valid because so was Moses taught by the Merciful One: "The larger part (of a partition) must not be broken." R. Huna bar R. Jehoshua held it not to be valid because the Merciful One taught Moses thus: "The larger part must be fenced in."

An objection was made: Our Mishna states that "the open spaces must not exceed in extent the fence proper" but if the space was equal in extent to the fence it should be valid. This question remains.

Another objection was made. Come and hear: "If a caravan encamped in a valley and a fence was made with camels, with saddles, with the baggage, or with sticks, or with bundles of herbs, things may be carried inside the fence, providing the space between each camel does not exceed the size of another camel or the space between each saddle does not exceed the size of another saddle, etc." (Whence we see that if the space equals in extent the actual fence, the fence is not valid.) Here the case is, that the space between two camels should be large enough for a camel to go in and out, but not the exact size of a camel.

Another objection was made: "Walls of which the greater part consists of windows and doors are valid, providing the wall proper is larger in extent than the space." If, however, the space and walls are equal, the walls are not valid; this would be contradictory to R. Papa's opinion. It is contradictory, but the Halakha remains according to R. Papa. How can it be, that there should be a contradiction and still the Halakha should prevail according to R. Papa? It is possible, because our Mishna states, that the open space should not exceed the fence proper, hence if space and fence are equal, the fence is valid. Consequently the Halakha prevails according to R. Papa.

MISHNA: A fence may also be constructed with three ropes, one above the other; providing the space between each rope be less than three spans, and the measure (width or thickness) of the three ropes together exceed one span, so that the entire (fence) attain (the height of) ten spans.

A fence may also be made of cane-laths, providing the space between the canes be less than three spans. All these regulations apply to a caravan only. So saith R. Jehudah, but the sages maintain, that the caravan (in the preceding Mishna) is particularly spoken of in order to adduce therefrom that which is generally done. Any partition which is not constructed on the principle of warp and shoot is not a (lawful) partition. Such is the dictum of R. Jose bar Jehudah; but the sages hold, that constructing it according to either one of the two principles is sufficient.

GEMARA: Said R. Hamnuna in the name of Rabh: "It was said, that the solid part of the partition must exceed the space of the partition when constructed on the principle of the shoot in order to make it valid; the question, however, arises by me concerning a partition constructed on the principle of the warp. What is the law?" Said Abayi to him: "Come and hear: Our Mishna states, that the width or thickness of the three ropes together must exceed one span in order to make the entire fence ten spans. If it were the same with a fence constructed on the principle of the warp as with one constructed on the order of the shoot, why does the Mishna specify one which, including all the ropes, will bring the total up to ten spans." How can such an assertion be made? Where should the space of four spans be placed? Should it be placed at the bottom, i.e., between the ground and the first rope, then the space will be large enough to permit of goats passing through and the fence will be of no use. Should it be placed at the top, i.e., between the second and third rope, then the space between the two ropes, together with the space above the third rope, will nullify the third rope entirely, because the third rope will have no connection whatever with the two lower. Should it be placed in the center, i.e., between the first and second rope, then there will be only a quasi-solid partition at the bottom and the same at the top, but between the two there will be virtually an empty space of four spans; should it be assumed that such a partition can also be accounted lawful where the solid parts are disconnected, and an empty space exists between them? (This question is not decided.)

"Cane-laths." How can R. Jehudah say, that all these regulations apply to a caravan only, and not to individuals? Have we not learned elsewhere, that R. Jehudah said: "It is not allowed for an individual to construct a partition for the Sabbath around a piece of ground, wherein more than two saahs of grain could be planted." Hence if the piece of ground is only so large that two saahs of grain can be planted therein, he may make the partition. (How then can he say in the Mishna, that these regulations apply only to a caravan?) This can be explained in the same manner as R. Na'hman, and according to others R. Bibhi bar Abayi, explained the last clause of our Mishna, viz.: "Any partition, which is not constructed on the principle of warp and shoot, is not a (lawful) partition. Such is the dictum of R. Jose bar Jehudah." The question was made, whether such could be the dictum of R. Jose bar Jehudah. Did we not learn in a Boraitha, that "no difference is made as far as a fence constructed with ropes is concerned between a caravan and an individual except that the space enclosed by the fence must not for one man or even for two exceed that in which two saahs of grain could be planted. For three men, however, who are regarded as a caravan, a space in which six saahs of grain can be planted is allowed. So said R. Jose bar Jehudah; but the sages maintain, that there is absolutely no difference made between a caravan and an individual, and that they may enclose all the space they require, providing they do not enclose superfluous ground to the extent that two saahs of grain could be planted in such an empty space." How can R. Jose bar Jehudah state that a fence must be constructed according to the principles of warp and shoot; does he not allow a fence made with ropes, which is only on the principle of the warp? And R. Na'hman, according to others R. Bibhi bar Abayi, answered and said, that R. Jose bar Jehudah requires a partition to be constructed on both principles only in order to allow even an individual all the space necessary. Now, the same can be said in answer to the question made concerning the contradictory statements of R. Jehudah.

R. Na'hman related in the name of our master Samuel: "An individual or even two men are allowed to enclose as much space as would permit of the planting of two saahs of grain therein, but three men, who are regarded as a caravan, may have all the space necessary." How is this? The first part of this teaching is in accordance with R. Jose bar R. Jehudah, and the last according to the sages? Yea; Abbahu is also of the same opinion.

R. Gidel in the name of Rabh said: "There are instances when three men must not occupy space so large that five saahs of grain can be planted therein, and again, there are instances when they may occupy space in which even seven saahs of grain maybe planted." (The instances were not quoted, however.) "Is it possible that Rabh should have said this?" queried the sages, and R. Gidel answered: "I swear by the Law of Moses and by the prophets, and by the Hagiographa, that Rabh said this." Said R. Ashi: "What difficulty is there in this? Let us suppose, that the three men needed a space of six saahs' capacity, and enclosed one so large, that seven saahs could be accommodated. (Then only a space is empty where one saah of grain could be planted.) Hence they may use the entire space. But supposing, that they needed only a space large enough to accommodate but five saahs of grain, and enclosed one large enough for seven, (then a space large enough for the planting of two saahs is vacant) and they must not use even the space large enough for five saahs." Did not the same Boraitha teach us, however, that a space large enough for the planting of two saahs must not be vacant, and thereby meant to state, that each man should be allowed a space large enough for two saahs, and then if a space for two saahs is vacant the entire space must not be used; hence, when there are three men, they should not be allowed the use of a space large enough for the planting of eight saahs, but one accommodating only seven should be allowed them? Nay; the Boraitha meant to state, that the space allowed to the men should be only as much as they need for the accommodation of all their belongings.

"But the sages hold that constructing it according to either one of the two principles is sufficient." Is this not a repetition of what the first Tana stated in opposition to R. Jose's bar R. Jehudah dictum? There is a difference of opinion concerning an individual between the first and second sages as regards an inhabited place (and not the desert).. According to the first sages who maintain that the regulations apply not only to a caravan but to all individuals in general, this refers to individuals who are on the road, but when in inhabited places the regulations do not apply to them, while the second sages who oppose R. Jose bar Jehudah hold, that it makes absolutely no difference, be it caravan or an individual, in an inhabited place or in the desert.

MISHNA: Four privileges have been granted to warriors in camp: They may bring wood from any place (without respecting the rights of ownership); they need not wash their hands before meals; they may eat of Damai (grain of which it is not certain that the legal dues, tithes, etc., have been set aside); and they are exempt from the obligation of making an Erub.

GEMARA: The rabbis taught: If an ordinary war is in progress, it is permitted for the warriors to appropriate dry wood without respecting the rights of ownership. R. Jehudah ben Thima said: "They may also encamp wherever they choose, and wherever one is killed there may he also be buried, although the ground does not belong to him."

"They are permitted to appropriate dry wood." This has also been ordained even by Joshua! Joshua ordained, that wood may be cut and appropriated by the warriors, but later even cut and dry wood was allowed to be taken.

"Where one is killed, there may he also be buried." Is this not self-evident? The killed were strangers and had no one to secure a burying ground for them. The law also states, that whenever a man dies without leaving sufficient means for the acquirement of a place of burial, he may be interred in the place where he dies. This case refers to warriors who even left sufficient means to secure a burying ground.

"They need not wash their hands before meals." Said Abayi: "This refers only to washing the hands before meals, but after meals it is even then necessary, because R. Hyya bar Ashi said: 'Why did the sages ordain the washing of hands after meals? Because among the salt used at the table there may be salt of Sodom, and when a hand which had touched salt of Sodom comes in contact with the eyes it blinds them.' There is only one grain of salt of Sodom in a whole kur of ordinary salt," said Abayi.

Said R. A'ha the son of Rabba to R. Ashi: "How is the law, concerning one who had measured salt?" and he answered: "So much the more must he wash his hands."

"They may eat of Damai." As we have learned in another Mishna: "Beth Hillel said, that a poor man and a warrior may partake of Damai."

"They are exempt from the obligation of making an Erub." The disciples of R. Janai said: They are exempt from the obligation of making an Erub as far as courts and entries are concerned, but not where the limit of the distance of two thousand ells (techoom) is concerned, because R. Hyya taught: "One who is guilty of transgressing the law of techoom should be punished with stripes as for any other biblical negative commandment." R. Jonathan opposed this: "Can a man be punished with stripes for a negative commandment which commences with the word Al?" This was again opposed by R. A'ha bar Jacob: "According to thy theory then the man who transgresses the commandment in [Leviticus xix. 31], 'Turn not unto them that have familiar spirits and unto wizards' (which also commences with 'Al'), should also not be punished with stripes?" R. Jonathan puts his question in the following sense: The violation of a commandment which involves the death penalty when committed intentionally cannot be punished with stripes at all, and the violation of the Sabbath is certainly a capital offence (how then can R. Hyya hold that it can be punished with stripes?). Answered R. Ashi: It is written [Exod. xvi. 29], "Let no man go out of his place on the seventh day," but it does not state, that a man should not carry things on that day. (Consequently the transgressing of the law of techoom is not a capital offence, and is on a par with all other negative commandments.)

MISHNA: Enclosures (partitions) must be made around wells. They must be made of four boards, placed at an angle (of forty-five degrees) at the corners of the well, so that the four boards appear like eight (see illustration). Such is the dictum of R. Jehudah; but R. Meir saith: Eight boards must be used which will appear as twelve, namely, four boards placed at an angle at the corners which appear as eight, and four boards placed between the corner boards. The height of the boards must be ten spans, the width six spans, and the thickness whatever it may be. The space between the two corner boards on the same side must not be wider than to permit of the passing through of two teams of cattle, each team of three animals abreast. Such is the decree of R. Meir. R. Jehudah, however, maintains, that each team may be of four animals abreast, meaning of cattle yoked together in a team, but not walking unyoked, so that one enters as the other passes out.

It is permitted to bring the enclosure quite close to the well, providing, that the head and greater part of the body of the animal be within the enclosure while it drinks. It may also be placed at some distance from the well, providing that more boards be used.

R. Jehudah said: The maximum distance from the well at which the enclosure may be placed is a space large enough for the planting of two saah of grain, but the sages said to him: "This size (sufficient for the planting of two saah of grain) is only applicable to a garden or a wood-shed, but as regards a cattle-pen, a fold, a bleaching-ground (behind the house), or a courtyard (in front of the house), even though it be large enough to permit of the planting of five kur of grain therein, yea, or even of ten kur, it is lawful (to carry things therein on the Sabbath)." It is also permitted to place the enclosure at any convenient distance from the well, provided more boards be used.

GEMARA: Shall we assume, that our Mishna is not according to Hananiah, as we have learned in a Boraitha, viz.: "Boards may be put up at a well and ropes for a fence of a caravan, but Hananiah said, that ropes for a well are permitted but not boards"? Nay; we may say, that our Mishna agrees with Hananiah; but a well containing rain-water is one thing and one containing spring-water is another. Our Mishna treats of spring-water and Hananiah refers to rain-water. To make an enclosure around a well of rain-water is permitted only during the time of the pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

"R. Jehudah said: The maximum distance," etc. We have learned in a Mishna (Damai i. I): R. Jehudah also said: "All bad (inferior) dates are not suspected of being Damai, with the exception of the fruit known as double-fruit (δι-ωπορα)." Said Ula: The tree bearing this fruit bears twice a year (and the ignorant people might object to acquit the legal dues thereof).

R. Jeremiah ben Elazar said: Adam the first (man) had a dual face, as it is written [Psalms cxxxix. 5]: "Behind and before hast thou hedged me in, and thou placest upon me thy hand."

It is written [Genesis ii. 22]: "And the Lord God formed the rib which he had taken from the man into a woman." Rabh and Samuel both comment upon this. One declares, that the Lord simply divided Adam, who had a dual head, while the other holds, that Adam had a tail and the Lord made the woman out of that tail. So according to the one the passage "Behind and before," etc., is correct, but, according to the other, how should it be explained? It may be explained as R. Ami said: "By 'behind' is meant that last of (behind) all was man created, and by 'before,' that before (first of) all others did he receive his punishment." The first part of this explanation is correct because man was created last of all on the eve of Sabbath, but the second part is not true; for was not the serpent cursed before Eve, and Eve before Adam? The punishment refers to the flood, concerning which it is written [Genesis vii. 23]: "And it swept off every living substance which was upon the face of the ground, both man, and cattle, etc.," and man is mentioned before all else. Further, it is written, that the Lord brought Eve to Adam, i.e., that the Lord was sponsor to them. Whence we learn, that a man, be he ever so great, should not refuse to be sponsor to a lesser man.

R. Meir said: Adam the First was very pious, for when he saw, that on his account the human race was made mortal, he fasted one hundred and thirty years, separated himself from woman, and wore leaves of a fig-tree on his body for the same length of time.

R. Jeremiah ben Elazar said: If a man is to be praised to his face only a small part of the praise due him should be given him, but his entire share may be bestowed upon him in his absence, as it is written [Genesis vii. 1]: "For thee I have seen righteous before me in this generation," and [ibid. vi. 9]: "Noah was a just, perfect man in his generations." Thus we see that to his face the Lord merely called Noah righteous, whereas in his absence the verse called him "a just, perfect man."

The same said again: A house, where the words of the Law are also heard at night, shall never more be destroyed, as it is written [Job xxxv. 10]: "But man saith not, 'Where is God my maker, who bestoweth joyful songs even in the night,'" and the verse is explained thus: If man would have sung joyful songs even in the night, he would not have been compelled to ask: "Where is God my maker?"

The same said again: Since the destruction of the temple it is sufficient for man to use only two letters in place of the four forming the name of the Lord (i.e., Yod and Heh instead of Yod, Heh, Vav, and Heh), as it is written [Psalms cl. 6]: "Let everything that hath breath praise Jah (the Lord). Hallelujah."

He said again: When Babylon was cursed, it was a curse to the neighbors also; but when Samaria was cursed, the neighbors rejoiced. Speaking of Babylon, it is written [Isaiah xiv. 23]: "I will also make it a possession for the hedgehog and pools of water," and speaking of Samaria, it is written [Micah i. 6]: "Therefore will I change Samaria into stone-heaps on the field, into vineyard plantations."

He said again: Come and see how the custom of the Holy One, blessed be He, differs from that of mortal man: When a man is about to be executed, a gag is placed in his mouth in order that he may not curse the king; but if a man transgresses against the Lord, the man is silenced, as it is written [Psalms lxv. 2]: "For thee praise is waiting, O God, in Zion." Not only is the man who transgresses against the Lord silent (waiting) but he also praises him, and the punishment given man for the transgression is regarded by him as a sacrifice unto the Lord, as it is written, "and unto thee shall vows be paid" [ibid.].

This is similar to the saying of R. Jehoshua ben Levi as follows: It is written [Psalms lxxxiv. 7]: "Passing through the valley of weeping, they will change it into a spring; also the early rain covereth it with blessings." "Passing" refers to the man who has trespassed against the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, "the valley" refers to hell which is made deeper, "weeping" signifies that they are weeping and shedding tears equal to the spring of Shitin, and "the early rain covereth it with blessings" denotes that the trespassers themselves bless the Lord, saying: "Creator of the Universe, Thou hast judged rightly, finding the righteous just and the wicked full of iniquity, (and blessed be Thou) that Thou hast ordained hell for the wicked and paradise for the righteous."

Is this statement not contradictory to the saying of Resh Lakish to the effect that the fires of hell cannot gain access to the bodies of the sinners in Israel, which is derived from the a fortiori conclusion that inasmuch as the gold which was only of the thickness of one golden dinar covering the ark of the covenant, was not touched by the perpetual light, although but one commandment was being fulfilled, so much more will the sinner in Israel who has fufilled as many commandments as a pomegranate has seeds escape the fires of hell (as it is written [Solomon's Song vi]: "Like the half of the pomegranate is the upper part of thy cheek," etc. And Resh Lakish said: Do not read "the upper part of thy cheek," but read "thy vain, wicked men"). Nay; even Resh Lakish admits that the sinners descend into hell; but our father Abraham, seeing that they are circumcised, rescues them.

R. Jeremiah ben Elazar said again. "Hell has three gates: One in the desert, one in the sea, and one in Jerusalem." "In the desert," as it is written [Numbers xvi. 33]: "And they went down, they, and all they that appertained to them, alive into the pit (Sheol-Gehenna)." "In the sea," as it is written [Jonah ii. 3]: "Out of the depth of the grave have I cried, and thou hast heard my voice." "And one in Jerusalem," as it is written [Isaiah xxxi. 9]: "Who hath a fire in Zion, and a furnace in Jerusalem." And the disciples of R. Ishmael taught, that by a fire in Zion is meant Gehenna, and by the furnace in Jerusalem is meant the gate of Gehenna.

R. Jehoshua, ben Levi said, that hell has seven names, viz.: Sheol, Abadon, Baar Shachath, Bor Sheon, Tit Hayavon, Tzalmoveth, and Eretz Hathachthith.

Where is the gate of Paradise? Said Resh Lakish: "If the gate of Paradise is in the land of Israel it is in the city of Beth Sheon. If it is in Araby it is in the city of Beth Gerem, and if it is between the rivers it is in Damaskanun."

In Babylon, Abayi would praise the fruit growing on the other side of the Euphrates and Rabha would praise the fruit of the city of Harphania (so it may be that the gate of Paradise is situated in one of these two places).

"Cattle yoked together in a team, but not walking unyoked." Why does the Mishna say "yoked together but not unyoked"? It is self-evident, that if they must be yoked they cannot be unyoked? We might assume, that if it said only "yoked together" we might think that apparently yoked would be sufficient, so it is repeated in order to make it more emphatic.

"So that one enters as the other passes out." That means, that one team can enter while another passes out. This was taught in a Boraitha.

The Rabbis taught: How much (in size) must the larger part of a cow be reckoned? Two ells. What is the breadth of a cow? One and two-thirds of an ell. Thus six cows abreast will measure about ten ells. So said R. Meir, but R. Jehudah said: "About thirteen or fourteen ells." Why does R. Meir say "about ten ells"? It is exactly ten ells? Because he must teach later "about thirteen ells," so he also approximates it in this case, and says "about ten ells." Now, why does R. Jehudah say "about thirteen ells"? According to his opinion it should be more? Because he wishes to say "about fourteen" he generalizes it and says "about thirteen or fourteen." How can he say about fourteen? It is less than fourteen? Said R. Papa: "He means to say more than thirteen and less than fourteen" (i.e., the measure of two teams of four cows each abreast is more than thirteen and less than fourteen ells),

R. Papa said: For a well that measures not more than eight ells in circumference, all agree, that no centre-boards are necessary. For a well of twelve ells in circumference, all agree that they are necessary. Where they differ is concerning a well that is between eight and twelve ells in circumference. According to R. Meir centre-boards are necessary, and according to R. Jehudah they are not. What would R. Papa inform us? We have learned this in our Mishna; for R. Jehudah says two teams of four animals each and R. Meir two teams of three each, so the difference is the size of two animals but not the size of one. R. Papa did not know of the Boraitha stating the size of a cow, so he came to teach us the measure.

Abayi asked Rabba: "What is the law if a man make the enclosures wider; must, according to R. Meir, centre-boards be put up nevertheless or not?" and Rabba answered: "This was taught us in the Mishna, 'providing that more boards be used.' Can we not assume that centre-boards are necessary?" Rejoined Abayi: "Nay! it may mean that the corner-boards should be increased in length." It seems to us that the opinion of the latter is the intention of the Mishna. This decides the argument.

Abayi asked Rabba again: "What is the law according to R. Jehudah if the space between the corner-boards on the same side exceeded thirteen and one-third ells? What should a man do then? Should he increase the length of the corner-boards or put up centre-boards?" Answered Rabba: This was taught us in a Boraitha as follows: What is meant by "they are near each other"? If they are only apart a space as large as the greater part of a cow. What would be called "they are far away from each other"? If the space between them is so large that a kur or even two kurs of grain can be planted therein. R. Jehudah, however, said, that only a space large enough to permit of the planting of two saahs of grain is permitted, but no more. The sages said to R. Jehudah: "Dost thou not admit that a cattle-pen or a fold, a bleaching-ground or a courtyard, even though they be large enough to accommodate five or even ten kurs of grain, are permitted?" R. Jehudah answered: "Here the case is different; for here we have partitions, while in the case of a well we have only enclosures." Now, if the length of the corner-boards should be increased, then R. Jehudah would say that the boards around a well also constitute a partition. Rejoined Abayi: Around a cattle-pen or a fold, a bleaching-ground or a courtyard, according to R. Jehudah, the law of a partition is applied and that must not contain a space larger than ten ells, and it matters not whether that space have a capacity large enough to permit of planting one or five kur of grain; but the space between the corner-boards was fixed at thirteen and one-third ells because the law of enclosures is applied, hence it should not have a capacity larger than would permit of the planting of two saahs of grain, even if the length of the boards be increased.

Abayi asked Rabba again: "Can a sandheap four ells wide and sloping up to a height of ten spans take the place of the corner-boards at a well?" Answered Rabba: "This is taught in a Tosephta: 'R. Simeon ben Elazar said: If there was a square rock standing at the corner of a well, which if divided would form an angle, each side of which would be one ell, it may take the place of corner-boards, otherwise it cannot.'" R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan ben Berokah said: "Even if the rock was round and when made square and divided would form an angle each side of which would be one ell, it may also take the place of the corner-boards." On what point do they differ? According to the former Tana there is only one supposition allowed regarding the rock, whereas according to the latter, even two suppositions concerning the rock are permitted.

He asked him again: "May a bush take the place of corner-boards?" and Rabba answered: "We have learned this in a Boraitha: If there was a fence, a tree, or a number of cane-laths on the spot, they may serve as corner-boards." What is meant by cane-laths? In all probability a bush. Nay; we might assume, that they were really cane-laths and less than three spans apart? Then, by application of the law of "lavud" it would be a fence, and the Boraitha mentions a fence in the first place; why should the repetition be made? If it is a bush, it is the same as a tree; why the repetition in this instance? It might be said, then, that two kinds of a tree are mentioned; why should not two kinds of fences be mentioned?

Abayi asked him again: May things be carried from a courtyard opening into the enclosure around a well and vice versa? Rabba answered: "They may." "How is it if there were two adjoining courtyards opening into the enclosure?" "Then one must not carry from the courtyards into the enclosure." Said R. Huna: "If there were two courtyards, even an Erub will not make it lawful to carry things from the courtyards into the enclosure as a precaution, lest it be said, that the law of Erub applies also to enclosures." Rabha, however, said: "If an Erub was made, it is lawful." Said Abayi: "I know of a Boraitha, which supporteth thy opinion, viz.: If a courtyard opened into an enclosure around a well, things may be carried to and from the courtyard and the enclosure, but if two courtyards opened into the enclosure, this is not allowed, provided an Erub was not made. If an Erub was made, it is lawful."

Abayi asked Rabba again: "What is the law concerning the enclosures of a well which had gone dry on Sabbath?" and he answered: "Were not the enclosures made merely for the sake of the water? If the water gave out, the enclosures are void." Now asked Rabin of Abayi: "What is the law if the well went dry on the Sabbath and was filled again on the same day?" Answered Abayi: Concerning the law of a well that had gone dry I asked Master and he told me that the enclosures were void; hence if the well filled up again on the same day the enclosure must be regarded as one constructed on the Sabbath and it was decided that [in Tract Sabbath, page 200] a partition constructed on the Sabbath is valid.

R. Elazar said: "If one throw something (from public ground) within the enclosures around a well, he is culpable." Is this not self-evident? If the enclosures were not regarded as a partition, how would it be allowed to draw water from the well on Sabbath? R. Elazar means to tell us, that if such enclosures were erected in public ground without having a well, it also makes one culpable to throw a thing within the enclosures. Is this not self-evident? If such enclosures were not regarded as a partition elsewhere, how could they be thus considered when erected around a well? He lets us know, that even if the space surrounded by the enclosures is used as a public thoroughfare, it is nevertheless regarded as private ground. Then he means to tell us, that the public who pass through the enclosures do not nullify the validity of the enclosures? This we have also been taught [in Tract Sabbath, page 10]. The ordinance there is derived from his dictum above.

"It is permitted to place the enclosures quite close to the well." We have learned in a Mishna [Sabbath, xi.]: A man must not, standing in private ground, drink in public ground, nor, standing in public ground, drink in private ground, unless he place his head and the greater part of his body within the place in which he drinks. Such is likewise the law regarding a vine-press. Shall we assume, that it is sufficient for a man to have his head and the greater part of his body in the place in which he drinks, but does this also apply to cattle or not? If the man hold the vessel from which the cattle drink and holds also the cattle (so that they cannot turn around), there is no question but that it is sufficient if they have their heads and the larger part of their bodies within the enclosures; but if the man hold the vessel only, and not the cattle, what is the law? Replied one of the schoolmen to the questioner: We have learned this in our Mishna, viz. "Providing the head and the greater part of the body of the animal be within the enclosure while it drinks." Must we not assume, that in this case the man holds only the vessel and not the animal? Nay; he holds both the vessel and the animal and the law seems to apply to the latter instances; for had he not held the animal also, how could this be allowed? Did we not learn in a Boraitha: A man must not fill a vessel with water to give to his cattle, but he may fill up the vessel and let his cattle drink of their own accord. (This was taught concerning the enclosures around the well.) Now, then, if we should say, that this Boraitha applies to a man who holds both the vessel and the cattle, why should he not water the cattle out of the vessel? We must therefore assume, that he did not hold the cattle, and consequently it is obvious that one must hold both the vessel and the cattle.

Have we not learned, that Abayi explains the mentioned Boraitha as follows: The case was, where a crib, ten spans high and four spans wide (forming in itself a private ground), and opening into the enclosures surrounding the well, stood in public ground and the animal stood in private ground? The Boraitha ordains, that the man should not fill a vessel with water and carry it to the animal, but pour it into the crib, i.e., he should not lift the vessel with water over the crib and carry it through public ground to the animal, lest he notice that the crib is broken and he will carry the crib into the place where the animal stands to mend it, thus carrying a thing from public into private ground?

Even if he did so, can the man be held culpable? Did not R. Saphra say, in the name of R. Ami, quoting R. Johanan: "If one moved a certain thing from one corner into another in private ground and then carried it into public ground, he is not culpable, because his original intention was not to carry it into public ground?" Abayi means to state, that the man might mend the crib where it was standing and then carry it into private ground.

Come and hear (another objection): "A camel, whose head and greater part of the body was within the enclosures around a well, may be crammed." Now, in such a case, the man certainly holds the animal and the vessel, and still it is necessary that the head and larger part of the body of the animal be within the enclosures? Said R. A'ha bar R. Huna in the name of R. Shesheth: "With a camel it is different; the neck of a camel being very long, if the camel turned its head around it would be in public ground."

We have learned also in a Boraitha, that R. Eliezer also prohibits this to be done with a camel, because its neck is very long.

R. Itz'hak bar Ada said: "The enclosures around wells are not permitted to be used by any but the pilgrims while going to Jerusalem for the festivals." Did we not learn in a Boraitha that the enclosures are allowed only for cattle? By cattle is meant the cattle of the pilgrims, but what should a man who wishes to drink do? He should hold on to the walls of the well and drink there. [This is not so! Did not R. Itz'hak in the name of R. Jehudah quoting Samuel say, that the enclosures are permitted to be made only around wells containing spring-water but not rain-water? If the wells were only allowed for cattle, why should this distinction be made? The water must be fit for human use also (because the enclosures are erected for the sake of the water, the latter should be good water).] If the walls of the well were very wide and a man could not climb over them, he may draw water from the well and drink it.

R. Jeremiah bar Abba said in the name of Rabh: The laws of a road that had huts built on it at seventy ells apart and of enclosures around wells do not hold good in Babylon or anywhere outside of Palestine. The first law does not apply to Babylon on account of the frequent floods and to other lands on account of thieves who would steal the huts, and the second law does not apply to Babylon because of the abundance of water and to other lands because there are no colleges of learning.

Said R. Hisda to Mari the son of R. Huna the son of Jeremiah bar Abba: "I have heard, that ye, men of Barnash, go to the synagogue of Daniel on the Sabbath, a distance of three miles. Upon what grounds do ye do this? Do ye depend upon the law of huts? Was it not said by thy grandfather in the name of Rabh, that this law does not apply to Babylon?" R. Hisda was shown by Mari demolished buildings scattered over the entire road, at about seventy ells apart, which at one time formed part of the city itself.

Said R. Hisda: Mari bar Mar related: It is written [Jeremiah xxiv. 1]: "The Lord caused me to see, and, behold, there were two baskets of figs placed before the temple of the Lord," etc., and [ibid. 2]: "The one basket had very good figs, like the figs that are first ripe; and the other basket had very bad figs, which could not be eaten, from being so bad." The good figs represent the strictly righteous and the bad figs the grossly wicked, but if you mean to say, that for the grossly wicked there is no more hope, therefore it is written [Solomon's Song vii. 14]:

The mandrakes give forth their smell."

Rabha preached: "By the passage 'The mandrakes give forth their smell' is meant the young men of Israel who have not yet tasted of the fruit of sin, and by 'at our doors are all manners of precious fruits' is meant the virgins of Israel who are modest before their marriage, and by the passage 'new and also old, O my friend! these have I laid up for thee' is meant what the congregation of Israel said to the Holy One, blessed be He, namely: 'Creator of the Universe! Even more than thou hast ordained for us, have we ordained for ourselves and have faithfully observed.'"

Said R. Hisda to one of the scholars who read legendary matter before him: "Hast thou not heard what is meant by new and also old' (in the passage quoted)?" He answered: "'The old' refers to biblical ordinances and the 'new' to rabbinical."

Rabha preached: "It is written [Ecclesiastes xii. 12]: 'But more than all these, my son, take warning for thyself: the making of many books would have no end; and much preaching is a weariness of the flesh.' This means: 'My son, be careful in the observance of the rabbinical commandments (even more than in the biblical); for while the biblical commandments are for the most part positive and negative (i.e., not always involving the death-penalty if violated), the rabbinical commandments, if infracted, would involve capital punishment. Lest one might say, that if such be the case, why were not the rabbinical commandments written down, the answer is provided, 'The making of many books would have no end.' The end of the passage 'Much preaching is a weariness of the flesh,' signifies, that one who devotes much thought and reflection to the rabbinical commandments, acquires a taste as if he had eaten an excess of meat."

The Rabbis taught: It happened that when R. Aqiba was in prison R. Jehoshua of Garsi served him every day. Water was given R. Aqiba in a measure. One day the warden of the prison said to R. Jehoshua: "To-day thy measure of water is too large. Perhaps it is thy intention to undermine the prison." So he poured out half the water and returned the remainder. When R. Jehoshua came to R. Aqiba the latter said to him: "Dost thou not know, that I am an old man and that my life is dependent upon thee?" R. Jehoshua then related what had happened. Said R. Aqiba: "Give me the water and I will wash my hands prior to eating," and he answered: "There is hardly enough water to drink, and thou wouldst use it to wash thy hands?" Rejoined R. Aqiba: "What can I do? I must follow the rabbinical commandment, which if violated would involve capital punishment. It were better for me that I die of hunger, than to act contrary to the opinion of my colleagues." And it was said that R. Aqiba would not taste anything until water was brought to him to wash his hands. When the sages heard of this, they said: If he was so careful in his old age how was he in his youth, and if he was so particular in prison how was he when at liberty!

R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: In the time that Solomon the king ordained the law of Erubin and that of washing the hands (before meals) a heavenly voice was heard, which said [Proverbs xxiii. 15]: "My son, if thy heart be wise, my heart shall rejoice, even mine," and [ibid. xxvii. ii]: "Become wise, my son, and cause my heart to rejoice, that I may give an answer to him that reproacheth me."

Rabha preached again: It is written [Solomon's Song vii. 12-13]: "Come, my friend! let us go forth into the field; let us spend the night in the villages; let us get up early to the vineyards; let us see if the vine have blossomed, whether the young grape have opened to the view, whether the pomegranates have budded: there will I give my caresses unto thee." "Come, my friend! let us go into the field." Thus said the community of Israel before the Holy One, blessed be He: "Creator of the Universe! judge us not by the inhabitants of the large cities; for there is robbery, rapine, false-swearing, and swearing in vain among them. Come into the field and we will show Thee many scholars who study the Law although they are in poor circumstances." "Let us spend the night in the villages." This means: Come with us and we will show Thee so many, to whom Thou hast shown so much mercy and still they deny Thee. "Let us go up early into the vineyards," refers to the synagogues and the houses of learning. "Let us see if the vine have blossomed," refers to those who study the Holy Writ. "Whether the young grape have opened to the view," refers to those who study the Mishna. "Whether the pomegranates have budded," refers to those who study the Gemara. "There will I give my caresses unto thee," signifies: We will show Thee our children who honor and revere us by studying the Law and walking in Thy ways.

Said R. Hamnuna: It is written [I Kings v. 12]: "And he spoke three thousand proverbs and his songs were a thousand and five." From this it is inferred, that Solomon said three thousand proverbs for every one of the biblical commandments and gave one thousand and five reasons for each of the rabbinical commandments.

Rabha preached: It is written [Ecclesiastes xii. 9]: "And in addition to this that Koheleth was wise, he continually also taught the people knowledge, and he probed, and searched out, and composed many proverbs." "He continually also taught the people knowledge" signifies, that he supplied the Holy Writ with the Massoretic text and explained the different passages with parables and proverbs. "And composed many proverbs." Ula said in the name of R. Eliezer, that prior to the time of Solomon the Scriptures were like a basket without handles, that could not be grasped, and when Solomon came, he provided the Holy Writ with all the precautionary measures necessary for its preservation.

R. Hisda said in the name of Mar Uqba: "It is written: 'His head is bright as the finest gold, his locks are like waving foliage, and black as a raven.'" (Locks are expressed by the Hebrew word "Taltalim," also meaning heaps.) The inference can be made from this passage, that upon every letter contained in the Scriptures a heap of ordinances can be based, and further, that the one wishing to find all the beauties contained in the Holy Writ must devote himself to its study until he becomes black as a raven." Rabha said not "until he becomes black as a raven," but until he becomes as hard-hearted towards his family as a raven is towards its young.

As it happened that R. Ada bar Mattna wished to go and seclude himself in the house of learning and his wife said to him: "What shall I do with thy little ones?" and he answered: "There are still herbs in the field."

It is written [Deuteronomy vii. 10]: "And repayeth those that hate him to their face, to destroy them. He will not delay, to him that hateth him he will repay him to his face." Said R. Jehoshua ben Levi: "Were it not for this passage, it would be impossible to make such an assertion; for this is like a mortal who would rid himself of a burden which had become too heavy to carry." The last part of the passage implies, that while punishment is not delayed to the wicked, the reward to the strictly righteous is delayed. So said R. Aila and it is similar to the dictum of R. Jehoshua ben Levi: "It is written [ibid. ii.]: 'The ordinances which I command thee this day, to do them,'" and signifies, that the commandments are to be fulfilled this day, but the reward for so doing is put off for a future day, i.e., will be given in the world to come."

"R. Jehudah said: 'The maximum distance,'" etc. The schoolmen propounded a question: Does R. Jehudah mean to exclude the space occupied by the well in the maximum distance or does it refer to the enclosures plus the space between the enclosures and the well? Come and hear: We have learned: What is meant by "the enclosure may be quite close to the well"? That the head and greater part of the body of the animal be within the enclosures, and what is meant by "it may be placed at some distance from the well"? That the space between the well and the enclosure may be of sufficient size to permit of the planting of one or even two kurs of grain therein. R. Jehudah, however, says, that it may be only of two saahs' capacity, but not more. The sages said to him: Wilt thou not grant us that as regards a cattle-pen, fold, bleaching-ground, or a courtyard, a capacity of five or even ten kur is permissible? He answered them: "Yea; but in the latter cases we have a partition whereas in the case of a well there are only enclosures." R. Simeon ben Elazar, however, said, that in the case of a well, the square of a space sufficient for the planting of two saahs of grain is allowed, and by "it (the enclosure) may be placed at some distance from the well" is meant such a square plus the two ells necessary for the accommodation of the head and larger part of the body of the animal. Now, then, if R. Simeon ben Elazar means to permit the two ells in addition to the square space permitted, it is evident, that R. Jehudah, who differs with him, means to include them in that space.

Nay; this is not so, after all! R. Jehudah also means to allow the two ells in addition to the permitted space, but he differs with R. Simeon ben Elazar in the measurement of the space. The latter holds, that the space should be square, i.e., if it be one hundred ells long it must be one hundred ells wide, whereas according to R. Jehudah it may be one hundred ells long and only fifty ells wide (for such was the measure of the court of the tabernacle). [The end of the Boraitha is.] A rule was laid down by R. Simeon ben Elazar: Every space used for a dwelling of any description, e.g.., a pen, a fold, a bleaching-ground, or a courtyard, may be of a size large enough to permit even of the planting of ten kurs of grain therein; but a roofed dwelling such as the huts in a field must not exceed two saahs' capacity.

MISHNA: R. Jehudah said: If a public thoroughfare passes through the enclosure, it must be closed up with boards at the sides facing the thoroughfare; but the sages hold, that it is not necessary.

GEMARA: Said R. Itz'hak bar Joseph in the name of R. Johanan: "There is no such a thing as public ground in Palestine. " R. Dimi sitting in his college repeated this Halakha. Said Abayi to him: "What is the reason of this assertion? Shall I assume, that it is because the rocks of the mount Tyre surround Palestine on one side and a canal on another side? Does not the river Euphrates on the one side and the river Diglat on the other side surround Babylon and in like manner the ocean surrounds the world, then there should be no public ground at all. Perhaps R. Johanan meant to say, that the path ascending the mountain and the other descending from the mountain is not public ground?" Answered R. Dimi: I see thou hast a wise head, and it seems to me as if thou wert among the pillars of R. Johanan's college, when he pronounced this Halakha.

When Rabhin came from Palestine, he said in the name of R. Johanan, and according to another version in the name of R. Abbahu quoting R. Johanan: The paths by which the mountains in Palestine are ascended and descended do not come under the head of public ground, because they were not encountered on the journey through the wilderness (the pillar of cloud removing all hills and mountains from the path of the children of Israel).

MISHNA: Be it a public cistern, a public well, or a private well, such an enclosure of boards must be made for it; to a private cistern, however, a partition ten hands high must be made. Such is the dictum of R. Aqiba; but R. Jehudah. ben Babah said: An enclosure of boards must be made only for a public well; for all others it is sufficient to make a rope fence ten hands high.

GEMARA: Said R. Joseph in the name of R. Jehudah quoting Samuel: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah ben Babah." And he said again in the name of the same authority: "It is allowed only to make an enclosure around a well containing spring-water." The reason this latter saying of R. Jehudah ben Babah is quoted is, because in the Mishna he states, that an enclosure must be made only for a public well and we might assume that even if the well contained rain-water, providing it be only a public well, an enclosure may be made around it: therefore we are taught, that even though it be a public well it must contain spring-water.

MISHNA: Furthermore, R. Jehudah. ben Babah said: "In a garden or wood-shed over seventy ells square and encompassed by a wall ten hands high, it is lawful to carry things, provided there is a watch-box or dwelling of some kind (within the garden or shed), or they are close to town." R. Jehudah, however, said: Even though there be nothing else within them than a cistern, a reservoir, or a cave, it is lawful to carry things (in the garden or shed). R. Aqiba said: Even if the garden or wood-shed contain none of these objects mentioned, one may carry things within them (on Sabbath), provided they do not measure much over seventy ells square. R. Eliezer said: "If the length of such a garden or wood-shed exceed its width by even one ell, it is not permitted to carry things therein." R. Jose, however, said: Even if its length be twice its width, it is lawful to carry things therein.

R. Ilai said: I heard from R. Eliezer, that even though the garden or wood-shed be large enough to permit of a whole kur of grain being planted within it, it is permitted to carry things therein on Sabbath. I also heard from him, that if one of the householders of a court had forgotten and not combined in the erub, he must not carry anything out of or into his house, but the other inmates of the court may do so. Furthermore, I heard from him, that a man can fully acquit himself of the duty (of eating bitter herbs) on the Passover by using hart's-tongue (scolopendrium). I inquired among all his disciples seeking a colleague who had also heard him pronounce these opinions, but I could not find one.

GEMARA: "R. Aqiba said: Even if the garden," etc. Is this not the same as was said by the first Tana? There is a difference in a trifling matter between the two, as we have learned in the following Boraitha: "There is a trifle over the seventy ells and something, which the sages failed to specify, and that is the difference between the space of two saahs' capacity (which is 100 by So ells) and the square of seventy ells and something (two saahs' capacity is equal to 100 by 50 ells, or 5,000 square ells, and 7 2/3 by 70 2/3 ells is equal to 4,994 2/3 square ells, hence the difference, 5 7/9 square ells). Whence do we adduce this? Said R. Jehudah: "It is written [Exodus xxvii. 18]: 'The length of the court shall be one hundred cubits and the breadth fifty-by fifty.' This means to say, that the fifty cubits of length exceeding the breadth should be apportioned to the breadth, so as to make the whole seventy cubits and four spans square." What is the correct interpretation of the passage? How can one hundred ells in length by fifty by fifty in breadth be understood? Said Abayi: "The passage implies that the tabernacle must be placed immediately beyond where the court is fifty ells in length, and being itself thirty ells long and ten wide, it will have a frontage of fifty ells and twenty ells on each remaining side."

"R. Eliezer said: 'If the length,'" etc. Did we not learn in a Boraitha: R. Eliezer said: "If the length exceeded double the width of the garden or wood-shed by one ell, things must not be carried in them"? Said R. Bibhi bar Abayi: Our Mishna must also be read not "if the length exceed the width," but "if the length exceed double the width." If such be the case, then is this not the same as said by R. Jose? The difference between them is the one square ell which R. Eliezer adds as a proviso but which R. Jose does not incorporate in his dictum, for the former says (according to the above Boraitha): "Even if the length exceed double the width by one ell," while the latter says, "even if the length be double the width (exactly)."

"R. Jose, however, said," etc. It was taught: R. Joseph in the name of R. Jehudah, quoting Samuel, said: The Halakha prevails according to R. Jose's dictum in that a square is not essential. R. Bibhi, also, in the name of R. Jehudah, quoting Samuel, said: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Aqiba, who says, that the garden or wood-shed need not contain any of those objects." Samuel found it necessary to make both statements in order to make the ordinance more lenient, i.e., that neither was it essential that the garden or wood-shed be square nor that it contain a watch-box, dwelling, etc.

If a wood-shed of more than two saahs' capacity was fenced in for a dwelling, and the larger part of it was used to sow grain therein, it is like a garden and things must not be moved therein, because the fact that it was used for the purpose of sowing grain nullifies the original intention to use it for a dwelling. If, however, trees were planted in the greater part of it, things may be carried therein, because it is considered as a yard or court adjacent to a house. What is the law, however, if only in the smaller part of such a wood-shed grain was sown? Said R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua: If the wood-shed was of two saahs' capacity, it is allowed to carry things therein under those circumstances, but if it was of a larger capacity, it is not allowed (to carry things therein). This will be in accordance with R. Simeon, whose opinion will be cited later (Chapter IX., Mishna i.). If trees were planted in the wood-shed: according to R. Jehudah in the name of Abhimi, things may be carried only if benches were made between the trees, but according to R. Na'hman, this is not necessary, and R. Huna the son of Jehudah is of the same opinion as R. Na'hman.

Said R. Na'hman in the name of Samuel: A wood-shed of over two saahs' capacity, which was not fenced in for a dwelling, stood near a house which was subsequently built adjoining it. What is to be done in order to make it lawful for the occupants of the house to carry things to and from the wood-shed and the house on the Sabbath? First, a breach of more than ten ells should be made in the wall of the wood-shed (thereby rendering the walls useless); then the breach should be filled up so as to make it ten ells only. This will be regarded as a door, and will make it lawful to carry things between the house and the' wood-shed.

The schoolmen asked: "How is it, if the man tore down and rebuilt the walls of the wood-shed piecemeal, i.e., ell by ell until more than ten ells were torn down and then by rebuilding just ten ells of the breach were left. (Must over ten ells be demolished at once in order to render the wall useless or does it suffice if eventually such a breach was made even if it was done ell by ell)"? The answer was: Is this not the same as we have learned in a Mishna (in Tract Kelim), that the vessels of householders which contain a hole larger than a pomegranate are not subject to defilement; and Hezkyah asked, what the law was if a hole the size of an olive was made in the vessel and stopped up and this was repeated until the hole became the size of a pomegranate. R. Johanan answered him and related that Rabbi taught this in another Mishna concerning a sandal, one ear of which had become torn and was mended when the other became tom and was also mended, the sandal after the second mending is not subject to defilement. Rabbi was asked why he had ordained thus, for after the second mending, the same condition existed in the sandal as after the first. He answered: Nay; when the other ear was broken off the sandal was virtually destroyed and after it had been mended it assumed a different appearance. This statement can also be applied to the wall, which with each successive breach of one ell assumed a different appearance. The answer was: Such explanations are superhuman (and can only be made by an angel). According to another version, the answer was: "This is a man (who has knowledge)."

Said R. Kahana: "In a bleaching-ground (behind a house) things must not be carried except for a distance of four ells." Said R. Na'hman: "If a door was erected in the bleaching-ground, things may be carried over its entire extent; because the door renders this lawful."

If a wood-shed of over two saahs' capacity which had been intended for a dwelling was filled with water it is considered as if planted with trees, and things may be carried over its entire extent. Said Ameimar: Provided the water was fit to drink; but if not fit for drinking purposes, things must not be carried within the wood-shed.

There was a bleaching-ground in the city of Pumnahara, one side of which opened into the city and the other side into a path leading to a vineyard, which in turn opened into the banks of a lake. Said Rabha: A side-beam should be erected on the side of the bleaching-ground facing the city, and if this is of use as an entry to the city, it will also be a valid entry for the bleaching-ground. This makes it lawful to carry things both in the entry and in the bleaching-ground; but as for carrying from the entry into the bleaching-ground or vice versa, there is a difference of opinion between R. Aha and Rabhina. One permits this because the bleaching-ground is uninhabited. The other prohibits this, lest the bleaching-ground become at some time inhabited and things will be carried to and fro nevertheless.

A wood-shed of over two saahs' capacity which was not fenced in for a dwelling and was made smaller by planting trees therein, is not considered diminished in size. If, however, a pillar was erected within it, ten spans high and four wide, it is considered diminished. If the pillar was less than three spans wide, all agree, that it is of no account; but if it be over three spans and less than four, Rabha said, that the wood-shed is thereby diminished because a thing which is over three spans wide does not come within the law of "lavud" (attachment), and is hence considered an independent subject; Rabha, however, maintains that it is not diminished, for a subject which is less than four spans is of no account.

If a partition was made in the wood-shed four spans distant from the wall, things may be carried over the entire wood-shed. If the partition was less than three spans from the wall, all agree that this would be unlawful. If over three and less than four, Rabba said it is lawful, and Rabha said it is not. R. Shimi, however, taught this ordinance in a more lenient form, namely: If the partition was over three and less than four spans from the wall, all agree, that it is lawful; but if it was less than three then there is a difference of opinion.

Rabba bar bar Hana propounded a question: "If the bottom part of a partition was swallowed up by the earth and the top part remained, can it be accounted a lawful partition or not?" What was the object of this question? If it refers to a partition which was erected on the estate of a deceased proselyte, then this question is identical with that of Jeremiah of Bira, which is decided in Tract Baba Bathra; and if it refers to the Sabbath-law, i.e., if a partition was made on Sabbath, then the question has already been decided previously (page 47).

Concerning a wood-shed of three saahs' capacity which was provided with a roof of only one saah capacity Rabha said: The atmosphere of the unroofed portion of the wood-shed nullifies the roof which has been erected and things must not be carries within it. R. Zera, however, said: The atmosphere of the unroofed portion does not interfere with the roof which is considered as attached to the part of one saah's capacity and things may be carried within the roofed part with impunity. I admit, however, that if a wall of the wood-shed facing a courtyard was entirely demolished, the atmosphere of the adjoining courtyard renders the remaining walls void and makes the woodshed one of over two saahs' capacity.

There was a garden on the estate of the Exilarch containing a pavilion. On a Friday R. Huna bar Hinana was told to go out there and make the pavilion suitable so that things could be carried and meals taken within it on the morrow. He went and placed some sticks of less than three spans in height in the ground around the pavilion. Rabha then went out and tore down the sticks. R. Papa and R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua even went and hid the sticks so that R. Huna bar Hinana could not obtain them again (because all three held, that the sticks would have been of no account whatever). So the Exilarch applied to them the verse [Jeremiah iv. 22]: "Wise are they to do evil, but how to do good they do not know."

"R. Ilai said: I have heard from R. Eliezer, that even though a garden or wood-shed be large enough to permit of the planting of a whole kur," etc. This Mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Hananiah, who said, that even if they have a capacity of forty saahs, as a parade ground for soldiers in front of the king's palace, things may be carried within them, so it was taught in a Boraitha. Said R. Johanan: Both R. Eliezer and Hananiah adduced their opinions from the same passage, viz. [II Kings xx. 4]: "And it came to pass, before Isaiah was gone out into the middle court," etc., while subsequently city is mentioned and hence the inference that a parade ground be it even as large as a medium-sized town is still called a court provided it be in front of the king's palace. Their point of difference is, that one holds a medium-sized town to have a capacity of one kur while the other holds that it has a capacity of forty saahs.

"I also heard from him," etc. Did we not learn in another Mishna, that neither the householder himself nor the other inmates of the court (yard) may carry anything to and from his house? Said R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua in the name of R. Shesheth: This presents no difficulty. The Mishna is in accordance with R. Eliezer, who holds, that if one had resigned his right to the use of the court he also resigned his privilege of the use of his house, but according to the opinion of the rabbis it may be said that, if he had resigned his right to the court, he did not thereby resign his privilege of the use of his house. Is this not self-evident? (Why should we say, it may be said?) They cannot differ on any other point. Said Rahabha (Rabha): I and R. Huna bar Hinana have explained this as follows: The case was, where there were five inmates of one court, and one of them forgot to combine in the erub; according to R. Eliezer, at the time that he resigns his right to the use of the court in favor of all the other inmates he need not do so to each one individually also, and he at the same time resigns the privilege of using his house to the other inmates, while according to the Rabbis, he must do so to each one of the inmates individually and must also bear in mind to resign his privilege of using his house.

REGULATIONS CONCERNING WHEREWITH AND WHERE AN ERUB MAY BE MADE. WHEREBY AN ERUB BECOMES INVALID. THE ERUB OF LIMITS, WITH ITS CONDITIONS. WHEN A FESTIVAL OR NEW YEAR PRECEDES THE SABBATH.

MISHNA: The Erub may be effected with all kinds of victuals excepting water and salt. All kinds of victuals may be bought with the proceeds of the second tithe except water and salt. One who has vowed to abstain from food, may partake of water and salt. The Erub maybe made for a Nazarite with wine and for an ordinary Israelite with heave-offering. Symmachus said: Unconsecrated things only may be used for the Erub of an ordinary Israelite. The Erub of a priest may be placed on a spot which had formerly been used as a cemetery. R. Jehudah said: It may even be placed in an actual burying-ground, since the priest may make a partition between himself and the burying-ground and then eat the Erub.

GEMARA: R. Johanan said: "We must not accept all the Mishnaoth that commence with a general rule as final, even such as are supplemented with an exception." Said Rabhina, according to another version R. Na'hman: We can infer this from our Mishna above. It is stated therein, that with all kinds of victuals an Erub may be effected, excepting water and salt, and there are certain mushrooms with which an Erub cannot be effected also. Consequently we may assume from this Mishna, that all those commencing with a general rule, even such as are supplemented with exceptions, need not be accepted as final.

"All kinds of victuals," etc. One of the two sages, R. Eliezer or R. Jose bar R. Hanina, taught as follows: The Mishna means to state, that an Erub must not be made with either water or salt, but with the two together it is allowed," and one of them taught the same with reference to second tithes, viz.: With the proceeds of the second tithes salt or water must not be bought; but the two together maybe bought. The one who applies this opinion to second tithes does so even to a greater degree in the case of the Erub; but the one who applies this to an Erub does not do so in the case of the second tithes; because some fruit must be bought therewith. When R. Itz'hak came from Palestine, he taught this to apply to second tithes also.

An objection was made: R. Jehudah ben Gadish testified in the presence of R. Eliezer, that his father's house used to buy fish-brine with the proceeds of the second tithes. Said R. Eliezer to him: "Perhaps thou didst not observe, that there were pieces of fish in the brine." Now, R. Jehudah ben Gadish himself testifies that fish-brine was bought and that is at least an article of food; but he certainly would not permit salt and water.

Said R. Joseph: "R. Itz'hak in permitting water and salt to be bought with the proceeds of second tithes refers to a case where the water also contained some oil." Said Abayi: "If such be the case, why does he say water and salt, it would be virtually buying the oil?" The answer is: "If the money was paid for the oil and incidentally also for the water and salt." Is it allowed to buy it indirectly? Yea; it is allowed, as we have learned: Ben Bagbag said: It is written [Deut. xiv. 26]: "And thou shalt lay out that money for whatsoever thy soul longeth after, for oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink, or for whatsoever thy soul asketh of thee." "For oxen" signifies for oxen together with the hide, "for sheep" with the wool, for wine "together with the barrel," or for strong drink even if it turned sour.

R. Johanan said. "The man who will explain to me the dictum of Ben Bagbag concerning the oxen, I will carry his clothes after him to the bath-house." Why is this so? Wherein does he find a difference between the oxen and the sheep? Because if we infer from the verse, that the sheep may be bought together with their wool, which can be shorn, it is self-evident that an ox must be bought with the hide, for how can it be bought otherwise? Hence the inference taken by Ben Bagbag from the oxen is superfluous.

Wherein do R. Jehudah ben Gadish, R. Eliezer, and the following Tanaim differ? R. Jehudah ben Gadish and R. Eliezer interpret an extension and a limitation thus: "Thou shalt lay out that money for whatsoever thy soul longeth" is an extension then; "or oxen, or for sheep, for wine or for strong drink" is a limitation; "or for whatever thy soul asketh of thee" is again an extension. Thus we have an extension, a limitation and another extension. What is the extension? "For every.

thing." But what is the limitation? According to R. Eliezer, it is fish-brine, and according to R. Jehudah ben Gadish it is water and salt, and the other Tanaim do not refer to extension and limitation but to the effect of general and particular terms, as we have learned in a Boraitha: "Thou shalt lay out that money for whatsoever thy soul desireth" is a general term, "for oxen, for sheep, etc.," is a particular term, and again "or for whatsoever thy soul asketh of thee" is a general term; hence we have a general term, a particular term and another general term, and wherever there is a particular term in the midst of two general terms the particular term determines the rule. Thus the particular thing to be bought with the proceeds of second tithes is fruit of fruit (i.e., a calf born of a cow or oil of olives) and everything generated above the ground; but salt and water or fish-brine is not included.

In another Boraitha however we were taught, that as the particular term refers to something born on or growing out of the ground, so does also the general term refer to subjects of this kind. What is the point of difference between the two Boraithas? Said Abayi: "Concerning fish." According to the Boraitha which holds, that the particular term refers to fruit of fruit and everything generated above the ground, fish is also included as it derives its sustenance from the earth; but according to the Boraitha which holds, that only something born on or growing out of the ground is meant, fish is excluded because it is generated in the waters.

Said R. Jehudah in the name of R. Samuel bar Shilas quoting Rabh: "An Erub may be made with lettuce, Halaglugoth (a certain edible plant) and clover but not with green rye-stalks and bad figs." How can he say that clover may be used? Have we not learned, that clover maybe eaten only by those who have many children but not by such as have none? Have we not learned that for a Nazarite an Erub may be made with wine and for an ordinary Israelite with heave-offering? Although neither of these two are allowed to partake of those things, there are others who may do so and the same case can be applied to clover, while there are some who are not allowed to eat it, there are others who may; hence all may use it for the purpose of making an Erub.

With green rye-stalks it is not allowed? Did not R. Jehudah say in the name of Rabh, that hops and green rye-stalks may be used to make an Erub and the benediction to be pronounced over these is "Blessed be He, etc., who hath created the fruits of the earth"? This presents no difficulty; for Rabh said, that rye-stalks were not permitted to be used, before he came to Babylon, not knowing that it was used for food, but when he learned that such was the case, he allowed its use.

With bad figs it is not allowed? Have we not learned, that palm-tops may be bought with the proceeds of second tithes and that they are not subject to defilement incidental to eatables, and bad figs may also be bought with the proceeds of second tithes but they are subject to the defilement? R. Jehudah, however, said that palm-tops were considered the same as trees under all circumstances with the exception that they may be bought with the proceeds of second tithes and that bad figs are considered the same as other fruit except that they are not subject to tithing? Thou sayest, they are subject to defilement? That is a different matter. The reason of that is, as R. Johanan stated in another case, that they can be made good through cooking over a fire and therefore they are subject to defilement, but they must not be used for making an Erub.

The text states, that hops and green rye-stalks may be used for making an Erub, etc. What quantity of hops should be used? As R. Yechiel said elsewhere, that a handful is sufficient, so it is also in this case; a handful will suffice for two meals. What quantity of green rye-stalks must be used? Said Rabba bar Tuvia bar Itz'hak in the name of Rabh: A bundle of the same size as that made by the peasants.

R. Helkyah bar Tuvia said: An Erub may be made with a Kalia (a certain root as hard as a piece of dry wood). How is that possible? Can it be eaten? He means to say when the root is young and tender. What quantity should be used? Said R. Yechiel: "A handful."

R. Jeremiah went out into the villages and was asked whether an Erub may be made with bean-pods. He did not know what to answer. When he came back to the college, he was told, that R. Janai said, "It was allowed," and as to the quantity R. Yechiel said, "A handful."

R. Hamnuna said: "An Erub must not be made with raw mangold. Because R. Hisda said that raw mangold can kill a man." But we see, that some people do eat it and it does not harm them? Yea; but they eat marigold which is partially cooked and is not quite raw.

R. Hisda said: "Cooked mangold is good for the heart, for the eyes and above all for the stomach." Said Abayi: Such is the case if the mangold was cooked over the centre of a big fire so long that it sizzled.

Rabha said at one time: I feel, that I am at present in the same condition as Ben Azai was in the markets of Tiberias. [Ben Azai used to lecture in the markets of Tiberias and in his time was the most sagacious among all the sages, so that he once said: All the sages of Israel are as the peel of garlic compared to me except the bald-head (meaning R. Aqiba).] So one of the scholars came to Rabha and asked him, how many apples it would take to make an Erub? He answered: "Art thou then certain that an Erub may be made with apples?" With apples it is not allowed? Have we not learned in a Mishna, that a quantity of mixed eatables equal to two eggs is sufficient to make the body of a man incapable of touching heave-offerings? If there is sufficient of those mixed eatables for two meals they maybe used for making an Erub. If there is a quantity of those mixed eatables equal to one egg, they arc subject to the defilement incidental to eatables. Why this question? 'Tis true that the Mishna mentions all eatables, but have we not learned, that wherever a general rule is laid down, even when supplemented with exceptions, it need not be accepted as final? Consequently apples may be excluded? This question is not based upon the statement that all eatables may be used, but upon the fact that a quantity of mixed eatables equal to two eggs may be used for an Erub, and if equal to one egg it is subject to defilement incidental to eatables. And if apples are subject to defilement, why should they not be used for an Erub? What should be the quantity of apples used? Said R. Na'hman: "A Kabh."

An objection was raised: R. Simeon b. Elazar said: A measure of spices, a litter of herbs, ten nuts, five persicum (apricots), two pomegranates, one citron. (This was a prescribed quantity for giving charity by the owner of a vineyard.) And Ghurseck bar Dori in the name of R. Menashiah bar Shegublick quoting Rabh said: The same quantity is sufficient for an Erub. Now why shall not apples also be equal to apricots and only five should be sufficient for an Erub? The persicums are more valuable, hence five are sufficient, but apples not being so valuable, therefore a Kabh is required.

Said R. Joseph: May the Lord forgive R. Menashiah bar Shegublick. I said this to him in reference to the following Mishna and he said this in reference to the above Boraitha. This is the Mishna (mentioned above). Nothing less than a half a Kabh of wheat and a Kabh of barley should be given to a poor man by the owner of a barn. R. Meir, however, says a half a Kabh of barley and one Kabh and a half of Kusmin, a Kabh of three or the weight of a maneh of pressed figs; R. Aqiba said a half of a maneh; and a half a lug of wine; R. Aqiba said a quarter of a lug; and a quarter of a lug of oil; R. Aqiba said an eighth of a lug. Concerning other fruits, however, said Abba Saul: A measure of fruit, the sale of which would realize sufficient for the purchase of two meals; and to this Mishna I added in the name of Rabh that the same quantities are needed for an Erub.

The text said: If there is sufficient of mixed eatables for two meals they may be used for an Erub. R. Joseph meant to say: "If there is enough of each kind for one meal." Said Rabba to him: "Nay; it is sufficient if there was enough of each kind for a half, a third or even a quarter of a meal."

Rabh said: "One may make an Erub with wine of the quantity of two quarters of a lug." Must we have so much? Did we not learn that R. Simon ben Elazar said: "With sufficient wine necessary for the eating of two meals," and by that he means boiled wine in which bread sufficient for two meals is soaked.

Rabh said again: "One may make an Erub with vinegar sufficient for the soaking of food for two meals." R. Gidel said in the name of Rabh: "By that is meant enough vinegar to soak herbs sufficient for two meals"; and according to others R. Gidel said in the name of Rabh (not two meals of herbs only but) sufficient wine to soak the herbs which are usually eaten in two meals.

R. Zera said in the name Of Samuel: "It is allowed to make an Erub with beer, but if three lugs of it be poured into a Mikvah, the Mikvah becomes invalid." How much beer is necessary for an Erub? R. Ahu the son of R. Joseph wished to state in the presence of his father, that two lugs were necessary, i.e., one lug for each meal. Said R. Joseph: This is not so. There are men who drink only one goblet-full in the morning and another in the evening (a goblet-full is supposed to be a quarter of a lug); hence two goblets-full are sufficient for an Erub.

What is the quantity of dates sufficient for an Erub? Said R. Joseph: "One Kabh." What is the quantity of Sheshitha (a dish made of parched corn and honey)? Said R. A'ha bar Pinhas: Two spoons-full. What is the quantity of roasted ears (of corn)? Said Abaja: Two bunis (measures used in the city of Pumbaditha).

Abayi said again: "My mother told me, that roasted ears are good for the heart and drive away care." He said again: My mother told me, that one who has heart-disease should take the meat from the right shoulder of a ram, bring some willow branches, burn them, and roast the meat on the coals. Then he should eat the meat and drink wine thinned with water.

Said R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel: "Of all things that are eaten with bread it is sufficient to use a quantity eaten with bread at two meals; but of such things as are eaten by themselves sufficient for two meals must be used for an Erub. Of raw meat sufficient for two meals if eaten by itself must be used, but of cooked meat Rabba said it is sufficient to use as much as is eaten with bread at two meals, and R. Joseph said as much as is eaten at two meals by itself should be used, and he said: "Whence do I adduce this? Because I saw that the Persians eat roasted meat without bread." Rejoined Abayi: Are the Persians the majority of the whole world?

R. Hyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rabh: "An Erub may be made with raw meat." R. Simi bar Hyya said: "An Erub may be made with raw eggs." And how many should be used? Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak: "Sinai said, two eggs should be used."

R. Huna in the name of Rabh said: If one vowed, that he would not eat this loaf of bread, an Erub may nevertheless be made for him with that loaf; because though he must not eat it, others may. If he says, however, that this loaf is on him, i.e., he devotes this loaf of bread (in honor of the Lord), it must not be used for an Erub.

An objection was made: If one vowed concerning a certain loaf of bread, an Erub may nevertheless be made with it. Shall we not assume that he said: "This loaf of bread is on me"? (i.e., he devoted that loaf of bread in honor of the Lord). Nay; be said: "I vow not to eat this loaf of bread," and such seems to be the case; because the latter part of the Boraitha states distinctly, that he said: "I vow not to taste any part of this loaf." What is the law, however, if the man said that the loaf is on him? It must not be used for an Erub? If that is so, why was it taught in the latter part of the Boraitha: "If he said the loaf is consecrated, an Erub must not be made with it, because it is not allowed to make an Erub with consecrated things." Why should this whole argument be repeated? Could it not be simply stated, that if the man vows not to eat the loaf an Erub may be made with it; but if he declares the loaf to be on him, an Erub must not be made with it? But as it does not say, that the loaf is on him in the first part of the Boraitha, there is a contradiction to R. Huna? R. Huna said the same thing as R. Eliezer said elsewhere. Did R. Eliezer indeed say so? Did we not learn, that R. Eliezer said: "If a man said: 'This loaf of bread is on me,' an Erub may be made with it, but if he said, 'This loaf is consecrated,' it must not be used for an Erub, because an Erub must not be made with consecrated things"? There are two Tanaim who report the dictum of R. Eliezer in different ways.

"An Erub may be made for a Nazarite with wine." This Mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beth Shammai, as we have learned in the following Boraitha: An Erub must not be made for a Nazarite with wine, nor for an ordinary Israelite with heave-offering. So said Beth Shammai; Beth Hillel, however, said: "This may be done." Said Beth Hillel to Beth Shammai: "Will ye not admit, that an Erub may be made for a man who is obliged to fast on the Day of Atonement, although he must not eat it?" They answered: "Yea." "Then," rejoined Beth Hillel, "as we are permitted to make an Erub for a man fasting on the Day of Atonement, so may we also make an Erub for a Nazarite with wine, and for an ordinary Israelite with heave-offering." What reason have Beth Shammai for prohibiting this? They give as their reason the fact, that a man may eat the Erub while it is yet day (before the eve of the Day of Atonement); but a Nazarite must not at any time drink wine nor an ordinary Israelite eat heave-offering.

This whole Boraitha is not in accordance with the teachings of Hananiah, as we have learned in the following Boraitha: "Beth Shammai do not recognize an Erub unless a man carries out his bed and all the utensils he intends to use to the place where he proposes to make the Erub, so taught Hananiah."

According to whose opinion is the Boraitha which states, that a man who deposits his Erub while wearing a black garment must not go out on the morrow dressed in a white garment, and vice versa? Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak: This is in accordance with the opinion of Beth Shammai as interpreted by Hananiah.

"Symmachus said: 'Unconsecrated things only may be used,'" etc. Consequently Symmachus does not dissent as regards making an Erub for a Nazarite with wine, but does dissent as regards heave-offering for the Erub of an ordinary Israelite. Why is this so? Because a Nazarite may go to a sage and be declared free from his vows as a Nazarite. As regards heave-offering for the Erub of an ordinary Israelite, he holds with the Rabbis, who decreed, that all things which are prohibited by rabbinical law on account of the Sabbath-rest are also prohibited for the time of twilight, and as regards heave-offering, an ordinary Israelite must not handle it on Sabbath on account of Sabbath-rest.

According to whose opinion is the following Mishna? There are sages who hold, that the prescribed quantities, which are dependent upon the size of a man, should be measured accordingly. And the two meals which must be constituted by the Erub, should be two meals sufficient for the man who deposits the Erub? Said R. Zera: "This is according to Symmachus, who holds, that an Erub must be according to the requirements of the man for whom it is made."

"The Erub of a priest may be placed on a spot which had formerly been used as a cemetery." R. Jehudah bar Ami said in the name of R. Jehudah, that a spot which had formerly been used as a cemetery becomes clean of itself if trodden down by people.

"R. Jehudah said: 'It may be placed in an actual burying-ground.'" It was taught: Because the priest can go there in a wagon; for R. Jehudah holds, that a temporary tent is sufficient to intervene between a man and uncleanness. Furthermore we have learned that for a ritually clean priest, clean heave-offering may be placed as an Erub even in a grave and for the same reason as above, in spite of the fact that the heave-offering becomes unclean and the priest is at no time allowed to eat it.

MISHNA: For the Erub doubtful grain (Damai) (of which it is not known whether the legal dues like tithes, etc., have been acquitted) may be used; first tithes, from which the heave-offerings have been taken; and second tithes and consecrated things that have been redeemed. For priests, the first of the dough and heave-offerings may be used. It is not lawful however to use unseparated grain (from which it is certain that the legal dues have not been separated), or first tithes from which the heave-offering had not been taken, or second tithes and consecrated things which had not been redeemed.

GEMARA: [The reasons for the above Mishna and the discussions appear several times throughout the Talmud. We shall render them, however, but once and that in Tract Berachoth (benedictions), which contains the complete and identical version.]

MISHNA: Should a man send his Erub by the hand of a deaf and dumb person, an idiot, a minor or one who does not acknowledge the legal necessity of an Erub, it is not a valid Erub; if, however, he had commissioned another proper person to receive it from his messenger, it is a valid Erub.

If a man puts the Erub in a tree higher than ten spans above ground, it is not valid; but if he puts it lower than ten spans, it is. If he had put it into a pit, even though it be a hundred ells deep, the Erub is valid.

GEMARA: By the hand of a minor it would not be a valid Erub? Did not R. Huna say, that a minor may collect the Erub? This presents no difficulty. R. Huna's dictum refers to an Erub of courts (where only the meal is to be gathered in order to make common cause), but our Mishna refers to an Erub of limits (where a man must go and declare his intention of making that his resting-place for the Sabbath).

"One who does not acknowledge the legal necessity of an Erub." Who is meant thereby? Said R. Hisda, a Samaritan.

"If, however, he had commissioned another person," etc. Why! Perhaps the above messenger will not deliver it! As R. Hisda said elsewhere, that he should stand and see the messenger depart, so must he also do in this case. Still there is fear that the person commissioned to receive it from the messenger will not receive it? As R. Yechiel said elsewhere, that it is an established rule, that if a messenger has been intrusted with an errand, it is presumed that he will perform the errand and this must also be assumed in the case under consideration. Where did R. Hisda and R. Yechiel make these statements? Concerning the following Boraitha, which teaches, that if a man sent his Erub through a trained elephant or a trained monkey and they deposited the Erub, ii is not valid, but if he had commissioned a person to receive it from them and deposit it, it is valid. The same question arose here which led to the statements of R. Hisda and R. Yechiel as stated above.

R. Na'hman said: The established rule, that a messenger will perform his errand, holds good where rabbinical laws are concerned, but not where biblical commandments are to be executed.

R. Shesheth, however, said: There is no difference. This rule holds good even where biblical commandments are concerned.

"If a man put his Erub in a tree," etc. R. Hyya bar Abba, R. Assi and Rabha bar Nathan sat together, and R. Na'hman sat near them. They were deliberating upon the question of where the tree spoken of in the Mishna was situated. Should we assume that it was standing in private ground, what difference does it make whether the Erub was put lower or higher; for private ground reaches even to the sky? Should we assume, that the tree was in public ground, where was the man's intention to rest on this tree; if on the top, why was the Erub which was placed above ten spans not valid? The man and the Erub would be in one place? We must say, that the man's intention was to rest at the foot of the tree (and if the Erub was placed above ten spans from the ground it is not valid, because at that height the tree becomes private ground by virtue of its being over four spans wide, while the foot of the tree is still public ground and consequently, the man would have to carry his food from private into public ground on Sabbath and that is prohibited). Still, will he not make use of a tree on the Sabbath and that is also prohibited? We must therefore assume, that the Mishna means that the tree was standing in public ground and it is according to Rabbi, who holds, that all rabbinical ordinances enacted on account of the Sabbath-rest (Shvuth) have no significance during twilight (before or after the Sabbath). Said R. Na'hman: "I thank ye, for so also did Samuel say." And they rejoined: "Was it so difficult for you to understand the Mishna, that you thank us for our opinion. [Did they not themselves argue and discuss the matter? Nay; they spoke thus to R. Na'hman.] Would you insert our opinion in the Gemara explaining this Mishna?" He answered: "Yea."

Rabha maid: All this refers to a tree, which was standing outside of the addition (of 70 2/3 ells square) to a town; but if the tree was standing inside of the addition to the town, it makes no difference where the Erub was placed on it, even at a height of over ten spans, because the atmosphere of a town pervades all the trees and it makes no difference where the man takes his rest.

Where is the opinion of Rabbi and the sages to be found concerning the twilight as mentioned above? In the following Boraitha.. If a man placed his Erub on a tree ten spans above the ground, the Erub is not valid. If placed lower than ten spans it is valid, but must not be taken down; if it was placed within three spans from the ground it is valid and may also be taken down. If the Erub, however, was placed in a basket and then hung on the tree even at a height of over ten spans it is valid; such is the dictum of Rabbi; the sages however say, that where an Erub must not be taken down, it is also not valid. (Hence the difference of opinion between Rabbi and the sages.) Concerning what part do they differ? Shall we say, that they differ concerning the last part (i.e., where the Erub was placed in a basket and hung up on a tree at a height of over ten spans, and the sages say therefore, that such an Erub is invalid because the tree will have to be used on Sabbath and that is prohibited), can we say, that incidental use of the tree is also prohibited? (We know that is not so.) Shall we say, that they differ concerning the first part (i.e., where the Erub was placed at a height of over ten spans and must not be taken down), we must first see what kind of a tree is under consideration. If it be a tree of less than four spans' width, it is a free place (not subject to jurisdiction), then why should the Erub not be taken down? If it be a tree that was four spans wide, it is regarded as private ground, then of what benefit is the basket which contains the Erub (it must also be taken down from private into public ground); said R. Jeremiah: "With a basket it is different. It need not be taken down at all, but can be bent over and the Erub may be removed." (Although the tree is private ground, when the basket is bent over so that it is below ten spans it is no longer in private ground.)

R. Papa sat in the college and repeated the above Halakha. Rabh bar Shva raised an objection: "We have learned in a following Mishna: "But how must this be done? One carries out the Erub, where he means to deposit it on the eve of the first day of rest and remains with it until dusk, when he carries it back with him." If thou sayest then, that it is sufficient if he hangs up a basket on the tree, because he can bend over the basket and bring it lower than ten spans, why should the Mishna quoted order, that the man must carry out the Erub, etc., and remain with it until dusk; it may just as well say, that as he can remain until dusk and carry it back, that it is sufficient, if he deposits it and carries it back with him at once.

Said R. Zera: This is only a precautionary measure for a case where a festival follows a Sabbath. (If it were said, that the man need not go out and deposit his Erub, wait until dusk and carry it back, then go out again on the next day and wait until dusk and eat the Erub, but that he may leave it there because he could have done as the Mishna states and the capability of performing an act is equivalent to its performance,--it would be wrong; for the day being Sabbath he would not have been permitted to carry it out again. Hence the precautionary measure was made to apply to all similar cases.)

"If he had put it into a pit," etc. Where is the pit supposed to be situated? If in private ground it is self-evident? For in the same manner as private ground has no limit as to height it also has none as to depth. If in public ground, the question arises, where the man intended to take his Sabbath-rest? If he intended to take it outside of the pit, he would be in one place and his Erub in another, and if he intended to take his rest inside of the pit, it is self-evident that he may deposit his Erub therein. We must say then, that the pit was situated in unclaimed ground (in a valley) where he intended to rest. The pit however being over ten spans deep is private ground, and as for carrying from private into unclaimed ground the opinion of Rabbi again prevails, that such acts as are prohibited on the Sabbath are not prohibited for twilight on account of the Sabbath-rest.

MISHNA: If the man should put the Erub on top of a cane or pole, that does not actually grow out of the ground, but is merely stuck in the ground, even though it be a hundred ells high, it is a valid Erub.

If one put it into a cupboard which he locked and then lost the key, the Erub is nevertheless valid. R. Eliezer said: If he does not know where the key is, the Erub is not valid.

GEMARA: R. Ada bar Massne propounded a contradictory question to Rabha: If the man should put his Erub on top of a cane, that does not actually grow out of the ground, it is valid; but if the cane were a growing one, the Erub would not be valid, because the tree would be handled thereby and that is not permitted; then this would be in accordance with the opinion of the sages; while the previous Mishnaoth were according to Rabbi's opinion? This was already asked by Rami bar Hama of R. Hisda and the latter answered, that the previous two Mishnaoth were in accordance with Rabbi's opinion, while this Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the sages.

Rabhina, however, said, that this Mishna is also in accordance with Rabbi's opinion, but here the precautionary measure is enacted, lest the man might break down the cane if it grew out of the ground, while a tree is too stout to be broken down, and in this case Rabbi concurs with the sages.

One Friday, a military garrison came to Neherdai and occupied the city, so that there was no room for the college of R. Na'hman. Said R. Na'hman to his disciples: "Go out into the field and incline the growing bushes towards each other, so that we have room enough to study in to-morrow." So Rami bar Hama, according to another version, Uqba bar Ada objected: "Did we not learn in this Mishna, that an Erub must not be put on growing stalks or cane?" Answered R. Na'hman: The Mishna refers to brittle (withered) cane, but as for healthy (moist) bushes it is not prohibited.

"If one put it into a cupboard, etc., and lost the key." Why should the Erub be valid? The man is in one place and the Erub in another? He cannot even obtain it without a key. Rabh and Samuel both said, that the Erub is valid only when the cupboard is not firmly immured but is loosely built, so that the bricks maybe removed and the Erub taken out, and that the Mishna is according to R. Meir's opinion, who holds, that this may be done on a festival to commence with and that the Mishna refers to a festival only, and not on a Sabbath. If this be so, how will the following clause of the Mishna be explained: "R. Eliezer said: If the key be lost in the city, the Erub is valid, but if lost in the field, it is not valid." If the Mishna refers to a festival, what difference does it make where the key was lost. Carrying is not prohibited on a festival? The Mishna is not complete and should read thus: If one put it into a cupboard, which he locked and then lost the key, the Erub is nevertheless valid, providing it was a festival. On Sabbath, however, it is not valid. If the key was subsequently found, whether in the city or in the field, the Erub is nevertheless not valid. R. Eliezer, however, said: If it was found in the city, the Erub is valid, because he holds to R. Simeon's opinion, who said, that all the courts and wood-sheds in the city are as one ground and the key could be brought through them; but if found in the field it could not be carried.

Rabba and R. Joseph both said: "Our Mishna treats of a wooden cupboard and the Tana who holds that if the key was lost, the Erub was valid, considers the cupboard the same as a vessel which may be taken apart on the Sabbath and the Erub taken out, while R. Eliezer considers the cupboard the same as a tent which must not be taken apart on the Sabbath." How can they differ as to its being a vessel or a tent? If it was large all agree, that it is a tent, and if it was small all agree, that it is a vessel? Therefore Abayi and Rabha both say, that the Mishna treats of a case where the key was tied to the lock by a string, which could not be undone by hand. The first Tana holds according to R. Jose, that all vessels may be handled on the Sabbath for any purposes whatever (hence a knife used for cutting bread may be used to cut the string), whereas R. Eliezer holds according to the opinion of R. Nehemiah, who decrees, that all vessels may be handled on Sabbath only for the purposes for which they are intended.

MISHNA: Should the Erub roll (or be moved) out of the limit of the Sabbath distance, should a heap of mould fall on it, or should it be burned, or if the heave-offering (used for the Erub) became unclean, and any or all of this take place while it is yet day (i.e., before the Sabbath set in) the Erub is not valid. If it take place, however, after dusk (when it is already Sabbath) the Erub is valid. If the time when it took place is doubtful, R. Meir and R. Jehudah both say: This is (like driving) an ass and (leading) a camel (meaning, that a man is hemmed in on all sides). R. Jose and R. Simeon say: A doubtful Erub is valid? R. Jose further said: Abtolymus attested upon the authority of five elders, that a doubtful Erub is valid.

GEMARA: Said Rabha: (If the Erub rolled outside of the limit of the Sabbath distance) for a distance of over four ells it is not valid; but if it rolled for less than four ells, the man who deposited the Erub is allowed four ells to move in, outside of the limits, consequently the Erub is valid.

"Should a heap of mould fall on it," etc. At a casual glance it was assumed, that the Erub could have been extracted from under the heap of mould by hand, and accordingly the Mishna was in conformity with the opinion of Rabbi, that at twilight such acts as are prohibited by rabbinical law on account of the Sabbath-rest may be performed; subsequently, however, the conclusion was arrived at, that the Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi's opinion, and that the Erub in this instance could not be extracted by hand but by means of a hoe.

It was necessary to insert both clauses (concerning the rolling of the Erub and its being buried beneath a heap of mould) in the Mishna and for the reason; that, were the first clause only inserted, one might say: "If the Erub rolled out beyond the limits, it was no more in its place and hence it is invalid; but if it was simply buried beneath a heap of mould it is still in its proper place and why should it not be valid?" If the latter clause only had been inserted, one might say: "In this case the Erub was buried and could not be seen, hence it is invalid, but if it merely rolled out and can be seen, the same wind might bring it back, why should it not be valid?" For this reason it was necessary to mention both cases.

"Or should it be burned, or if the heave-offering (used as an Erub) became unclean," etc. The ordinance referring to an Erub which was burned up is taught in order to show the firmness of R. Jose, who declares, that (if a doubt existed whether the Erub was burned before or after dusk) although the Erub is no longer in existence, it is still valid, and the ordinance referring to heave-offering which became unclean was taught to show the firmness of R. Meir, who maintains that although the heave-offering was still there and only a doubt existed as to whether it became unclean before or after dusk, the Erub is nevertheless invalid. Is it possible, that R. Meir holds a doubtful case based upon rabbinical law to necessitate the more rigorous decision? R. Meir holds, that the law pertaining to Sabbath-limits is biblical. Does R. Meir indeed hold thus? Have we not learned in a Mishna further on (Chapter V., Mishna 3), that R. Meir maintains, when measurements are made to determine the Sabbath-limit and mountains are encountered that it is permitted to cut straight through the mountains (in an imaginary sense or figuratively speaking), and such subterfuges are certainly not allowed where biblical laws are concerned?

The latter opinion while credited to R. Meir is not in reality his own, but the opinion of his teacher, while the former is his own conviction and the proof is, that the Mishna quoted states distinctly: R. Dostai ben Janai said: I have upon the authority of R. Meir, etc.

We have learned in a Boraitha: How should the dictum of R. Jose to the effect, that "a doubtful Erub is valid" be explained? Thus: If an Erub was made with heave-offering concerning which there was a doubt whether it became unclean while it was yet day, or after dusk, or with fruit concerning which there was a doubt whether the tithes had been acquitted while it was yet day or after dusk, it constitutes a doubtful Erub, which is nevertheless valid; if, however, the Erub was effected with heave-offering concerning which there was a doubt whether it was clean or unclean to commence with, or with fruit concerning which there was a doubt whether tithes had been acquitted at all, it does not constitute a doubtful Erub, which is valid.

Let us see! Why is it said, that heave-offering, concerning which there was a doubt whether it became unclean before or after dusk, would constitute a doubtful Erub which was nevertheless valid, because the heave-offering is presumed to be in its original condition and that was certainly clean, why should not the same case apply to the fruit concerning which there was a doubt, whether tithes had been acquitted thereof or not, let the fruit also be presumed to be in its original condition and that is unseparated (of which tithes had not been acquitted)? Do not say, therefore, that the fruit was doubtful as to its having been separated but say: there was a doubt whether it had not subsequently been mixed with other (unseparated) fruit before or after dusk.

R. Samuel bar R. Itz'hak asked of R. Huna: If there were two loaves of bread before a man, one of which was clean and the other unclean and he said: "Make an Erub for me with the clean loaf wherever it may be"; but did not know which was which. [If both loaves which were heave-offerings, were used in making the Erub; for if they were ordinary and even (ritually) unclean they may be eaten by an ordinary Israelite], what is the law according to the diverse opinions? According to R. Meir, who pronounced a doubtful Erub invalid in a case where the entire Erub would have been unclean, it may be said, that in this case, where one of the loaves was positively clean, he may hold the Erub to be valid; or according to R. Jose, who pronounces a doubtful Erub valid in a case where if it is clean, he can distinguish it, it may be said, that in this case the Erub, would in his opinion be invalid because although part of it is clean, he cannot distinguish it from the unclean?

R. Huna answered: According to both R. Meir and R. Jose, when the Erub is deposited (while it is yet day) it must be fit to eat and in this case it could not be eaten to commence with, because, the clean could not be distinguished from the unclean, how then could an Erub be made therewith?

Rabha asked of R. Na'hman: If a man say: "This loaf of bread is to-day ordinary but to-morrow it shall be consecrated. Nevertheless make me an Erub therewith." What is the law? (Does it become consecrated at twilight and, as it is not permitted to make an Erub with consecrated things, it is not valid as an Erub, or does it become consecrated after twilight?) "The Erub is valid," was the answer. What is the law, however, if the man say: "To-day this loaf is consecrated, but tomorrow it shall be ordinary (i.e., it shall be redeemed by a sum of money representing its value); nevertheless make me an Erub therewith?" "The Erub is not valid," was the answer. What is the difference between the two cases? Said R. Na'hman to Rabha: "If thou wilt measure a whole Kur of salt and present me with it, I shall tell thee the answer: If the loaf of bread was ordinary when it was deposited as an Erub, the fact, that at twilight it becomes doubtful, whether it is consecrated or not, does not destroy its validity as a legal Erub, but if the loaf of bread was deposited while yet consecrated, the doubt existing at twilight whether it had already become ordinary does not nullify its sanctity as a consecrated object, and as a consecrated object cannot be deposited as an Erub, the validity of the Erub, is impaired."

MISHNA: A man may make his Erub, conditional and say: If foes come from the east, my Erub shall be valid for the west; should they come from the west, my Erub shall be good for the east; should they come from both sides, I am at liberty to go in what direction I please; should they not come from either side, I am like the rest of my townsmen. Should a sage come from the east, my Erub shall be valid for the east; should one come from the west, my Erub shall be valid for the west; should one come from each side, I am at liberty to go in which direction I please; should none come from either side, I am like the rest of my townsmen. R. Jehudah. said: If one of the two sages (should they come at the same time) had been the man's teacher, he must go to meet his teacher; if both had been his teachers, he may go in which direction he pleases.

GEMARA: "R. Jehudah said: 'If one of the two sages,'" etc. What is the reason of the dissension of the sages from R. Jehudah's opinion? Because it frequently happens, that a man has a greater fondness for his colleague than for his teacher.

Rabh said: This part of the Mishna (wherein R. Jehudah states, that "if both sages had been the man's teachers, he may go in whichever direction he pleases") does not hold good, because Ayo taught: R. Jehudah said: "A man cannot make an object conditional upon two contingencies and in this case of the Erub he may make it conditional upon the arrival of a sage from either the west or the east, but not upon sages arriving from opposite directions." Why can he not make it conditional upon the arrival of sages from opposite directions? Because R. Jehudah does not admit of the theory of premeditated choice (i.e., he does not consent to a man deciding upon a certain thing on one day and declaring that it had been his intention to decide in that manner since the day before), hence if two sages come from opposite directions, the man cannot say, that he had intended to meet the sage towards whom he went at the time he deposited the Erub, i.e., on the day before.

If R. Jehudah does not hold to the theory of premeditated choice why does he consent to a man making an Erub and saying: "If the sage come from the east, my Erub shall be good for the east, and if from the west, for the west." His choice is certainly dependent upon two conditions; first the condition, that the sage will come from either one of two directions, and second, that he may not come at all, in which case his Erub is of no account. If the sage arrived on the morrow, and the man will go forward to meet him, he (the man) will be compelled to claim a premeditated choice saying, that he had intended when depositing his Erub to go in that direction and that would be incorrect; for it may be, that at the time the Erub was made, the sage himself did not know from which direction he would come.

Said R. Johanan: The statement of Ayo in the name of R. Jehudah, that a man may make his Erub conditional upon the arrival of a sage from the east or west holds good, only if the sage had already started on his way and was no more than four thousand ells away from the man [i.e., if he or his Erub was at the time when the man deposited his Erub already within the legal limit established through the deposition of his (the sage's) own Erub]. Hence it was not a premeditated choice on the part of the man dependent upon the two conditions cited, for the sage was already on his way and his coming from a certain direction was an accomplished fact.

Why does Rabh say, that the Mishna does not hold good because of Ayo's statement? Let him say on the contrary, that Ayo's statement does not hold good, because the Mishna opposes it? Nay; it would not be proper; for we have learned elsewhere, that R. Jehudah does not hold to the theory of premeditated choice. Ula, however, declares, that Ayo's statement should be discountenanced on account of the Mishna (and as for the report, that R. Jehudah discards the theory of premeditated choice, Ula declares, that on the contrary, he holds it to be good).

Said Rabha to R. Na'hman: Who is the Tana, who holds, that the sages also discountenance the theory of premeditated choice? For we have learned as follows: If one man said to five others: "I will make an Erub for any one of you whom I may choose, and if I desire, he shall be permitted to go within its limits, and if not, he must not do so." If he made his decision, while it was yet day (before the Sabbath set in) his Erub is valid; but if he made his decision after dark, his Erub is not valid, (because it was not known at twilight which man he had chosen). R. Na'hman was silent and did not answer.

Should he have said, that this was according to the school of Ayo? He had not heard of Ayo's decree. Said R. Joseph: Wouldst thou ignore the other Tanaim? There are other Tanaim who dispute the above decision, as we have learned: If a man said: "I will make an Erub for all the Sabbaths of the ensuing year. If I then choose to go, I shall do so, and if not, I shall not." If he made his decision while it was yet day on the day preceding Sabbath, he may go, but if he made his decision after dusk, R. Simeon says, his Erub is still valid, and the sages say, it is not. (Hence there are sages who do not hold to the theory of premeditated choice.)

Have we not heard elsewhere, that R. Simeon does not hold to the theory of premeditated choice? This would be a contradiction made by R. Simeon to himself? Therefore learn to the contrary: (R. Simeon says, the Erub is not valid, and the sages say it is.) Why this question? Can it not be, that R. Simeon does not hold the theory of premeditated choice to be good where biblical laws are concerned but does hold the theory good for rabbinical laws? R. Joseph maintains, that one who admits of the theory of premeditated choice does so for both biblical and rabbinical laws, and one who discountenances the theory does so for both kinds of laws.

MISHNA: R. Eliezer said: When a festival precedes or succeeds a Sabbath (by one day), a man should prepare two Erubin and say: My first Erub is to be valid for the east and my second for the west; or my first for the west and the second for the east. My Erub is valid for the first day and the second day I am like the rest of my townsmen, or my Erub is good for the second day and the first day I am like my townsmen. The sages however hold, that one may prepare his Erub for one direction only; otherwise it is not valid at all; also that he must prepare his Erub for both days, or it is not valid at all. But how must this be done? One carries out the Erub to the place, where he means to deposit it on the eve of the first day of rest and remains with it until dusk, when he carries it back with him. He then brings the Erub out again on the second day, remains with it till dark and then cats it and goes away. It is obvious, that in this manner he gains his walk beyond the Sabbatical limit and he gains by eating his Erub. Should his Erub have been eaten on the first day, it is a legal Erub for the first day only; but not for the second day. R. Eliezer said to them: "Thus ye acknowledge to me that they are two distinct holidays (i.e., that the sanctification of one day is not equal to that of the other)."

GEMARA: What do the sages mean to tell us: If a man prepares his Erub for one direction, it is good for both days and if he prepares it for both days it is good for one direction? What need is there of this repetition, is it not one and the same thing? Nay; the sages mean to say to R. Eliezer: "Wilt thou not acknowledge, that it is not permitted to make two Erubin for one day, one of which shall be good for the South for one half of the day and the other be good for the North for the other half of the day?" and he answered: "Yea." "Then," rejoined the sages, "in the same manner as this is not permitted, it is also not allowed to make Erubin good for both days, which should in addition be also good on one day for the east and on the other for the west." [What answer could R. Eliezer make to this? He might say, that in the case of the two Erubin for one day, the sanctification of that one day continues throughout the entire time of the validity of the Erub, whereas in the case of the Erubin for both days, the sanctification of the one day (Sabbath) is not the same as that of the other day (the festival); therefore a separate Erub may be made for each sanctification in a different direction.] Said R. Eliezer to the sages again: "Let us suppose now, that a man did not make an Erub, but on the eve of the first day went to the place, where he should have made it, personally and declared that he would take his Sabbath-rest there. Would this hold good also for the second day? Nay, he would have to return on the following day and again declare his intention of resting there the next day, and then it would be lawful? The same theory applies to an Erub. If he deposited it on the eve of the first day, and it had been eaten when deposited, he would have to make another Erub for the second day?" and they answered, "Yea." "Now will ye not acknowledge that the two days have each a separate degree of sanctification?"

[What reply can the sages make to this? They may declare that the fact of there being a distinct degree of sanctification for each day is rather doubtful to them and for that reason they desire to enforce the more rigorous interpretation of the ordinance both ways, namely, that an Erub must not be made for each of the two directions, lest there be but one degree of sanctification for both days and that one Erub cannot serve for both days, lest there be a different degree of sanctification for each day.]

Again the sages said to R. Eliezer: "How is it, if no Erub at all was made on the eve of the first day? Thou wilt acknowledge that a man cannot go and make an Erub on the eve of the second day?" and he answered, "Yea." "Then," rejoined the sages, "thou thereby dost admit, that there is but one degree of sanctification for both days." [What will R. Eliezer say to this? He will say, on the contrary, that there are two degrees of sanctification and just for that reason one must not make the Erub on the eve of the second day, because one must not prepare for a festival on the Sabbath or vice versa.]

The Rabbis taught: "If one made an Erub on the eve of the first day by means of his feet (i.e., by standing at the place where he intends to rest) he must do so again on the eve of the second day. If he made an Erub (of victuals) on the eve of the first day and the Erub was consumed, it does not hold good for the second day. Such is the dictum of Rabbi. R. Jehudah, however, said. "This is like driving an ass and leading a camel" (i.e., R. Jehudah means to say this: If the two days have but one degree of sanctification and the Erub was made for both days, the maker loses the two thousand ells in the opposite direction from that towards which his Erub was made, and merely gains two thousand ells in the one direction towards which his Erub was made. If the two days have different degrees of sanctification and hence the Erub is valid only for one day, the maker of the Erub should on the second day be on a par with the rest of his townsmen, but in reality he only has two thousand ells on the way back to the town and no more). R. Simeon ben Gamaliel and R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan ben Berokah, however, both say, that if a man made an Erub with his feet on the eve of the first day it suffices for the second day and if he made an Erub (of victuals) on the eve of the first day and it was consumed, he is exempt from making it on the eve of the second day. Said Rabh: "The Halakha prevails according to the opinion of the four old sages and in conformity with R. Eliezer, who says, that the two days have different degrees of sanctification; and the four old sages are: R. Simeon ben Gamaliel, R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan ben Berokah, R. Elazar ben R. Simeon and R. Jose ben R. Jehudah. The last of these is generally quoted by Rabbi anonymously wherever his opinion seems to be justifiable and according to another version, one of the four sages is R. Elazar ben Samua instead of R. Jose ben R. Jehudah. Rabh's information on this point was derived from a tradition, which was to the effect, that those four sages held in accordance with R. Eliezer concerning the two degrees of sanctification for both days.

R. Jehudah said: If one made an Erub on the eve of the first day with his feet, he must do likewise on the eve of the second day, and if he made an Erub on the eve of the first day with bread, he must make it in like manner on the eve of the second day. If he made an Erub on the eve of the first day with bread which was lost, he may make it on the eve of the second day with his feet, but if he made it with his feet in the first instance he must not make it with bread in the second instance, because making an Erub with bread to commence with on Sabbath or on a festival would be an infraction of the law prohibiting the preparing on a Sabbath for a festival or vice versa. If a man made an Erub with bread on the eve of the first day, he must make it with bread on the eve of the second day also and, according to Samuel, he should use the same bread in both cases (for if he uses new bread in the second instance it will be a case of preparing on a Sabbath for a festival). Said R. Ashi: We can adduce this also from our Mishna, which teaches: "But how must this be done? One carries out the Erub to the place, where he means to deposit it on the eve of the first day of rest and remains with it until dusk, when he carries it back with him; he then brings the Erub out again on the second day, remains with it until dusk, then eats it and goes away." (The fact that it says, "he carries it back with him and then brings it out again," is proof that it must be the same Erub.) The sages that differ with Samuel and assert that new bread may be used on the eve of the second day maintain, that the Mishna merely administers good advice and tells us, that we need not trouble ourselves to make a new Erub in case the first one is lost.

MISHNA: R. Jehudah said: "If a man apprehend that the new year will be celebrated two days, he must prepare two Erubin." He then says: My Erub of the first day shall be valid for the east and of the second day for the west; or of the first day for the west and of the second day for the east. My Erub shall be valid for the first day, and on the second I am like my townsmen; or my Erub shall be valid for the second day and on the first I am like my townsmen. The sages however did not coincide with him.

R. Jehudah further said: "A man may conditionally separate (the heave-offering from) a basket of fruit on the first day of the new year and eat it on the second day; likewise an egg which is laid on the first day of the festival may be eaten on the second. The sages however do not coincide with him.

R. Dosa ben Harchinas said: He who stands before the pulpit to pray on the first day of the new year must say: Strengthen us, O Lord our God, on this day of the new moon, whether to-day or to-morrow (be the true day). And on the morrow he says the same prayer with the variation "whether this day or yesterday be the true one." The sages, however, do not agree with him.

GEMARA: Who are the sages, that do not coincide with R, Jehudah? Said Rabh: That is R. Jose, as we have learned in a Boraitha: The sages agree with R. Eliezer that "if a man apprehend that the new year will be celebrated two days, he should prepare two Erubin. He then says: My Erub of the first day shall be valid for the east and of the second day for the west; or of the first day for the west and of the second day for the east. My Erub shall be valid for the first day and on the second I am like my townsmen; or my Erub shall be valid for the second day and on the first I am like my townsmen." R. Jose, however, does not consent to this. (He holds that if the witnesses come before the high court in the afternoon of the first day that had been kept holy and declare that the next day is New Year, both days are nevertheless holy and are of one degree of sanctification.)

We have learned in a Boraitha: How does R. Jehudah explain his dictum, that "a man may conditionally separate (the heave-offering from) a basket of fruit on the first day of the New Year and eat it on the second?" Thus: If there were two baskets of unseparated fruit before a man on the first day of the New Year he may say: "If to-day is the ordinary day and to-morrow is the holy day, let the heave-offering separated from this basket of fruit also serve for the other, and if to-day is the holy day and to-morrow the ordinary, then I have said nothing." He then designates the fruit which he calls heave-offering and lets it remain. On the morrow again he may say: If to-day is an ordinary day, let the heave-offering of this basket also serve for the other, but if to-day be a holy day I have said nothing. He may then designate part of the fruit in the one basket and call it heave-offering and eat the remainder in both baskets. R. Jose however prohibits this not only for the two days of the new year but for the two days of every other festival, which is celebrated in exile.

It happened that a stag was caught on the first day of a holiday (in exile) at the house of the Exilarch and on the second day it was slaughtered. R. Na'hman and R. Hisda partook of the stag, but R. Shesheth would not do so. Said R. Na'hman: "What shall we do with R. Shesheth who does not eat venison?" Rejoined R. Shesheth: "How can I eat this venison; for did not Issi teach in a Boraitha [or a Boraitha taught, that Issi said], that R. Jose would not permit this to be done even during the two days of a holiday in exile?"

Once R. Shesheth met Rabba bar Samuel and asked him: "Did master teach anything regarding the sanctification of the holidays?" Answered Rabba: "Yea, I taught in a Boraitha, that R. Jose coincides with the sages, as far as the two days of a holiday in exile are concerned." Rejoined R. Shesheth: "If thou shouldst meet any of the Exilarch's household, say nothing to them about this Boraitha."

It once happened that herbs were brought to the city of Mehuzza on a festival. Rabha went out and noticed, that the herbs were somewhat withered. He permitted the herbs to be bought, saying: "It is obvious, that these herbs were not gathered on this day, and the only objection that might be made to their being purchased can be, that they were brought from beyond the techoom (legal limits)." The law, however, ordains, that if things are brought for one Israelite from without the techoom, another Israelite may use them, and in this case, where the herbs were brought even for the Gentile inhabitants they can in so much greater a degree be used by Israelites. Subsequently, however, he observed, that herbs were brought in large quantities, so he prohibited the purchase of them on a festival.

The men whose occupation was to prepare baldachins for marriages once cut off branches of myrtle on the second day of a holiday in exile. The moment it became dark, Rabhina permitted the people to smell the myrtle. Said Rabha bar Tachlipha to Rabhina: Master should have prohibited this, for these people are ignorant (and if thou wilt permit this, they may ignore the second day of the festival entirely). R. Shmaya opposed this: "Thou sayest, because they are ignorant, and even were they intelligent men, would it be allowed? Is it not necessary to allow sufficient time after the Sabbath to expire until the branches can be cut off afresh?" They finally went and asked Rabha and he decided that it was necessary to allow sufficient time to expire until the branches could be cut anew.

"R. Dosa ben Harchinas said," etc. Said Rabba: When we were in the college of R. Huna, a question was propounded by us as follows: "Must the reference to the day of the new moon be added to the prayers recited on the day of the New Year?" Shall we assume, that because there are separate additional sacrifices for each, that the reference to the day of the new moon shall be added to the prayers of the New Year, or because the New Year is mentioned in the prayer as the "day of Remembrance" such mention will suffice for both occasions? R. Huna answered us by quoting the Mishna: R. Dosa ben Harchinas said: He who stands before the pulpit to pray on the first day of the New Year must say: "Strengthen us, O Lord our God, on this day of the new moon, etc." Does not R. Dosa state this in order to demonstrate that the day of the new moon must be explicitly mentioned? Nay, he simply means to make the prayer conditional but not because special mention must be made of the day of the new moon. It seems to us, that such is truly the case, because further on the Boraitha states, that so did R. Dosa act on all the days of the new moon throughout the year; but the sages did not coincide with him.

Now, if it be said, that the prayer was made conditional it is correct, (because there was a doubt concerning the exact day at each recurring new moon) but if it be said, that the new moon must be mentioned in the prayer especially, why should the sages not agree with him?

An objection was made: When New Year falls on a Sabbath, Beth Shammai say, ten benedictions are to be recited during the prayer and Beth Hillel say "only nine." [The first three are benedictions of praise, the last three benedictions of thanks; the Sabbath benediction, and the three pertaining to New Year, viz., the one in which God is proclaimed King (Malkhioth), the one referring to God's remembrance of his creatures (Zikhronoth) and the one referring to the sounding of the cornet (Shophroth), but according to Beth Hillel the Sabbath benediction is included in those pertaining to the New Year, hence there are only nine.] Now if we say, that the benediction for the new moon must be especially mentioned in the Musaph (additional prayer) then according to Beth Shammai, there should be eleven benedictions in all.

Said R. Zera: "With the benediction of the new moon it is different; because if the new moon fall on a Sabbath no separate benediction is made, but it is included in the Sabbath benediction at the morning and evening prayer; the benediction of the, new moon is also mentioned in the Musaph-prayer in conjunction with the new year benediction." Do Beth Shammai indeed maintain, that if the new moon fall on a Sabbath the benediction pertaining to it is included in that of Sabbath? Have we not learned, that if the new moon fall on Sabbath, Beth Shammai hold, that eight benedictions must be recited in the prayer and Beth Hillel only seven? This question is not decided.

Rabba said: "When I was at the college of R. Huna the question arose, whether the benediction of the time should be recited in the New Year and Day of Atonement prayers. Shall we say, that because these holy days only come from time to time, the benediction of time should be made, or, because the Bible does not classify them as festivals, no such benediction need be made? R. Huna could not answer the question but when I subsequently came to R. Jehudah's college, the latter said he made such a benediction even over a new pumpkin. I then said to him, that I did not question the right to pronounce this benediction over anything whatever, but I wished to know whether it was compulsory to do this on the New Year and the Day of Atonement. He then answered: Rabh and Samuel both said, that the benediction of time must be recited only for each of the three festivals."

An objection was made: It is written [Ecclesiastes xi. 2]: "Give a portion to seven, and also to eight." R. Eliezer said that by "seven" is meant the seven days of the creation and by "eight" is meant the eight days of the circumcision. R. Jehoshua said: "By 'seven' is meant the seven days of Passover, by 'eight' is meant the eight days of the feast of Tabernacles and by 'also' is meant Pentecost, New Year and the Day of Atonement." May we not assume, that by this is meant, that the benediction of time must be pronounced on all these festivals? Nay; this simply means to state, that benedictions should be recited but no special benedictions are specified. It seems to us, that this is the correct explanation; for the benediction of time is certainly not recited on every one of the days of the festivals but only the first day. This is not the question, because the benediction of time must be recited in the course of the festival; if not on the first day, on the second and so on. At any event this benediction must be made over a goblet (of wine)? Shall we assume, however, that the above is in support of the dictum of R. Na'hman, who holds that the benediction of time may be recited even in the market and without a goblet? This is not the question either; for if a man does not recite this benediction on one day, he may do so on the next when he might come across a goblet. This would be feasible where the three (main) festivals and New Year are concerned, but how would it be with the Day of Atonement?

What should the man do? Should he pronounce the benediction over the goblet on the day preceding the Day of Atonement before dusk, he would then and there usher in the Day of Atonement, and as is well known, he must not eat or drink on that day. Should he pronounce the benediction and let the goblet stand until after the Day of Atonement? Have we not learned that one must drink the contents of the goblet immediately after pronouncing the benediction; otherwise he must not make the benediction at all? Should he pronounce the benediction and then give the goblet to a child? In that case, there would be fear, lest the child be accustomed to drinking on that day, and will continue to do so when grown and therefore the Halakha according to R. A'ha does not prevail. How, then, does the Halakha concerning the benediction of time on the New Year and the Day of Atonement prevail? The Rabbis sent the elder R. Yeimar to R. Hisda with instructions to observe how the latter proceeded on the eve of the New Year, and then to return and report what he had seen. When R. Hisda saw R. Yeimar (and upon questioning him as to his mission was told that he just called to see him) he said: If a wet piece of wood is lifted, it is obvious, that either the wood or its space is needed. (If thou camest thou certainly didst so with an object.) At about that time a goblet of wine was brought to R. Hisda and he pronounced the benediction of the day and also that of the time over it.

The Halakha prevails, that the benediction of time must be recited on the New Year and on the Day of Atonement and the Halakha also prevails that if a man forgot to recite it and was reminded of his negligence even in the market, he may recite it then and there.

Rabba said again: "When I was at the college of R. Huna, the question arose whether a young scholar, who fasted on the day preceding Sabbath must fast until night or in honor of the Sabbath break his fast earlier. R. Huna could not answer the question. I went to R. Jehudah and he could not answer this either." Said Rabha: "Let us see if we cannot decide this question ourselves from what we have learned in the following Boraitha: If the fast-day of the ninth of Abh fall on a Friday, bread may be brought to a man just before twilight of the size of an egg, and he should eat it, in order that he may not enter upon the observance of the Sabbath while still in pain."

We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Jehudah said: It once happened that we were sitting before R. Aqiba on the fast of the ninth of Abh, which fell on a Friday, and just before dusk a soft-boiled egg was brought to him which he swallowed without even salting it, and not because he desired to eat it in that manner; but because he wished to show his disciples how the Halakha was carried out. R. Jose, however, said, that a man must fast through the entire day until dusk.

R. Jose said to the sages: "Will ye not admit, that if the ninth of Abh fall on the day after Sabbath, a man must stop eating while it is yet day on Sabbath?" and they answered "Yea." "What difference is there then between entering in upon the observance of the Sabbath while still in pain and finishing the Sabbath under the same conditions?" asked R. Jose. They answered: "In the first instance he fasted all day; but in this instance he had been eating and drinking all day and was surely not in pain." Finally, however, Ula said that the Halakha prevailed according to R. Jose.

Do we then act according to the opinion of R. Jose? Have we not learned, (concerning the Boraitha in Tract Taanith which teaches) that Rabbon Gamaliel said: "On a Friday the fast need not be completed," that upon the death of Rabbon Gamaliel, R. Jehoshua came and sought to nullify his decree and R. Johanan ben Nouri arose and declared: "We see that the body always follows the head. As long as Rabbon Gamaliel lived, we abided by his decisions. Now that he is dead, thou wouldst abolish them. Jehoshua! We will not listen to thee. The Halakha prevailed according to R. Gamaliel and so must it remain," and there was none to contradict R. Johanan ben Nouri. (Thus we see, that the decree of R. Gamaliel was accepted and not that of R. Jose.) (This is no question!) In the generation of R. Gamaliel his decree was followed and in the generation of R. Jose, R. Jose's opinion prevailed.

And did they really act in accordance with R. Gamaliel's opinion during his generation? Have we not learned that R. Elazar ben Zadoc (who was certainly of R. Gamaliel's day) said: I am a descendant of Sanab of the tribe of Benjamin and it once happened that the ninth of Abh fell on a Sabbath, so we postponed it until the following day and we did not complete the fast because it was our holiday. Thus we see, that the fast was not completed because the tenth of Abh was a holiday and besides the fast-day was a postponed one. Had the ninth of Abh however fallen on a week-day, which for them would have been the eve of a festival, they would have completed the fast nevertheless and this is not in conformity with the decree of R. Gamaliel? Said Rabhina: How can ye compare that festival to our festivals. Their festival was not biblical and on a festival which is not biblical one may fast for three or four hours if he chooses. On a biblical festival, however, it is not allowed to complete the fast.

R. Joseph said: "I did not hear of this Halakha." Said Abayi: Thou didst relate this to us thyself, in reference to the Boraitha, that a fast-day must not be ordered on the days of the first of the month. (The occasion when R. Joseph related this is mentioned in Tract Taanith.) Mar Zutra related in the name of R. Huna: The Halakha prevails, that one may complete the fast until dusk.

REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE OVERSTEPPING OF THE LEGAL LIMITS ON THE SABBATH, AND MEASUREMENTS OF THE SABBATH-DISTANCE.

MISHNA: If foes, or an evil spirit (a fit of insanity?), caused one to go beyond the Sabbath limit, he after recovering his freedom must not move further than four ells; if the foes or the fit have carried him back within the limit, it is as if he had not gone beyond it. If they have carried him into another town, or into a pen or a fold for cattle, he according to Rabbon Gamaliel and R. Eliezer ben Azariah, may go about throughout the entire extent (of the town, pen or fold). R. Joshua and R. Aqiba maintain, that he must not move further than four ells. It once happened that these four sages came together from Parendisim (Brundusium, or Brindisi) and their vessel was still at sea on the Sabbath. Rabbon Gamaliel and R. Eliezer ben Azariah walked about throughout the whole vessel; but R. Joshua and R. Aqiba did not move beyond four ells, as they wished to take upon themselves the rigid observance. Once these four sages were on board a vessel and did not enter the harbor until after dark (on the eve of Sabbath); so they inquired of Rabbon Gamaliel: "What are we to do as to descending from the vessel?" He answered them: Ye may descend; for I observed, that we had already entered the limits of the Sabbath-distance before dusk.

GEMARA: The Rabbis taught: "There are three things, which cause a man to commit deeds against his own will and against the will of his Creator, viz.: Idolatry, and evil spirits and stress of poverty." [For what purpose do the Rabbis tell us this? In order, that we may pray God to deliver us from those evils.]

Three persons will never come to Gehenna: He who suffers from extreme poverty, he who suffers with a diseased stomach and one who is oppressed by the government, and others add also the man who is afflicted with a bad wife. [Why was the latter not mentioned in the first place? Because if one has a bad wife he should divorce her. Those however who declare that one who has a bad wife will not see Gehenna refer to those, who cannot afford to make a settlement upon their wives, or to those, who have children and cannot divorce their wives. For what purpose did the Rabbis tell us this? In order, that a man, who is subject to these misfortunes, should accept them with resignation.]

Three classes of human beings die in the possession of their power of speech, viz.: "A man who is suffering from a diseased stomach, a woman lying in and a man suffering with dropsy." [For what purpose are we taught to this effect? In order that shrouds may be prepared for such people.]

R. Na'hman said in the name of Samuel: If one went out beyond the Sabbath-limit and foes or an evil spirit brought him back within the limit, he must not move more than four ells from where he stands. Have we not learned this in our Mishna, which says, if foes or evil spirits carried him out and then brought him back it is as if he had never gone out at all; now is it not self-evident that if he went out of his own accord, he has only four ells of space in which to move? We might assume that the Mishna teaches us, if foes or evil spirits carried him out and he returned of his own accord, he has no more than four ells of space, but if he went out of his own accord and foes or evil spirits brought him back it would be as if he never went out at all, hence this teaching of Samuel.

Rabba was asked: "How is the law regarding one, who only had four ells to move in and was compelled to go out to obey nature's call?" and he answered: "Great is the honor of man, which supersedes even a biblical negative commandment."

The men of Neherdai said: If the man in question is prudent, he will enter the legal limits, perform his necessities and then go on.

Said R. Papa: "If fruit was carried beyond the legal limits and then even purposely brought back, the right to move it within the limits is not forfeited, because the fruit certainly did not go out beyond the limits of their own accord." R. Joseph bar Shmaya objected to this statement: "R. Nehemiah and R. Eliezer ben Jacob both said: The fruit which was carried out must not be handled when brought back unless this was done unintentionally, but if intentionally, they must not be handled?" Concerning this, there is a difference of opinion between Tanaim in a Boraitha elsewhere (and R. Papa holds with the Tana, who permits it).

Said R. Na'hman in the name of Samuel: "If one went out and did not know the legal distance he could traverse, he may walk on for a distance of two thousand medium steps. This will constitute the lawful limit of the Sabbath." He said again quoting the same authority: If one took his Sabbath-rest in a valley, and Gentiles made an enclosure around the valley on the Sabbath, he may go two thousand ells, but he may throw things over the entire extent of the valley." R. Huna said: "He may go two thousand ells, but may carry only for a distance of four ells." The reason R. Huna prohibits throwing is in precaution, lest the man throw a thing outside of his two thousand ells and go after it.

Hyya bar Rabh, however, said: He may go two thousand ells and may carry things inside of that limit.

Said R. Na'hman to R. Huna: "Do not refute the dictum of Samuel; for we have learned in a Boraitha in support of Samuel."

R. Huna said: "If one measured the legal distance on a Sabbath and his measurement came to an end in one half of a court, he may avail himself of that half of the court only." Is this not self-evident? If he ended his measurement in one half of a court, why should he not avail himself of that half? We might assume, that if the one half is permitted he might be tempted to use the other half also, so we are told that this precaution is not necessary.

R. Na'hman said: "Huna agrees with me, that if in measuring the Sabbath-distance, the measurement end in the edge of a house, one may throw things into the house although he must not go into it himself, for the edge of the house is a fixed sign for him and will remind him, that he must not enter the house." Said R. Huna the son of R. Nathan: "The necessity for a precautionary measure to prevent the man from entering the house forms the subject of a discussion between Tanaim as follows: If foes or an evil spirit have carried the man into another town, or into a pen or a fold for cattle, he may, according to Rabbon Gamaliel and R. Elazar ben Azariah, go about throughout the entire extent (of such a place); R. Joshua and R. Aqiba, however, maintain, that he must not move further than four ells." Now, we must assume that those who permit the traversing of the entire extent of such places do so because they do not fear that the man will traverse the whole valley where those places are situated, and those who only allow four ells, do so, because they regard this precautionary measure necessary. The same argument applies also to throwing, viz.: Those who have no fear that the man will traverse the entire valley, permit throwing throughout the pen or fold where the man Is ensconced and those who allow him only four ells hold the same precautionary measure necessary where throwing and going after it is concerned.

Rabh said: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Gamaliel. where a pen, fold or ship is concerned," but Samuel said: "Only as far as a ship is concerned, but not as regards a pen or a fold." Thus we see that, as to a ship, all agree the Halakha prevails according to R. Gamaliel. What is the reason therefor? Said Rabba: "Because already before the Sabbath set in, the man is within the confines of the ship and although the ship was involuntarily carried out beyond the legal limits, the man had prepared his Sabbath-rest there." R. Zera said, however: "The reason is: that the man on board of the ship did not have four ells to move in, for the ship moves more than four ells every time it lurches foward, consequently he does not come under the law of four ells and may go throughout the entire extent of the ship." Rabba rejoined: "Thou referrest to a man who entered the ship while in motion. Concerning this, there is no difference between any of the Tanaim; even R. Aqiba permits the traversing of the entire ship, but they differ concerning a man who entered the ship while it was anchored."

Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak: From the Mishna itself we may infer, that there was no difference concerning a ship while in motion, because it states, that R. Joshua and R. Aqiba did not move beyond four ells, as they wished to take upon themselves the rigid observance. Were it not permitted at all, why should it say, that they wished to take upon themselves the rigid observance, they would have to obey the law?

Said R. A'ha the son of Rabha to R. Ashi: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Gamaliel where a ship is concerned." Then, there must be some who maintain that the Halakha does not prevail according to R. Gamaliel. Yea, there are, as we have learned in the following Boraitha: Hananiah the son of R. Jehoshua's brother said: "The whole day that R. Gamaliel and R. Aqiba were on board the ship they disputed concerning this Halakha, and yesterday my uncle affirmed the Halakha to the effect, that as regards a ship at anchor it prevails according to R. Gamaliel and as for a pen or a fold it prevails according to R. Aqiba."

R. Hananiah propounded a question: Is there such a thing as a legal limit above ten spans from the ground or not? Concerning a pillar ten spans high and four spans wide one side of which was outside of the legal limit there is no question; for it is equal to the ground itself, but concerning a pillar, that was ten spans high and less than four spans wide or a man who went on board of a ship, does the law of legal limits apply or not? R. Hosea answered: "Come and hear! It once happened that four sages came together from Parendisim, etc. (see Mishna). If we say, that the law of legal limits applies to objects higher than ten spans, then it can be understood why R. Joshua and R. Aqiba took upon themselves the rigid observance (for concerning a ship in motion they do not disagree with the other sages), viz.: on account of the law of legal limits, but if this law does not apply to a ship, what rigid observance could they have taken upon themselves?" Rejoined R. Hananiah: "It may be that their ship was passing through shallow water, as related elsewhere by Rabha, and was not over ten spans from the ground."

Come and hear! The seven Halakhas related on a Sabbath morn in the presence of R. Hisda at Sura were related on the same evening in the presence of Rabha at Pumbaditha. Who could have decreed them? No one, but Elijah? Hence we see, that there is no such thing as legal limits above ten spans from the ground? Nay. It may be that those Halakhas were transmitted from one school to the other by Joseph the evil One, who did not observe the Sabbath.

Come and hear! If one say: I wish to be a Nazarite at the coming of the Messiah, he may drink wine on a Sabbath or on a festival but must not do so during the week-days. (For Messiah is liable to come at any time.) The Boraitha would be correct if we assume, that there is a legal limit above ten spans from the ground, because Messiah will then not come on the Sabbath or on a festival, but if there is no legal limit above ten spans, the man should not drink wine even on those days, because the Messiah might come. In that case it is different: for it is written [Malachi iii. 23]: "Behold, I send unto you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the day of the Lord, the great and the dreadful." Hence, if Elijah did not come on the day preceding Sabbath, he may drink on the Sabbath. If this is so, then he may drink on a week-day also providing Elijah did not come on the preceding day. It might be assumed, however, that Elijah had already come and appeared before the high court and for that reason the man should not drink on any day, lest Elijah had already come, then this would apply also to the Sabbath? There is a tradition among Israelites that it is an assured fact, that Elijah will not come on the eve of a Sabbath or a festival. If that is so, why should the man not be permitted to drink wine on the eve of Sabbath? Because although Elijah will not come, the Messiah himself might come.

Thus it must be assumed, that if there is a legal limit above ten spans, a man who wishes to be a Nazarite on the day of the coming of the Messiah should be permitted to drink wine not only on Sabbath and the festivals but also on the day following Sabbath, because Elijah cannot come on the Sabbath? The sages who prohibited a man of that kind to drink wine on a weekday were themselves in doubt as to the validity of a legal limit above ten spans and only made it more rigid for the man on general principles.

"And did not enter the harbor until after dark," etc. It was taught in a Boraitha, that R. Gamaliel had a telescope, through which he could see for a distance of two thousand ells on land and on sea. If a man wishes to measure the depth of a valley, he should use one of those telescopes and if he should wish to measure a tree, he should observe his shadow, measure himself and his shadow and the shadow of the tree and calculate the proportion.

Nehemiah the son of R. Hanilayi was engrossed in thinking about a Halakha and inadvertently stepped out beyond the legal limits. Said R. Hisda to R. Na'hman: "Thy disciple Nehemiah is in trouble," and R. Na'hman answered: "Make him a partition with men and let him come back."

R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak sat behind Rabha who sat in the presence of R. Na'hman. Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak to Rabha: "How was the case when R. Hisda asked R. Na'hman concerning Nehemiah who had overstepped the legal limits? Shall we say, that there were sufficient men on hand who had made an Erub at the limits and could therefore go out to Nehemiah then the question was merely whether the Halakha prevailed according to R. Gamaliel, who said, that where there is a partition, even if a man had not declared his intention to rest there on the Sabbath, he may avail himself of it and traverse its entire extent, or that there were not sufficient men who had made an Erub who could reach Nehemiah and the question presented itself, whether the Halakha prevailed according to R. Eliezer, that if a man went out two ells beyond the limits he may return, and Nehemiah did not go out further than that." Is this not self-evident? For if there were sufficient men to reach Nehemiah, why did R. Hisda ask R. Na'hman? Rabh had already decided that the Halakha mentioned prevailed according to R. Gamaliel and for R. Hisda Rabh was the final authority? The question was merely then, whether R. Hisda could make a partition with men who had not made an Erub, at the end of two ells beyond the limit, which according to R. Eliezer was free to everybody, so that Nehemiah who had gone further than two ells beyond the limit could avail himself of that partition and return.

R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak objected to the above, addressing Rabha: "Have we not learned in a Boraitha: 'If the wall of a booth fell in on a festival, one must not use a man, or an animal or vessels or put up a bed and cover it with a sheet in order to fill in the gap, because a temporary tent must not be erected on a festival to commence with and so much less on a Sabbath?'" Answered Rabha: Thou quotest this Boraitha but I can quote another which states: "A man can make a wall of his comrade, that he may be able to eat a meal or drink or sleep in a booth (the wall of which had fallen in); he may also put up a bed and cover it with a sheet to keep the sun off from a corpse or from food."

These two Boraithas are contradictory to each other? This.presents no difficulty. One of them is according to the opinion of R. Eliezer and the other according to the opinion of the sages.

It happened once, that some baldachin-makers brought in water through a partition formed by men. Samuel punished them, saying: "This was done in an emergency where a man had overstepped the legal limits accidentally but ye do this 'purposely.'"

It once happened that flasks of wine were thrown out of Rabha's house on the road in the city of Mehuzza. When Rabha came from his college, a number of men followed him as usual, and thus relying upon the partition formed by them, someone carried the flasks back into the house. Next Sabbath, the same thing happened, but Rabha would not permit the flasks to be carried back to the house, saying, that this time it might seem as if it were done on purpose. In like manner straw was brought into the house of Levi, hay to the house of Zera, and water into the house of R. Shimi bar Hyya.

MISHNA: One who is authorized to go beyond the prescribed limit on important business pertaining to public or private safety and is told, that "it is already done," is at liberty to go two thousand ells in any direction. If he was still within the prescribed limit, it is as if he had not gone out at all, for all those who go forth on an errand of safety, are permitted to return to their homes on Sabbath.

GEMARA: What is meant by "if he was still within the prescribed limit"? Said Rabha: "This means to impart to us, that if he had not gone out beyond the limit, it was as if he had not left his house. Is this not self-evident? I would say, that if he had gone out of his house he forfeits his right to go two thousand ells in any direction he chooses, and we are told, that such is not the case." R. Shimi bar Hyya however said: "This means to state, that if the man had already gone beyond the usual limit but had not yet gone out of the additional limit allowed him by the sages for the errand, it is regarded as if he had not overstepped his own ordinary limit." Upon what point do they differ? Upon the permissibility of one end of a limit including another established limited distance adjoining it. The latter holds, that this point may be depended upon, while the former holds that it cannot.

"For all those who go forth on an errand of safety, "etc. Even such as go beyond four thousand ells? In the first part of the Mishna it is stated that they only have two thousand ells in each direction? What question is this? This is a case of where a man goes forth on an errand of safety, and on such an errand it may be permitted to go beyond four thousand ells. If there is a question it can be made upon the following Mishna: "Those who go to assist others in case of conflagration, or of an attack of robbers, or of flood, or of rescuing people from the ruins of a falling building are considered for the time being as inhabitants of that place, and may go thence on the Sabbath, two thousand ells in every direction." Thus here it is stated, that they may go only two thousand ells and our Mishna does not limit the distance? Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh: Our Mishna means to imply, that they may even return to their homes with all their implements of war, as we have learned in a Boraitha: In former times, they used to deposit their arms in a house nearest to the fortifications of the city. Once it happened, however, that the enemy was informed of the fact, that the Israelites had stored their arms, so they pursued them and in endeavoring to enter the house to gain possession of their arms, the Israelites trampled more of their own to death than were killed by the enemy. Since that time it was ordered to carry their arms back to their homes.

R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak however said: This presents no difficulty: If the Israelites are victorious, they have only two thousand ells in which they may go in every direction, but if they are defeated, they may escape as far as possible.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh: If enemies besieged cities inhabited by Israelites, the latter must not go outside of the cities with their arms and must not violate the Sabbath, providing the enemies were there on account of money-matters; but if they were there for the purpose of slaughter, the Sabbath may be violated and arms be carried on Sabbath. If a city near the boundary of the country is besieged even on account of a trivial business matter such as straw or hay, arms may be carried and the Sabbath may be violated. Said R. Joseph bar Minyumi in the name of R. Na'hman: "Babylon is considered as a city near the boundary," and this dictum was explained to mean the city of Neherdai (which was surrounded on one side by Gentile neighbors and on the other side by Israelites).

MISHNA: If a man sit down by the road-side (towards dark on the eve of Sabbath), then gets up and observes, that he is near a town, he must not enter the town; for it had not been his intention to do this. Such is the dictum of R. Meir; but R. Jehudah permits him to enter. R. Jehudah said: "It once happened that R. Tarphon entered a town although it was not his intention to do so."

One who falls asleep on the eve of Sabbath while on the road and thus knows not that night has set in, is permitted (upon awaking) to go two thousand ells in any direction. Such is the decree of R. Johanan ben Nouri; but the sages hold, that he has only the right to move four ells. R. Eliezer said: "And he himself forms the centre of the four ells." R. Jehudah however said: He can go four ells in whichever direction he pleases. Still R. Jehudah admitted, that if the man had made his choice (which direction to take) he must not afterwards (change his mind and) go in another direction. Should there be two persons so situated (i.e., form the centre of the four ells they are allowed to move in), and part of the four ells permitted to one is within the limits of the other, they may meet and take their meals together in the centre of their joint space, provided that neither exceed his own limits by going into those of his neighbor. If there are three persons so situated and part of the four ells occupied by the middle one forms part of the space belonging to each of the other two, the one situated in the middle is at liberty to meet each of the others, or each of the others may meet him; but the two on each side of him must not meet each other. Said R. Simeon: What can this be compared to? Three courts opening into each other and also opening into public ground. If the two outer courts have combined in an Erub with the middle one, one is at liberty to carry things between the middle court and each of the outer ones, but between the two outer courts one must not carry or convey anything.

GEMARA: We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Jehudah said: It once happened that R. Tarphon while on the road was overtaken by dusk on the eve of Sabbath and stayed outside of the town over night. In the morning the cattle-herders met him and said: "Rabbi, the town is not far distant. Enter." So he entered the town, went into the college and lectured all day. Said R. Aqiba to R. Jehudah: Wouldst thou cite this as an example? Perhaps it had been the intention of R. Tarphon to enter the town previously (i.e., he was within two thousand ells of it) or the college was included with the legal limits allowed R. Tarphon.

"Such is the decree of R. Johanan ben Nouri." Rabba propounded a question: What is the intent of R. Johanan's decree? Does he hold that things having no particular owner, if situated at a certain place on the Sabbath, acquire the right to their resting-place (i.e., may be carried for a distance of two thousand ells in any direction)? And the Mishna should have commenced by citing an instance of this kind. Why does it give the instance of a man who had fallen asleep, whom the sages consider the same as a thing having no particular owner? In order to show the firmness of the sages, who, though agreeing that the man when awake, is entitled to two thousand ells in each direction, whence we might assume that he is entitled to the same privilege when asleep, we are told that such is not the case; or, in order to show that R. Johanan ben Nouri does not hold, that a thing having no particular owner acquires the right to be carried for a distance of two thousand ells in every direction, but that a man when asleep is entitled to this privilege, merely because he is entitled to it when awake.

Said R. Joseph: "Come and hear: We have learned that if rain had fallen on the eve of a festival, the rain-water acquires the right of (being carried) two thousand ells in every direction; but if rain had fallen on a biblical festival, the rain-water has the same right (of being carried for the same distance) as the inhabitants of the place where it had fallen (have the right of walking)." Now, if we say, that R. Johanan holds, that a thing having no particular owner, if situated at a certain place on Sabbath, acquires the right of (being carried) two thousand ells in every direction, then the Boraitha is in conformity with his opinion; but if we say, that he does not hold to that effect, according to whose opinion is the Boraitha, certainly not according to that of the sages?

Said R. Jacob bar Idi in the name of R. Jehoshua ben Levi: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Johanan ben Nouri." Said R. Zera to R. Jacob: "Didst thou hear R. Jehoshua himself declare this, or dost thou merely infer this from another ruling made by him?" And he answered: "I heard him declare it." What ruling could R. Zera have referred to, which R. Jehoshua ben Levi had made? The ruling made by R. Jehoshua ben Levi elsewhere, that the Halakha always prevails according to the Tana, who makes the laws regarding Erubin more lenient. Why was it necessary for R. Jehoshua to make both statements? Said R. Zera: It was necessary; for had he said merely, that the Halakha prevails according to R. Johanan ben Nouri, we might assume that it always prevails thus, whether it be more lenient or more rigorous than another; hence we are told, that the Halakha prevails according to the one who is the more lenient regarding the laws of Erubin.

Let him say then, that the Halakha prevails according to the one who is the more lenient with the laws of Erubin, and that will cover the case of R. Johanan who is more lenient. Nay; it was also necessary to make the statement regarding R. Johanan exclusively; because it might be assumed that the Halakha prevails according to the more lenient interpretation where one opinion is opposed by the opinion of another individual, or where the opinion of a number (of sages) is opposed by the opinion of another number (of sages), but if the opinion of one is opposed by that of a number, the latter opinion prevails whether it be lenient or rigorous; hence we are told that the opinion of R. Johanan ben Nouri prevailed although opposed by a number of sages, and from this the rule is adduced that as far as the laws of Erubin are concerned the more lenient Halakha prevails even if the opinion of one is opposed by a number (of sages).

R. Papa, however, said: "Both statements made by R. Jehoshua ben Levi are necessary, because, had he simply stated, that the Halakha of the more lenient Tana only prevails, we might have assumed that he referred only to Erubin of courts and not to Erubin of legal limits; therefore he also stated the case of R. Johanan ben Nouri in order to demonstrate that he referred also to Erubin of legal limits."

R. Ashi said: "Both statements made by R. Jehoshua ben Levi are necessary because, had he only made the statement concerning the Halakha of the more lenient Tana, it might have been assumed that he referred to an Erub that had been made for a number of Sabbaths and had gradually dwindled, but not to such Erubin as had been made afresh; hence he also made the statement concerning R. Johanan ben Nouri in order to emphasize the fact that the more lenient Halakhoth prevail even in the instances of newly made Erubin."

R. Jacob and R. Zreiqa both said: "In all instances where R. Aqiba differs with an individual the Halakha prevails according to R. Aqiba. In all instances where R. Jose differs even with a number of sages the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, and in all instances where Rabbi differs with an individual, the Halakha prevails according to Rabbi." For what purpose is this statement made? Shall we act accordingly or is this merely a vague statement? R. Assi said: "Yea; we must act accordingly. Where R. Aqiba differs with an individual we must act in accordance with R. Aqiba's opinion; where R. Jose differs with a number of sages we must act in conformity with R. Jose's opinion." R. Hyya bar Abba, however, said: R. Jacob and R. Zreiqa, did not mean to establish the rule, that the Halakha prevails according to the opinions of R. Aqiba, R. Jose and Rabbi, but that they should be given preference wherever possible over their opponents (i.e., if, for instance, a man asks concerning a decree of R. Jose, it may be declared valid, but it should not be taught as a rule in the colleges that when a number of sages decide against R. Jose the Halakha nevertheless prevails according to his opinion). R. Jose bar R. Hanina, however, said: (Not even this should be done.) R. Jacob and R. Zreiqa, merely assert, that it seems to them that the Halakhas should prevail as stated, but not that this should be maintained as a general rule (and if one inclined to their opinion, he cannot be accounted wrong).

In the same manner as there is a divergence of opinions concerning the statement of R. Jacob and R. Zreiqa, so is there also a dispute concerning the following statement of R. Jacob bar Idi in the name of R. Johanan: In all instances where R. Meir and R. Jehudah differ, the Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah, wherever R. Jehudah and R. Jose differ the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, and so much more when R. Meir and R. Jose differ the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, for if R. Jehudah is given preference over R. Meir, and R. Jose over R. Jehudah, then certainly R. Jose has preference over R. Meir.

Said R. Assi: "From this I can infer, that where R. Jose and R. Simeon differ, the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, for R. Abba said in the name of R. Johanan, that wherever R. Simeon and R. Jehudah differ, the opinion of R. Jehudah prevails." As a matter of course if R. Jehudah is given preference over R. Simeon, R. Jose is certainly more competent authority than R. Simeon.

The schoolmen propounded a question: "How is it, when R. Meir and R. Simeon differ?" This question is not decided.

R. Mesharshia said: All these rules are of no account (i.e., decisions should be made according to the dictates of one's own understanding); for Rabh never acted according to such rules. R. Jehudah. said in the name of Samuel: "Things belonging to non-Israelites, if situated at a certain place on the Sabbath, do not acquire the right to their resting-place." According to whose opinion is this statement? Shall we say, according to the opinion of the sages? This is self-evident; for they hold, that even things having no particular owner do not acquire the right to their resting-place, and so much more things belonging to a Gentile, which accordingly possess an owner. Hence we must say, that this is even in accordance with the opinion of R. Johanan ben Nouri, who says, that things having no particular owner do acquire the right to their resting-place (but those, which have an owner, unless he be an Israelite, do not).

An objection was made: R. Simeon ben Elazar said: "Vessels which an Israelite borrows from a Gentile on a festival, or which he has lent to a Gentile and receives in return on a festival, also vessels and treasures which were within the legal limits on the eve of Sabbath, may be carried two thousand ells in every direction; but if a Gentile brought fruit on a Sabbath from beyond the legal limits, it must not be moved from its place." Now if it be said, that R. Johanan ben Nouri holds, that things belonging to a Gentile acquire a right to their resting-place, then R. Simeon ben Elazar's statement is in accordance with the opinion of this R. Johanan; but if the latter holds, that things belonging to a Gentile do not acquire a right to their resting-place, according to whose opinion is the statement of R. Simeon; not according to that of R. Johanan nor to that of the sages? Nay; R. Johanan may hold, that things belonging to a Gentile do acquire the right to their resting-place and still Samuel quoted the opinion of the sages; but as for this being self-evident, it is not so, for it might be assumed that a precautionary measure should be made in the case of a Gentile owner in order to put them on a par with vessels of an Israelite owner; therefore we are told that such a precautionary measure is not necessary. R. Hyya bar Abhin, however, said in the name of R. Johanan, that things belonging to Gentiles do acquire the right to their resting-place, as a precautionary measure for things belonging to Israelites.

It once happened that rams were brought into the city of Mabrakhta on a festival. Rabha allowed the inhabitants of the city of Mehuzza (which adjoined the other city) to buy them and take them home. Said Rabhina to Rabha: "Why didst thou permit this; because thou holdest to the opinion of Samuel, that things belonging to Gentiles do not acquire the right to their resting-place, but the rule is, that where Samuel and R. Johanan differ, the opinion of R. Johanan prevails and R. Johanan holds, that things belonging to Gentiles do acquire the right to their resting-place on Sabbath?"

Thereupon Rabha said: "Let the rams be sold to the inhabitants of Mabrakhta; for that city is to the rams as four ells (being equal to the case of where a man was brought into a pen or a fold against his will and may in consequence traverse the entire extent of the pen or fold, as if they were only four ells)."

R. Hyya taught: "If the legal limits of two cities terminated in the water and a partition was made to denote the place where they met, by means of a fishing-net, it is not sufficient; for an iron partition is necessary in order that the water of both limits should not mingle." R. Jose bar Hanina laughed at this teaching. Why did he laugh at it? Because Rabh decreed, that the sages were very lenient with all things pertaining to water (see page 24).

"But the sages hold, that he has only the right to move four ells." Is R. Jehudah not of the same opinion as the first Tana? Said Rabha: Nay; they differ to the extent of eight square ells. The sages hold that he may go four ells in every direction, that is, in all, eight square ells; but R. Jehudah says, that he may go only four ells in one direction. We have also learned to this effect in a Boraitha: "He may move in eight square ells, so saith R. Meir." Said Rabha: "They differ as to the extent that the man may traverse, but as for carrying things all agree, that he may do so only for a distance of four ells."

The questions seem to be centred in four ells. Whence do we derive these four ells? As we have learned in a Boraitha: From the passage [Exodus xvi. 29]: "Remain ye, every man in his place," etc. By "his place" is meant the size of his body. What is the size? Three ells, and one ell additional in case he wishes to stretch his limbs. So said R. Meir. R. Jehudah, however, said: "Three ells are allowed for the size of the body and an additional ell in case he wishes to take a thing at his feet and place it underneath his head." What is the point of variance between the two? According to one, the four ells must be exactly measured, and according to the other, an approximate distance only is necessary.

R. Mesharshia said to his son: "When thou goest to see R. Papa, ask him whether the four ells are measured proportionately to the size of the man concerned or whether they are the holy ells (i.e., ells measuring six spans). If he should tell thee, that the holy ells are meant, what should a man do who is as tall as Og, King of Bashan, and if he should tell thee, that the proportionate ells are meant, why were the four ells not included in the Boraitha, which teaches, that all things should be reckoned according to the proportionate ells."

When the son of R. Mesharshia came to R. Papa he was told: "If we were to learn the Talmud in this manner (i.e., if we were so particular as to details) we would never be able to learn anything. Certainly proportionate ells are meant, and the reason the Boraitha does not mention them, is because it was not quite certain, and there may chance to be a dwarf, whose legal four ells the Boraitha did not feel justified in diminishing."

"But between the two outer courts one must not carry anything." Why should this not be permitted? If both of the outer courts and the middle one have combined in one Erub, they are regarded as one court? Said R. Jehudah: "In this instance a case is referred to, where the middle court deposited an Erub in each of the outer courts; hence the two outer courts have no connection with each other." R. Shesheth, however, said: "Even if the two outer courts had deposited their Erubin in the middle court but had each done so in a separate house, they have no connection with each other. Had they deposited their Erubin in the same house, they would have been regarded as one court." According to whose opinion would this be? Shall we assume, that it was according to the Beth Shammai as we have learned in the following Boraitha: "If five persons conjoined their Erubin and deposited them in two vessels the school of Shammai hold them to be of no value, but the school of Hillel say they are of value." Nay; this latter opinion is even in conformity with the school of Hillel who, while maintaining, that if the Erubin had been deposited in separate vessels the connection would be consummated, may hold, that if this was done in separate houses the connection is not valid.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh: "All the foregoing is according to the dictum of R. Simeon; the sages, however, hold, that from the two outer courts things may be carried into the middle court, but from the middle court, things must not be carried into the outer courts; provided no Erub had been made, for one court may serve for two others, but two must not be utilized by one." And R. Jehudah goes on to state: "When I made this statement before Samuel, he said: 'Even this is in accordance with the dictum of R. Simeon; but the sages hold, that neither of the three courts may be made use of.'"

The following Boraitha is in support of the dictum of Samuel as quoted by R. Jehudah: R. Simeon said, "What can this be compared to? Three courts opening into each other and also opening into public ground. If the two outer courts had combined in an Erub with the middle one, a man is at liberty to carry victuals from either of the outer courts into the middle court and eat them, then remove the remainder (but a man of the middle court must not carry things into the outer courts);" the sages however said: "No connection is permitted between the three courts."

Samuel in making this statement holds to his theory advanced elsewhere: If there is a court between two entries, and an Erub was made by the court with both entries, connection between the court and both entries is nevertheless prohibited (but in each entry separately things may be carried); if, however, no Erub was made by the court with either of the two entries, the court acts as a bar so that carrying in either entry is prohibited even by the inhabitants of the entries. If the court, however, made more frequent use of one entry to the neglect of the other, it acts as a bar only to the one frequently used, but the inhabitants of the neglected entry may carry therein.

Said Rabba bar R. Huna: If the court made an Erub with the entry used only on rare occasions (it is evident, that henceforth, the court intends to make more frequent use of this entry and to abandon the other entry) then the other entry becomes separated and the inhabitants thereof may carry therein.

Rabba bar R. Huna said again in the name of Samuel: If the entry more frequently used by the court made an Erub for its own use, and the court itself as well as the neglected entry did not make any Erubin for their own use, the court is relegated to the neglected entry, but cannot prove a bar to the entry having an Erub, because that were otherwise as the manner of the Sodomites, i.e., if an act is perpetrated which is neither beneficial nor injurious to the perpetrator but solely in order to injure another, the perpetrator is compelled to desist. (The comparison is made to the case in question as follows: Neither the inhabitants of the court itself nor of the entry may carry within their precincts nor even within the entry provided with an Erub, and hence it would not be just, if, because they were not permitted to carry, they should prove a bar to those who by virtue of their Erub are allowed to do so.)

R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: "The Erub of a man who is particular about it that his fellow (with whom he had joined in the Erub) should not eat it, is of no account. Why so? Because the word Erub signifies commixture, i.e., those who make the Erub can individually do with it as they see fit, and if one man is particular about it, its intent is abolished." R. Hanina however said: The Erub is valid; but a man of that kind is like the men of Vardina (who were notoriously penurious).

R. Jehudah said again in the name of Samuel: "An Erub which is divided by a man in two parts or deposited by him in two separate vessels is of no account." Then Samuel's dictum is in accordance with Beth Shammai, as stated in the Boraitha (page 108): We may assume that Samuel's teaching may be also according to Beth Hillel; for the latter hold, that the Erub is valid only then, if one vessel was filled with it and the remainder had to be put into another vessel, but if it was originally divided and then deposited, it is not valid.

Samuel said: "The virtual intent of the Erub is, that by mutual interchange of articles, the right to the ground is bought and sold." Why then are eatables necessary; could it not have been permitted to make an Erub with money? Because, as a usual thing on the eve of Sabbath money is scarce. (If that is so, then why should an Erub that had been made with money not be valid? This is merely a precautionary measure, lest it should be said that the main principle of an Erub is money, and in the case of a lack of money, eatables will not be used in its stead, and thus the law of Erubin will sink into oblivion.) Rabba, however, said, that the Erub signifies, that wherever the victuals have been deposited, there the man resides, i.e., wherever a man's bread is, there is also his domicile. What is the point of difference between Samuel and Rabba? The points of difference are as follows: A vessel of any value, victuals worth less than a Prutah (a coin of minimum value) and a minor. (According to Samuel a vessel having a market value may be used, but according to Rabba it does not follow that if it is deposited in a certain place the owner resides there, hence it must not be used. Victuals worth less than a Prutah, according to Samuel, not having a market value, must not be used, but according to Rabba, being eatables, may be deposited. A minor, according to Samuel, cannot be commissioned to act because no money consideration can be intrusted to him, and according to Rabba where he only gathers the material for the Erub, he may be commissioned to act.)

Said Rabba in the name of R. Hama bar Guria, quoting Rabh: The Halakha prevails according to R. Simeon.

MISHNA: Should a man, when overtaken by dusk on the road (on the eve of Sabbath), single out a tree or a hedge and say: "I will take my Sabbath-rest underneath it," (legally) he has said nothing, but if he says: "I will take my Sabbath-rest at its base," he may go from the spot on which he stands to the base of the tree or hedge two thousand ells and thence to his domicile two thousand ells more; thus it may be seen, that a man may go four thousand ells after dark (on Sabbath). If he cannot single out a tree or a hedge or is not conversant with the Halakha (covering his case) and says: "I will take my Sabbath-rest on the place where I stand," the spot upon which he stands (virtually) gives him two thousand ells in any direction; in a circle, according to the dictum of R. Hanina ben Antignous; but the sages hold, that he has two thousand ells in a square, so as to enable him to take advantage of the angles. This rule is explanatory to the saying (of the sages): "The poor prepare their Erubs with their feet." R. Meir said: "This rule is applied only to the poor," but R. Jehudah replied: It applies to poor and rich both; inasmuch as the Erub to be made with bread was only decreed in order to render its observance easier for the wealthy, so that they should not be compelled to go out and prepare the Erub with their own feet.

GEMARA: What is meant by "legally he has said nothing"? Said Rabh: "It means literally that he has said nothing and must not move from his place; (because where he stands, he did not acquire the right to rest on Sabbath, his intention having been to rest underneath the tree. Underneath the tree he acquired no right, not having specified the spot where he would rest, and although the space underneath the tree is within two thousand ells from his position at the time, as long as he did not specify the exact spot he must not go there)." Samuel, however, said: It means, that he said nothing concerning the distance from the tree to his domicile but he may traverse the distance from where he stands to the tree (because the entire space underneath the tree is within two thousand ells of his position at the time, and the distance from his domicile is only two thousand ells to the base of the tree, but to the entire space underneath the tree it is more than two thousand ells); hence this entire space is like driving an ass and leading a camel, for it is not known from which side the distance to his domicile is two thousand ells. If it be measured from the north, chances are that it should be measured from the south, and vice versa.

Said Rabba: (Samuel's opinion is feasible, for he says, that the man acquired the right to two thousand ells from where he stands; but not having determined the exact spot underneath the tree, he loses the further two thousand ells to his domicile) but what grounds has Rabh for his opinion? Rabh holds, that if two intentions, one consequent upon the other, are expressed in one assertion, the inability to carry out one intention destroys the other also (and in this case as the man cannot proceed from the tree to the domicile it invalidates his right to go from his place to the tree). What is the difference between the two opinions? The difference is if one says, "I will take my rest in the four ells of the eight ells underneath the tree," according to those who hold that the place of rest must be exactly determined, it is of no value, but he who holds that if two intentions, one consequent upon the other, are expressed in one assertion, the inability to carry out one intention destroys the other also, in this case when he determines four ells it may be called the exact spot, and is valid.

Said R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua: The case in the Mishna mentioned "he legally said nothing" applies only if the space underneath the tree is eight ells or more; but if it measures only seven ells the man may proceed to the tree and from the tree to his domicile (because he is entitled at any rate to four ells and no matter from which side the distance to his domicile is measured, part of his domicile will be within two, thousand ells).

We have learned one Boraitha in support of Rabh and another supporting Samuel: The one upholding Rabh is as follows: If one, while on the road, was overtaken by dusk, and, singling out a tree, said: "I will take my Sabbath-rest underneath it," he has said nothing. If he said, however, that he would rest in a certain place, he can proceed to that place and, arriving there, may traverse the entire extent of that place and two thousand ells outside of it. When may he do so? If he designated a particular place, i.e., if he designated a sand-heap ten spans high, or a valley ten spans deep, and from four ells to two saahs' capacity wide; but if he did not previously designate the place or there was no such place in existence, he may only move four ells from where he is situated at the time. If there were two men, one of whom could designate the place and the other could not, the latter may invest the former with the right to select the place for him and he (the former) may act accordingly. This is the case only if the man designates the four ells where he desires to rest, but if he does not, he must not move from his place.

The Boraitha upholding Samuel is as follows: If a man made an error and deposited his Erub in two directions, or if a man thought that it was allowed to make two Erubin and go in one direction in the morning and in another in the afternoon, or if a man said to his servants: "Make an Erub for me," without specifying the place for it, and one of them made the Erub in the north and the other in the south, the man may go south for a distance of two thousand ells minus the distance from his house to the Erub on the north or may go north for a distance of two thousand ells minus the distance from his house to the Erub on the south. If the house was midway between the two Erubin, however, i.e., the two Erubin were placed equidistant from the house two thousand ells, he must not move beyond his house.

"If he says, 'I will take my Sabbath-rest at its base,'" etc. Said Rabha: "Being overtaken by dusk" signifies, that if the man walked slowly he could not reach the tree before dusk, but if he ran speedily he could reach the base of the tree.

Rabba and R. Joseph were on the road: Said Rabba to R. Joseph: "We will rest underneath the tree that tolerates good fellowship." And according to another version he said: "We will rest underneath the tree, that honorably acquits itself of its dues (i.e., that bears quantities of fruit and thus pays its dues)." Said R. Joseph: "I know not of such a tree." Answered Rabha: Depend upon me, as a Boraitha stated, R. Jose said: If there be two men, one of whom could designate the place and the other could not, the latter may invest the former with the right to select the place for him and he (the former) may say: "There shall we rest." In truth this is not so. R. Jose never said this; but Rabba asserted this in the name of R. Jose so that R. Joseph should listen to him; for it was known that R. Jose was final authority and that the Halakhas prevailed according to his opinion.

"If he cannot single out a tree or is not conversant with the Halakha." From what biblical passage is all this talk about two thousand ells adduced? We have learned in a Boraitha: It is written [Exod. xvi. 29]: "Remain ye every man in his spot, let no man go out of his place on the seventh day." "On his spot" means four ells, and "out of his place" refers to two thousand ells. Whence does the Boraitha adduce this assertion? Said R. Hisda: "Because it is written [Numbers xxxv. 5]: 'And ye shall measure from without the city on the east side two thousand ells,' etc. (Thus from the verse it is seen, that the city was in the centre and they measured two thousand ells on every side and from this the legal limits were derived.)

"Two thousand ells in any direction in a circle," etc. What grounds has R. Hanina ben Antignous for the statement? If he agrees to the interpretation of the passage quoted, he should have said in a square, for so the passage determines, and if he does not hold to the passage at all, whence does he adduce two thousand ells in general? He holds to the interpretation of the passage quoted, but the end of the same verse reads, "This shall be to them the open spaces of cities," and he declares, that for the purpose of the verse it should be in a square, but for Sabbath it should not be in a square. Whence do the sages adduce that the two thousand ells should be in a square? The sages hold with Hananiah, who taught, that "this shall be to them," should read "as this," and as this should be all the legal limits of the Sabbath.

Said R. A'ha bar Jacob. One who carries four ells in public ground is not culpable unless he carries in a diagonal of four ells.

Said R. Papa: "Rabha wished to examine us and asked the following question: 'Is it necessary that a pillar ten spans high and four wide standing in public ground, should contain a square so that a diagonal can be drawn?' We answered: Is this not the same as the teaching of R. Hananiah which states 'as this should be all the legal limits of Sabbath.'

"R. Meir said: 'This rule is applied only to the poor,'" etc. Said R. Na'hman: "The point of difference between R. Meir and R. Jehudah is where a man says: 'I will rest in my place' (where I am standing). R. Meir holds, that the principal thing to be used for an Erub is bread; and for the poor man, who has no bread with him, it is made easier; the rich man, however, has no right to do so; but R. Jehudah holds, that the principal way to make an Erub is to make it with one's feet, whether the man be poor or rich, but concerning the designation of a tree or a certain place for a Sabbath-rest while travelling, all agree, that it is allowed for a poor man but not for a rich man." The statement in the Mishna "This rule is explanatory to the saying," means to say that the saying is that of R. Meir, and what does it refer to? To the previous clause in the Mishna, "If he cannot single out a tree or is not conversant with the Halakha." The teaching "for the poor man who has no bread with him, it is made easier," is that of R. Jehudah.

R. Hisda, however, said: On the contrary. R. Meir and R. Jehudah differ only as to the designation of a certain place for the Sabbath-rest, the former holding, that for a poor man this is allowed, but not for a rich man, and the latter holding that it is permitted for both; but all agree that as for resting in one's place where he stands it is allowed to both rich and poor, because the principal way of effecting an Erub is with one's feet. The statement of the Mishna, "This rule is explanatory to the saying," refers to a man who was overtaken by dusk, while the teaching "for the poor man who has no bread, it is made easier," is according to the opinion of all.

We have learned a Boraitha in support of R. Na'hman: Be it a poor man or a rich man an Erub should be effected with bread. A rich man should not go out to the legal limits and say: "Here will I take my Sabbath-rest" because this is allowed only to one who was overtaken by dusk on the road, so saith R. Meir. R. Jehudah, however, said: Be it a poor man or a rich man the Erub should be effected with the feet and a rich man may go out to the legal limits and take his Sabbath-rest there, because the principal manner of effecting an Erub is with the feet. To the householder, however, the sages allowed to send a servant, a son, or any other messenger, to make the Erub in his stead, in order to make it easier for him, and R. Jehudah said again: It happened to the men of the house of Mamel and of the house of Gurion in the city of Aruma who would distribute figs and raisins during years of famine, that the poor of the villages of Shihin and Hananiah would come on the eve of Sabbath to the legal limits, remain there over night, and on the morrow would enter the city of Aruma and receive their share.

R. Hyya bar Ashi taught Hyya the son of Rabh in the presence of Rabh: "Be he a rich man or a poor man." Said Rabh to him: "Add to this teaching, that the Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah."

Rabba bar R. Hanan generally went on the Sabbath from Artibna to Pumbaditha. Once, while on the way he said: "I will take my Sabbath-rest in Tzintha (a small hamlet between the two towns)." Said Abayi to him: Why dost thou say this, because thou knowest, that where R. Meir differs with R. Jehudah the Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah and besides, thou art of the opinion of R. Hisda, who holds, that they differ only concerning the designation of a certain place for the Sabbath-rest; but did not R. Na'hman explain to the contrary and have we not a Boraitha in support of R. Na'hman?

Answered Rabba bar R. Hanan, "Henceforth I shall not do this again."

Rami bar Hama asked: "It was said, that one who made an Erub by means of his feet, has four ells for himself besides the two thousand allowed him. What is the law concerning one who had sent bread to make the Erub? Has he the extra four ells or not?" Said Rabha: "Come and hear: The Mishna states that the Erub was to be made with bread only to make it easier for the wealthy. If we should say, that he has not the four ells, it will not be made easier for the wealthy, but on the contrary stricter?" It will not be stricter? For he would rather lose the four ells and be enabled to send a messenger in his stead than to go himself.

MISHNA: If a man (on the eve of Sabbath) had been despatched by his townsmen to combine by an Erub a town (or village in the vicinity) and was subsequently induced by a neighbor to go back (before completing his errand) he is permitted to go to the place in question (nevertheless); all his townsmen, however, are forbidden (to go thither). Such is the dictum of R. Jehudah; but R. Meir said: One who can prepare an Erub and does not prepare it, is (like one driving) an ass and (leading) a camel (at the same time).

GEMARA: What difference is there between the man and his townsmen? Said R. Huna: "This is a case of where a man possessed two houses which had two legal limits between them, i.e., they were four thousand ells apart and the man went out on the road without taking bread along. He is then considered as a poor man; (and in consequence made his Erub wherever he was with his feet) but his townsmen who sent him to make the Erub are regarded as wealthy and their Erub not having been effected are not allowed to go out."

We learned a Boraitha supporting this teaching: "One who has two houses between which there are two legal limits makes the Erub valid as soon as he starts out on the way from one to the other, such is the dictum of R. Jehudah. Moreover, said R. Jose the son of R. Jehudah, even if his comrades meet him and tell him to stay over night where he is, because it is too hot or too cold, he may arise in the morning and continue on his way (for his intention was originally to make his Erub at the end of his journey)."

Said Rabba: "All agree that a man may continue his journey after remaining at a certain place over night, if he had been persuaded to interrupt his journey by another, but if he did so of his own accord, he must not continue on his way, because he may have changed his original intention. Wherein they differ is, if the man was persuaded to remain at a certain place before commencing his journey. According to one, his Erub is invalid as long as he had not yet started, and according to the other, it is valid because the intention originally existed."

R. Joseph, however, said: "All agree that one must start on the journey, otherwise his Erub is not valid; but they differ in a case of a man having been persuaded to stop over at a certain place or doing so of his own accord. One holds, that if he stopped over of his own accord, he may have changed his original intention and hence his Erub is not valid, while the other maintains, that as long as he had started, it does not matter."

R. Jehudah bar Isht'tha brought a basket of fruit to R. Nathan bar Oshiya on the eve of Sabbath (and the distance from his house to that of R. Nathan was four thousand ells). He started to return and R. Nathan let him go as far as the first step and then said to him: "Remain here over night." On the morrow, he arose and returned to his home.

"But R. Meir said: 'One who can prepare an Erub,'" etc. Have we not learned already in a Mishna (of the third chapter) that R. Meir and R. Jehudah both said: "If (an Erub) is doubtful, this is (like driving) an ass (and leading a) camel." Said R. Shesheth: It might be assumed that the reason of R. Meir's opinion is that only in the case of a doubtful Erub, it is a case of an ass and a camel, but if it is known to a certainty that no Erub was made, such is not the case (but it is positively forbidden); hence we are given to understand that even where it is certain that the Erub was not made it is also a case of an ass and a camel; because the Mishna cites a case where it is certain that no Erub was made.

MISHNA: If one went beyond the legal limit even a single ell, he must not go back the entire distance. R. Eliezer said: If he went two ells beyond the limit he may go back; but if three ells, he must not.

GEMARA: Said R. Hanina: "If a man had one foot within the limit and the other foot outside he may enter, because it is written [Isaiah lviii. 13]: 'If thou restrain thy feet for the sake of the Sabbath' and we read 'thy feet' and as one foot was still within the limit, it cannot be said, that he had restrained his feet." We have learned, however, in another Boraitha, that he must not enter? R. Hanina holds according to the opinion of the anonymous teachers, who maintain in still another Boraitha, that wherever the greater part of the body of a man is situated, there is his place.

"R. Eliezer said: 'If he went two ells,'" etc. Did we not learn in a Boraitha, that R. Eliezer said: If he went one ell beyond the limit he may go back; but if he went two ells, he must not? This presents no difficulty; our Mishna refers to a case where he had overstepped one ell and remained exactly two ells beyond, while the Boraitha refers to one who had overstepped two ells and was already in the third. Did we not learn in another Boraitha, that R. Eliezer said: "Even if he had stepped out one ell, he must not reënter?" This Boraitha refers to the one who measured the legal distance (as is stated in the last Mishna of the next chapter, which will be explained then and there).

MISHNA: One who was overtaken by dusk one ell outside, of the legal limit must not reënter the town; R. Simeon, however, said: Even if one was fifteen ells beyond the limit, he may go back, as the land-surveyors who establish the limits, are not very exact in their measurements and allowance is made for those who might err.

GEMARA: We have learned in a Boraitha: "It sometimes happens that the land-surveyors forget their mark and go beyond the distance."

REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE BOUNDARIES OF A TOWN AND THE MEASUREMENTS OF THE LEGAL LIMITS.

MISHNA: How can the boundaries of a town be extended? If one house recede from the city wall and another project, or if a ruin recede or project, or if fragments of a wall ten spans high lie beyond the walls, or if there be any bridges or cemeteries, with dwelling-houses thereon, the measurement of a town is commenced on a level with them; and the whole is formed into a (quasi) square, in order to gain the angles.

GEMARA: R. Johanan said: For eighteen days I lived with Oshiya the Great and did not learn but one thing concerning this Mishna, namely: The Mishna should not read "How can the boundaries of a town be extended, but how can they be districted." This is not so! Did not R. Johanan once assert, that during his stay with Oshiya the Great for eighteen days he learned to know the heart and wisdom of each one of Oshiya's twelve disciples? He says only that he learned but one thing concerning this Mishna, but aside from that, he learned many other things.

R. Johanan said again: "When we were studying the Law at Oshiya's we sate four men to one ell." Rabbi said: "When we studied at R. Elazar ben Shamua's college we sate six men to one ell."

R. Johanan said once more: As R. Meir was in his generation so was R. Oshiya the Great in his day. As with R. Meir, the colleagues of his day, could never arrive at his final decisions, so was it also with Oshiya. His colleagues could also never fathom his ultimate conclusions.

R. Johanan said again: The hearts of the first sages were as broad as the porch of the Temple and those of the later sages were as broad as the gates of the Temple, but our hearts are as narrow as the eye of a sewing-needle. Whom does he refer to as the first sages? R. Aqiba. Whom as the later sages? R. Elazar bar Shamua, and according to another version he refers to R. Elazar ben Shamua and Oshiya the Great respectively.

Said Abayi: We are as a nail driven in a hard wall as far as explanations are concerned (i.e., we understand but little of what we hear, and that with difficulty). Said Rabha: We are also like a finger pushed into a cake of wax (meaning we are so dull of comprehension where comparisons are concerned, that but as little remains with us as with the finger that has been pulled out from the wax). Said R. Ashi: "And we may say, that it is as easy for us to forget what we have learned as it is to put our finger in the hole of a well."

R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh: The children of Judæa who paid strict attention to the words of their masters and propounded many questions retained all they learned. The Galileans, however, who did not pay strict attention to the language of their masters, and did not question them, did not retain anything. The Judæans learned from one master, hence they remembered what they learned; but the Galileans had many teachers and in consequence they did not retain anything.

Rabhina said: The Judæans taught every tract they had themselves mastered to others; hence they retained their knowledge; because teaching others improves one's own learning; the Galileans, however, did not do this and in consequence their knowledge forsook them. Of David who taught others it is said [Psalms cxix. 74]: "Those that fear thee will see me and be rejoiced," but of Saul, who did not teach others, it is said [I Samuel xiv. 471: "And whithersoever he turned himself, he caused terror."

Said R. Johanan: "Whence do I know, that the Lord forgave Saul for the sin of massacring the priests of the city of Nev?" Because Samuel's spirit said unto him: "On the morrow, thou and thy children shall be with me." What is meant by "with me"? (That means in the same place as Samuel and as Samuel was a righteous man and certainly in Paradise, so Saul must have been forgiven in order to share Samuel's abode.)

R. Jehoshua ben Hananiah said: "I was never disconcerted in my life except by a woman, a boy, and a little girl. The instance of the woman occurred in this wise: I at one time resided at the house of a widow. At table she set before me a plate of beans and I ate it up leaving nothing. On the second day she gave me the same dish which I also consumed entirely. on the third day she made the dish too salt and after tasting it I naturally stopped and left it alone. Said she to me: 'Rabbi, why dost thou not eat?' and I answered, that I had already eaten during the day; she then rejoined: 'Thou shouldst have eaten less bread,' and continued: 'Perhaps because thou didst not leave any Peah on the first two days, thou dost leave it now to serve for all three; for have not our sages decreed, that no Peah need be left in the cooking pot, but some should be left in the plate on which the dish is served?'"

The instance of the little girl happened as follows: Once I was travelling on a road and seeing a beaten path leading across a meadow I took that path. Said a little girl to me: "Rabbi! is this not a meadow that thou art crossing?" and I answered: "Is this not a beaten path?" and she answered: "Yea; such robbers as thou art have made it a beaten path." As for the affair with the little boy it happened thus: Once while on the road I noticed a child sitting at a cross-road. I asked him, which road led to the city, and he answered: "This road is the shorter but at the same time the longer, and this one is long but nevertheless short." I took the shorter road that was at the same time the longer. When I came to the city I saw the entrance to the city at that point was surrounded by gardens and vineyards, so that I had to retrace my steps. Said I to the child at the cross-road: "Didst thou not say that this was the short route?" and he answered: "Did I not also tell thee that it was a long route?" I then kissed him on the forehead and remarked: "Well is thee, Israel, that all thy children are wise, both great and small."

R. Jose the Galilean was travelling on the road. He met Brurih (the wife of R. Meir) and asked her: "Which way must we take to the city of Lud?" She answered: "Thou Galilean fool! Did not our sages say, that thou shouldst not converse much with a woman? Thou shouldst have asked, which way to Lud?"

The same Brurih once found a young scholar learning quietly to himself. She scolded him and said: "It is written [II Samuel xxiii. 5]: 'Firm in all and sure,' which signifies, that if the Law is firmly imbedded in all the two hundred and forty-eight members of the body it can remain with the man, otherwise it can not." We have learned that there was a disciple of R. Eliezer, who learned quietly to himself and in the course of three years he forgot all he had learned.

Said Samuel to R. Jehudah: Thou sagacious one. Open thy mouth, when thou readest and also when thou learnest and then may it come to pass, that thou shalt live long, as it is written [Proverbs iv. 22]: "For they are life unto every one of those that find them, and to all his body a healing." Do not read "that find them," but "that make them a find for others," that is by pronouncing them with the mouth others will hear them and be benefited.

Samuel said again to R. Jehudah: Thou sagacious one! As long as thou hast any money, eat and drink; for the world which we leave behind is like a wedding-feast, it is soon over (and in the next world, thou wilt not be able to do this).

Rabh said to R. Hamnana: My son! If thou hast the wherewith to do thyself good, do so, for in the grave there is no pleasure and there is no fixed time for death, and if thou shouldst wish to say: "I will leave my children sufficient to live on when I am in my grave," who can assure thee, that they will keep it; for men are like grass in the field--some spring up and have everything prepared for them while others fade and have nothing.

R. Jehoshua ben Levi said: One who travels on the road and has no companion, should study the Law, as it is written [Proverbs i. 9]: "For a wreath of grace are they unto thy head, and chains for thy throat." If a man have a headache, he should study the Law for it is "a wreath of grace" unto his head. If his throat be sore, he should study the Law for it is "a chain" for his throat. If thy stomach hurt thee, do likewise, for it is written [ibid. iii. 8]: "It will be healing to thy travel" (body), and also if thy bones ache, for it says further [ibid.], "and marrow to thy bones." Likewise one who has pains in any part of his body should study the Law, for it is written [ibid. iv. 22]: "And to all his body a healing."

Said R. Jehudah ben R. Hyya: Come and observe how the custom of the Lord differs from that of man! If a man pre scribes a remedy, it may benefit one and injure another, but the Holy One, blessed be He, gave the Law to all Israel as a remedy for all and for the whole body as it is written: "And to all his body a healing."

R. Ama said: It is written [Proverbs xxii. 19]: "For it is a pleasant thing if thou keep them within thy bosom, if they be altogether firmly seated upon thy lips." Which signifies: "When are the words of the Law a pleasant thing? If thou canst keep them within thy bosom, and when canst thou keep them in thy bosom? If thou canst pronounce them well with thy lips."

R. Zera said: It is written [ibid. xv. 23]: "A man hath joy by the answer of his mouth; and a word spoken at the proper time, how good is it." Which signifies: When hath a man joy by the answer of his mouth, if at any time that he is asked concerning the Law, he can make proper reply.

R. Itz'hak said: It is written [Deut. xxx. 14]: "But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it." When is the word nigh unto thee? If it is in thy mouth, and in thy heart thou meanest to do it.

Rabha said: It is written [Psalms xxi. 3]: "The longing of his heart hast thou given him, and the request of his lips hast thou not withholden. Selah." Which means: When was the longing of his heart given him? If the request of his lips was in accordance with the Law.

Rabha inferred a contradiction from the verse just quoted: It says, "The longing of his heart hast thou given him," and immediately afterwards, "and the request of his lips hast thou not withholden." If the longing of his heart was given him, what need was there of the request of his lips? And explained this seeming contradiction thus: If the man had merited it, the longing of his heart was granted him without request, but if he did not, he first had to make a request for it, before it was granted.

The disciples of R. Eliezer ben Jacob taught: In every instance, where the words "Netzach," "Selah," or "Voëd" form the conclusion of the passage it signifies, that it will be forever without interruption. As for the word "Netzach" it is written [Isaiah lvii. 16]: "For not to eternity will I contend, neither will I be forever wroth"; "forever" is here expressed by "Netzach." As for the word "Selah" it is written [Psalms xlviii. 9]: "As we have heard, so have we seen it in the city of the Lord of Hosts, in the city of our God: God will establish it forever. Selah." Concerning "Voëd" it is written [Exod. xv. 18]: "The Lord will reign for ever and ever" and the expression used is "Voëd."

R. Elazar said: The term quoted in the verse [Proverbs i. 9]: "Chains for thy throat" means to signify, that as a chain is loose around the neck and is not seen when a man bows his head, so it is with a scholar. If he is not seen constantly in the markets, or oppresses not his neighbor, but sits quietly and studies the Law, he retains his knowledge; otherwise he does not.

R. Elazar said again: The verse [Solomon's Song v. 13]: "His cheeks are as a bed of spices" means "If a man makes himself as a bed (of plants) upon which everyone treads (i.e., is extremely modest) and also conducts himself as a man who held spices in his hand, which even after leaving the hands, still make them fragrant, he retains the knowledge he has acquired, otherwise he does not."

He said again: It is written [Exod. xxxi. 18]: "Tables of stone" (tables are in this verse expressed by the Hebrew term "Luchoth" and Lechi also means cheek). This refers to a man who hardens his cheeks until they are like stone and when trodden upon are not defaced, meaning a man who constantly studies and in the same manner as the stone is not impaired by wear, the constant study does not injure the man: such a man retains knowledge, otherwise he does not.

Again R. Elazar said: It is written [Exod. xxxii. 16]: "Engraved upon the tables," which means, that if the tables had not been broken the first time, the Law would never have been forgotten by Israel, for a thing that is engraved cannot be obliterated, and R. Aha bar Jacob added, "that no nation on earth could have got them in their power," because: do not read "Charuth" (engraved) but "Cheiruth" (liberty).

R. Mathna said: It is written [Numbers xxi. 18]: "And from the wilderness to Mattanah," which signifies, that if the man makes himself as a wilderness, upon which everybody treads, and does not mind it, the knowledge he gains remains with him as a present.

R. Huna said: It is written [Psalms lxviii. 11] Thy assembly dwelt therein: thou didst prepare it with thy goodness for the afflicted people, O God! ("Thy assembly" is expressed in the Hebrew by "Chaiothcha" and Chaiah means a wild beast.) If a scholar is in the manner of learning as a wild beast which devours its prey immediately after killing it, i.e., as soon as he learns a thing he repeats it again and again until he knows it thoroughly, he retains his knowledge, otherwise he does not. If he does this, however, the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself, prepares a meal for him, as may be seen from the end of the passage quoted.

R. Hyya bar Abba said in the name of R. Johanan: It is written [Proverbs xxvii. 18]: "Whoso guardeth the fig-tree will eat its fruit." Why are the words of the Law compared to a fig-tree? As a fig-tree yields its fruit whenever it is shaken, so does the Law always yield new teachings whenever it is repeated.

R. Samuel ben Na'hmeni said: It is written [Proverbs v. 19]: "Let her bosom satisfy thee abundantly at all times." Why is the Law compared to a bosom? Because as at all times when the child desires to suck, the bosom yields its milk, so does the Law yield its teachings every time it is perused. Further, it is written [ibid.]: "With her love be thou ravished continually." This means to imply as was said of R. Elazar ben P'dath, that when he was studying the Law in the lower market of Sepphoris, his clothes were frequently found in the upper market; so engrossed was he in his studies, that he did not even miss his clothes. Said R. Itz'hak ben Eliezer: "Once a man attempted to steal the clothes of this R. Eliezer and found an adder lying on top of them."

The disciples of R. Anan taught: It is written [judges v. 10]: "Ye that ride on white asses, ye that sit in judgment, and ye who walk on the way, utter praise!" "That ride on white asses" refers to scholars who go from town to town and from country to country to teach the Law and who make it clear as daylight. "That sit in judgment" refers to those who give a just verdict which is truly just. "Who walk" refers to those who study the Bible, "on the way" refers to the students of the Mishna, and "utter praise" refers to the students of the Talmud, whose every utterance is concerning the Law.

R. Shezbi said in the name of R. Elazar ben Azariah: It is written [Proverbs xii. 27]: "The indolent roasteth not that which he hath caught in hunting." This signifies, that one who studies the Law superficially merely to delude people but does not study it thoroughly and repeat it often, will not retain the knowledge nor will he live long. R. Shesheth, however, said: "A man of that kind is not wicked, but merely foolish; on the other hand a prudent man, who studies many things and makes marks, so that he will not forget what he had learned, retains his knowledge and will have long life."

When R. Dimi came from Palestine he said: The verse quoted is a simile to a man who catches birds. If he pinions the wings of those he catches, he can proceed and catch more, otherwise they will escape. The same applies to a man who studies the Law. If he reviews his learning constantly, he retains it and can proceed; if he does not, however, he cannot retain it.

Rabha in the name of Sechorah quoting R. Huna said: "It is written [Proverbs xiii. 11]: "Wealth gotten by vain deeds will be diminished; but he that gathereth by close labor will increase it." Which means: If a man groups the ordinances he has learned, he cannot retain them; but if he gathers them slowly and deliberately, he will constantly increase them." And Rabha said: "The Rabbis know of this and yet they pay no attention to it." Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak: "I have acted accordingly and in consequence I have retained my knowledge."

The Rabbis taught: "How was the method of teaching the Law in the days of Moses?" Moses learned the Law from the might of God. Then Aaron entered and Moses taught him a chapter. When Aaron had finished he sat down to the left of Moses and his children came in, when Moses would teach them the chapter again. When they had finished, Elazar would sit down to the right of Moses and Ithamar to the left of Aaron. R. Jehudah, however, said, that Aaron would always sit to the right of Moses after his children had finished. Following the sons of Aaron would come the elders of Israel and Moses would repeat the chapter to them. After the elders had finished, the rest of the Israelites who wished to learn would enter and would learn the same chapter. Thus we see, that Aaron heard the same chapter four times, his sons three times, the elders twice, and the rest of the people once. After the last reading Moses would depart and Aaron would again repeat the chapter to the others; then he would depart and his children would teach the chapter; after them the elders would do so, so that no one heard it less than four times. From this R. Eliezer deduced, that every teacher should recite his teaching to his disciples four times, holding that as Aaron who learned from Moses, who in turn learned from the might of God, had to learn one thing four times so much more ought an ordinary man to do so when learning from another.

R. Aqiba, however, said: Whence do we adduce, that a teacher should teach his disciple until the latter knows the lesson thoroughly? From the verse [Deut. xxxi. 19]: "Now therefore write ye for yourselves this song, and teach it the children of Israel," and whence do we infer, that a disciple must be taught until he can impart the teaching to others? From what is written further [ibid.]: "put it in their mouth," and whence do we know, that if the reasons for the teaching can be given, this must be done? From the verse [Exod. xxi. 1]: "And these are the laws of justice which thou shalt set before them," and by setting before them is meant that they must be thoroughly explained.

Why did not all learn directly from Moses? In order to show honor to Aaron, his children and the elders. If that be so, let Aaron learn it from Moses, Aaron's children from Aaron, and the elders from the children, then the people from the elders? Because Moses learned from the might of God, all wished to hear it from him.

R. Preida had a disciple, whom he would teach a thing four hundred times and then the disciple would understand it. One day R. Preida was invited to attend the celebration of a circumcision and as he was just teaching his disciple, he finished the teaching for the four hundredth time but still the disciple did not understand. So he asked him: "What is the difficulty?" and the disciple replied, that from the moment the master was invited to the celebration, he could not pay proper attention, thinking that every moment he would be going away. So R. Preida said: "Pay proper attention and I will teach thee again," and he accordingly repeated the teaching another four hundred times. A heavenly voice was heard at that time which said: "What wouldst thou rather, that thou live another four hundred years, or that thou and the entire generation in which thou livest should be given a share in the world to come." R. Preida answered: "I would rather accept the latter proposition." Said the Holy One, blessed be He: "Give him both."

R. Hisda said: The law cannot be retained except through signs, as it is written (as quoted previously): "Put it in their mouth." Read: "Put it with signs in their mouth." R. Tachlipha of Palestine heard this and on his arrival home repeated it in the presence of R. Abbahu. Said R. Abbahu: Ye learn this from that verse, but we derive the same from the verse [Jeremiah xxxi. 21]: "Set thyself up way-marks," meaning, set up way-marks to the Law; this is in accordance with the dictum of Abhdimi bar Hama bar Dosa, viz.: It is written [Deut. xxx. 12], "It is not in heaven," meaning if it were even in heaven, one would have to get it from there, and [ibid. 13], "Neither is it beyond the sea" implies that even were it beyond the sea, one would have to go after it there. Rabha, however, said: "It is not in heaven" means, that knowledge cannot be found in a man who holds himself as high as heaven; and "Neither is it beyond the sea" means, that knowledge cannot be found in a man who considers his opinions as vast as the sea. R. Johanan said the first statement refers to those who are great in their own estimation, and the last statement to those who ply the seas and are constantly engaged in traffic.

The Rabbis taught: How are the boundaries of a town extended? A town that is oblong remains as it is. A town in the form of a circle is provided with corners. One that is in the form of a square need not be made equiangular. If it was narrow on one side and wide on another it must be made even all around (through the formation of a parallelogram). If a house or row of buildings protruded from one of the walls of the town, a straight line is drawn from the extreme end of such protruding buildings parallel to the wall and thence two thousand ells are measured. If the town was in the form of an arch. or a right angle it should be considered as if the entire space enclosed by the arch or right angle were filled with houses and two thousand ells should be measured from the extreme ends.

R. Huna said: If a town was in the form of an arch and the distance between the two ends of the arch was less than four thousand ells, the enclosed space is considered as filled with houses and two thousand ells may be measured from the extreme ends. If the distance was more than four thousand ells, the two thousand ells must be measured from the centre of the arch. What distance should a man have from his house to the end whence the two thousand ells are measured. Rabba bar R. Huna said: "Two thousand ells" and Rabha the son of Rabba bar R. Huna said: "Even more than two thousand ells." Said Abayi: "It seems to me that the latter opinion is correct, because, if the man chose, he could go through all the houses in the arch to that end, then why should he not be permitted to cross over the space between his house and the end of the arch?"

Or if fragments of a wall ten spans high, etc. What is meant by this? R. Jehudah said: "This means, if there were three partitions without a roof." A question was propounded: How was it if there were two partitions with a roof? Come and hear: These are the things that are counted in together with the town: A monument covering four square ells, a bridge, a mausoleum, a synagogue that has a dwelling for an attendant, a church with a vestry, stables, and barns that have a dwelling attached for the keeper, huts in the field and houses built on islands of a lake, which are not more than seventy and two-thirds ells away from the town. All these are counted in together with the town, and following are the things that must not be counted in with the town: A monument partly demolished on both sides, a bridge, a burying ground without a dwelling on it, a synagogue or church that has no dwelling for the sextons, a stable or barn that has no dwelling for the keeper, a pit, a cavern, a fence, a dove-cot, and a boathouse; all these are not counted in with the town." We see then, that a monument which had been partially destroyed on both sides, must not be counted in with the town? Must we not assume that it still retained its roof? Nay, this refers to a monument that did not retain its roof. Of what use is a house built on an island? Said R. Papa. "Those houses are used to unload the utensils of a ship." It is said "a cavern is not to be counted in with the town"? Did not R. Hyya teach that it should? Said Abayi: "R. Hyya refers to a cavern, that has a building above it." If that is the case, why mention the cavern? The building itself must be counted in? Here the meaning is, if a building was above the cavern, no matter how far the cavern extended, it is regarded as a foundation for the house and should be counted in.

R. Huna said: Those who live in huts made of twigs may measure the limit only from their doors (even if there are a number of those that extend for over one hundred ells). Said Hinana the son of R. Kahana in the name of R. Ashi: If in the street where the huts stood there were three courts each containing two ordinary buildings, the huts are given the privileges of a town.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh: Those who dwell in huts and those who travel in the deserts do not enjoy life and their wives and children are not their own. We have also learned the same in a Boraitha: Eliezer the man of Biria said: Those who live in huts are the same as those in a grave and concerning their daughters it is said [Deut. xxvii. 21]: "Cursed be he that lieth with any manner of beast." Why is this so? Said Ula: Because they have no bathhouses (and when the men go away to some distant bathhouse no one is left to take care of the women). R. Johanan said: "Because, when the women go to take their ritual bath, they are afraid to go alone so long a distance; hence they go in company with other women and arc followed by evil men who lead them astray." What is the point of difference between Ula and R. Johanan? If there is a lake in the vicinity, the statement of R. Johanan falls to the ground, but according to Ula even then, the women, if left alone by their husbands, are led to sin.

R. Huna said: "In a town where there are no herbs, a scholar should not live (because herbs are cheap and good food and a scholar can thus live economically)." Shall we assume, that herbs are such a good thing? Have we not learned in a Boraitha, that three things cause much waste, cause a man's body to stoop, and deprive a man of one five-hundredth of his eyesight? Those three things are: coarse bread, newly brewed beer, and herbs? This presents no difficulty: R. Huna refers to onions, garlic, and fine herbs, which are necessary, while the Boraitha refers to bad herbs.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh: In a town that is hilly and where there arc many steps to ascend and descend, both man and beast become prematurely aged. Said R. Huna bar R. Jehoshua: "The towns of Bebiri and Benaresh, two adjoining cities, that had may hills between them caused their inhabitants to become prematurely aged."

The Rabbis taught: "If one comes to make a town square, he must make it as the square of the earth, i.e., the north must be towards the north of the earth, the south towards the south, and his signs shall be: the zodiac of the capricorn in the north and that of the scorpion in the south." Said R. Jose: If he does not understand how to make it as the square of the earth, he should be guided by the equinox. How so? Where the sun rises during the long days and sets during the long days, it is north of the equator, and during the short days, where it rises and sets it is south of the equator, but during the Nissan and the Tishri equinox, it rises half (i.e., directly) east and sets half (i.e., directly) west, as it is written [Ecclesiastes i. 7]: "Going toward the south" during the day, "and turning around toward the north" during the night "the wind moveth round about continually," meaning east and west; at times it goes through them and at other times it passes them. Said R. Mesharshia: All these rules are of no account, for we have learned in a Boraitha that the sun never rose in the northeast nor set in the northwest and the sun never rose in the southeast nor set in the southwest.

Samuel said: The equinox of Nissan can only take place during one of the four quarters of a day, either at sunrise, sunset, noon, or midnight, and the equinox of Tamuz cannot take place except at one and one-half hours after sunrise or sunset or seven and one-half hours after either. The equinox of Tishri takes place only at three or at nine hours after either sunrise or sunset, and the equinox of Tebeth takes place only four and one-half hours or ten and one-half hours after either sunrise or sunset. There is not more than ninety-one days seven and one-half hours between each equinox, and they occur in the first and second half of the same hour respectively.

The Rabbis taught: One who comes to measure the city should first make it square in the form of a board. Afterwards he makes another square of the legal distance of two thousand ells also in the form of a board. When he comes to measure the legal limits from the town, he should not commence at the centre of a side because then he would lose the corner, for, if the diagonal distance from one corner to another is two thousand ells the distance from the one side to the opposite will be 1,428 ells. Hence he should make the square two thousand ells from one opposite side to the other, and in that event he will gain four hundred ells on each side. Then the two legal limits together will gain eight hundred ells on each side, and, in consequence, the town together with the limits will gain twelve hundred ells on each side. Said Abayi: "This can be proven by calculating on a city exactly two thousands ells square."

MISHNA: An allowance of seventy and two-thirds ells of space must be made to the town. Such is the dictum of R. Meir; but the sages hold, that such an allowance is to be made only if two towns be so close to each other, that each only requires seventy and two-thirds ells to bring them within the legal limits; in that case an allowance is made to both, so that they become as one. Thus also, if three villages form a triangle, and the two outer ones require 141 1/3 ells, a double allowance to bring them within legal distance of each other, the middle one between the two makes all one, so that the three villages, become as one.

GEMARA: Whence do we adduce, that an allowance should be made to the town? Said Rabha: Because it is written, [Numbers xxxv. 4]: "From the wall of the city and outward," which implies, first leave a part outward and then commence to measure.

"But the sages hold," etc. It was taught: R. Huna said: An allowance should be made to each of the two cities, and R. Hyya bar Rabh said: "Only one allowance is made for both." We have learned in the Mishna, however, that the sages hold, such an allowance is to be made only, etc., whence we see that only one allowance is spoken of and this would be contradictory to R. Huna? R. Huna may say, that by the allowance is meant the law of the allowance, and if the law of allowance is given at all, it should be given to each of the two cities. It seems to us, that the explanation of R. Huna is correct, because further on the Mishna states, that each only requires seventy and two-thirds, i.e., one town requires seventy and two-thirds ells and the other requires seventy and two-thirds ells, hence the law of allowance applies to each of the two.

An objection was made based upon the last clause of the Mishna: If three villages form a triangle and the two outer ones require 141 1/3 ells, the middle one between the two makes all one; thus if there were no middle one the allowance for the two outer ones would not hold good, and this would be contradictory to R. Huna, who says, that the law of the allowance should be applied? R. Huna might reply: It was taught, however, that Rabba in the name of R. Idi quoting R. Hanina said: The Mishna does not mean to state that there must absolutely be three villages in a triangle, but even if the third is some distance off and between the two there is sufficient space which would permit of the third village being placed there, and the distance from that third village to one of the outer ones be 141 1/3 ells, i.e., the quantity of two allowances of seventy and two-thirds ells each, this third village makes the other two as one. Then Rabha asked of Abayi: "How far must the third village be from the other two, that it may be counted in with them?" and he answered: "Two thousand ells." Said Rabha to Abayi: "Didst thou not say previously, that thou art of the opinion of Rabha bar R. Huna, who said that it may be even more than two thousand ells distant?" Rejoined Abayi: "How canst thou compare the two? In the former instance there were inhabited houses, while here there is only empty space."

Rabha asked Abayi again: "What must the distance between the two outer villages be?" and he answered: "What is the difference? Thou hast heard, that if the village standing at a distance is placed between the two there would be a distance of 141 1/3 ells to each of the outer ones." "According to that," rejoined Rabha, "it would not matter if there were four thousand ells between the two outer ones?" "Yea," answered Abayi, "so it is."

MISHNA: One must not measure the legal distance except with a line exactly fifty ells long, no more and no less; and one must not measure in any manner except from the breast. If during the measurement a deep dale (cleft) or heap of stones is encountered, the line is passed over it and the measurement resumed; if a hillock is encountered, the line is passed over it (also) and the measurement resumed, provided the legal limit is not overstepped while this is being done. If the line cannot be passed over the hillock on account of its height, R. Dostai bar Janai said: I have heard on the authority of R. Meir, that those who make the measurement cut straight through the mountain (in an imaginary sense).

GEMARA: Whence do we adduce that the line must be exactly fifty ells long? Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh: It is written [Exod. xxvii. 18]: "The length of the court shall be one hundred ells, and the breadth fifty by fifty," and thus the verse means to say, that the line should be fifty ells. Is this verse not necessary in order to teach us that the excess of fifty ells of length over the breadth should be apportioned so as to make the court seventy ells and four spans square? (See page 73.) If such were the case, the verse could read "fifty and fifty," but from the fact that it reads "fifty by fifty" we assume that both teachings may be adduced.

"No more and no less." It was taught in a Boraitha: "No less," because when the line is taken up (by the surveyor) it may be stretched a trifle (and it, should be only fifty); and "no more," for should it be longer, it might become entangled and be shortened accordingly.

Said R. Assi (according to another version R. Ami): "The line must be made only of Apaskima." What is an Apaskima? Said R. Abba: "A Nargila," and what is a Nargila? Said R. Jacob: "The fibre of walnut-trees."

We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Jehoshua ben Hananiah said: There is nothing better to measure with than an iron chain; but what can be done, when it is written [Zechariah ii. 5]: "There was a man with a measure-cord in his hand." It is written, however [Ezekiel xl. 3]: "There was a man, etc., and a measuring rod." The verse quoted refers to the measurement of the gates of the Temple.

R. Joseph taught: "There are three kinds of cord: One made of rushes, one made of willows, and one made of flax. The first kind of cord was used to tie the red heifer (because it was not subject to defilement and all things used in connection with the red heifer had to be not subject to defilement) as we have learned (in Tract Parah): "She was tied with cord made of rushes and was laid on the spot where she was to be burned." The second kind was used for tying a woman who was to stand the bitter water test as we have learned in a Mishna (Tract Sotah): Then an Egyptian rope was tied above her breast (an Egyptian rope was made of willows). The third kind was used for measuring.

"If during the measurement a deep dale, etc., was encountered," etc. From the statement of the Mishna that after passing over it the measurement is resumed, we must assume, that if the surveyor cannot pass over it with a line fifty ells long, he must go to a place where it is possible for him to do so, and after passing over it, should resume the measurement at the original place as nearly as possible on a level with the place where he had left off at the other location.

This is identical with the teaching of the Rabbis as follows: "If during the measurement the surveyor come to a cleft, and can pass over it with a line fifty ells long, he should do so. If, however, he cannot do this, he should go to another place where this would be possible and resume his measurement at the original place as nearly as possible on a level with the place where he had left off at the other location. Should, however, the cleft be sloping so that he can cross over it without difficulty he should measure it by drawing an imaginary line straight across the cleft and do this successively both up hill and down. If he come to a wall, he must not cut through the wall but must estimate its thickness, and after allowing sufficient distance for it, he should resume his measurement." We have learned, however, that he should cut through it (in an imaginary sense), why do they say that he should estimate its thickness? In the former instance the case referred to is where the wall was impassable, while in this instance the surveyor can circumvene it.

Said R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel: "Under what circumstances are these rules concerning passing over (a cleft) or cutting straight through to be applied? If the line with a weight attached to one end, will not, when dropped, reach bottom. If, however, the line will reach bottom, the actual measurement of the cleft must be counted." What must the depth of the cleft be in order that it may be passed over? Said R. Joseph: "Even if it be more than two thousand ells deep." According to whose opinion is this teaching of R. Joseph? Have we not learned in a Boraitha, that if the cleft is one hundred ells deep and fifty wide it may be passed over but not if it be more? while the anonymous teachers hold, even if it be two thousand ells deep. Then R. Joseph's teaching coincides neither with that of the first Tana nor with that of the anonymous teachers? The Boraitha refers to a case where the depth of the cleft cannot be sounded with the sounding line, while R. Joseph refers to a case where the sounding line can be dropped straight down. If the sounding line cannot be used, what distance may he go to find another location for measuring? Said Abimi and also Rami bar Ezekiel: "Four ells."

"If a hillock is encountered," etc. Said Rabha: "This refer to a hillock with a base of five ells and a peak of ten spans; but a hillock with a base of four ells and a peak of ten spans should be merely estimated and the measurement resumed."

"Providing the legal limit is not overstepped," etc. What is the reason therefor? Said R. Kahana: In order that it may not be said, that the legal limit commences at the spot where the hillock had already been passed over (i.e., if the hillock was too wide to be passed over in the line of the legal limit and another place had to be selected for passage, it serves as a precautionary measure, in order not to appear as if the legal limit commenced at the point on the other side of the hillock, which, by virtue of its accessibility, had been selected for passage).

"If the line cannot be passed over the hillock," etc. The Rabbis taught: "What is meant by cutting straight through the mountain?" The man at the foot of the mountain should hold the line to his breast and the man at the summit should hold it to his feet. Said Abayi: There is a tradition to the effect, that the mountain must not be cut through (measured) except with a line measuring four ells.

Said R. Na'hman in the name of Rabba bar Abbahu: "The law of cutting through the mountains does not apply in the case of the heifer, which must have its neck broken (see Deut. xxi. 1-9), and not to the cities of refuge (see Deut. xix. 2-10; and Numbers xxxv. 6).

MISHNA: The measurement must be undertaken only by one who is an expert (in measuring land). If the legal limit was carried farther to one place than to another, the farther limit is held to. If one surveyor carried the limit farther than another, the farther measurement is abided by. Even a bond-man or bond-woman must be credited if testifying, that "Until here is the Sabbath-limit"; for the sages do not intend to enforce a more rigorous observance (of the law) but to make it more lenient.

GEMARA: What is meant by, "the farther limit is held to"? What about the shorter limit? Is that not within the limit? The Mishna must be read: Even the farther limit is also held to.

"If one surveyor carried the limit farther than another," etc. Said Abayi: "Provided the difference in the distance does not exceed the diagonal measurement of the town."

MISHNA: If a town (originally the property) of a single individual, becomes (property) of the public, all the householders residing therein may combine in preparing the Erub. If the town originally was public property and becomes the property of an individual, all the householders must not join in the Erub, unless a number of dwellings outside of the city was not included in the Erub made by the town proper, which number was equal to the new town in Judæa; i.e., containing fifty dwellings. Such is the dictum of R. Jehudah; R. Simeon, however, holds, that it is sufficient if three courts each containing two houses were not included.

GEMARA: The Rabbis taught: What is meant by originally the property of a single individual, and become property of the public? Said R. Jehudah: "For instance, the district of the Exilarch." Rejoined R. Na'hman: "Why dost thou mention the district of the Exilarch, because many people come there and it thus becomes like public ground; but the seat of government being there, it will serve as a reminder, that there is a law against carrying on the Sabbath? Still even in a place where many Israelites congregate on the Sabbath, even if the seat of government is not there, they will remind each other of the law? Therefore," continued R. Na'hman, "(it is not necessary that the district be the property of the Exilarch) it may be like the district of Nathazai, who owned a whole town."

The Rabbis taught: In a town, originally the property of an individual, which had become public property, containing a wide street, how should an Erub be made? Either a side-beam or a cross-beam must be erected at each end of the street (providing the town was not surrounded by walls) and it is permitted to carry throughout the street. It is not permitted, however, for one half of the town to combine in an Erub (because the city, having at one time been the property of an individual, the other half will prove a bar to those who have combined in the Erub). Either the whole town must combine an Erub, or each entry must make an Erub for itself. If, however, the entire town was at all times public property, and have but one exit, an Erub may be combined for the whole town.

Who is the Tana who holds, that even for the wide street an Erub may be effected? Said R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua: This is according to R. Jehudah, as we have learned in a Boraitha: "Moreover, R. Jehudah said: 'A man having two houses, one at each end of a wide street, may make a cross or a side beam at each end of the street and is allowed to carry throughout the street,' and the sages rejoined: 'Such an Erub is not sufficient for a wide street.'"

The Master said: "It is not permitted for one half the town to combine an Erub." Said R. Papa: This prohibition refers to an Erub made lengthwise in half the town but in the breadth of half the town (which contained one of the two exits of the whole town) it is allowed.

The Master said: "Either the whole town must combine an Erub or each entry must make an Erub for itself." Why should an Erub not be effected in one half of the town, because the other half might prove a bar? Why should one entry then not prove a bar to another? Each entry may erect a door for itself, which will signify that there is no connection with the others. This is identical with the statement of R. Idi bar Abin in the name of R. Hisda, viz.: If one of the inhabitants of an entry made a door to his court, he demonstrates thereby that he has no connection with the other inhabitants and consequently does not make the Erub of the others invalid.

"If the town was originally public property and became the property of an individual," etc. R. Zera made an Erub in the city where lived R. Hyya, that included the whole city and did not leave out any part thereof. Asked Abayi: "Why did Master do this? Why did he not leave out a part of it?" Answered R. Zera: "The elders of the city told me, that R. Hyya bar Assi once combined an Erub for the entire city, so I thought that at one time the city was individual property and then became the property of the public." Rejoined Abayi: "The same elders told me, that at one time a pile of dirt blocked one of the entrances so that only one remained; hence R. Hyya bar Ashi made the Erub for the entire city. Now, however, the dirt has been removed and the city never was individual property"; and R. Zera answered: I did not know this.

R. Ami bar Ada of Harphan asked Rabba: "What is the law concerning a town that had one entrance by means of a door and another by means of a ladder?" He answered: "Rabh said, that a ladder is in law accounted the same as a door." Said R. Na'hman to them: "Do not heed him; for thus said R. Ada in the name of Rabh: 'A ladder combines within itself the two uses, that of a door and that of a partition.' The latter if it is on the outside of the city and is hence not accounted as a door and when it stands between two courts it can be accounted as a partition, thus enabling the courts to make separate Erubin, or it can be accounted as a door and both courts may combine in effecting one Erub."

R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel said: "If an entire wall was made of ladders even though it be wider than ten ells, it is nevertheless a lawful partition." R. Brona contradicted R. Jehudah, standing at the wine-cellar of R. Hanina's house: How canst thou say, that Samuel held the ladders to constitute a partition, did not R. Na'hman say in the name of Samuel: "If the people living in attics of courts, which contain balconies, and who are obliged to descend by means of ladders to the court, had forgotten to combine an Erub with the people below, they do not render the Erub of the people below invalid, providing their ladders have apertures at least four spans high?" This is the case if the balconies were not over ten spans high. If the balconies were not over ten spans of what use are the apertures? If the balconies were provided with railing and ten ells were left vacant and a small door was erected in that vacant space, it signifies, that there is no connection between the inhabitants of the attics and those of the court; hence they do not prove a bar to each other.

The inhabitants of Kakunai came before R. Joseph and asked him to give them a man to effect an Erub for them in their city. He accordingly said to Abayi: "Go and make an Erub for them, but see that it provoke no comment from the college." He went and saw that some houses of the city faced a lake and had no other entrance. "I will make an Erub, but will exclude these houses," said he. Subsequently it occurred to him, that an Erub must not be made for the entire city, at the same time it was possible to do this; with these houses, however (that faced the lake), it was an impossibility. Consequently he desired that apertures be made in those houses facing the streets, thereby making it possible for them to make an Erub and then to exclude them, in which event the Erub for the entire city would be valid. Then he concluded that even those apertures were unnecessary, because Rabba bar Abbahu made an Erub for the entire city of Mehuzza, which was composed of several rows of entries and between each row there was a ditch used for the storing of kernels of dates to be used as fodder. He made an Erub for each row and permitted the carrying of things in each entry and from one entry into another without erecting either cross or side beams. He did this on account of the ditches between the rows, which ditches prevented crossing over from one row to the other and the town having been originally public property and subsequently having become the property of an individual, in which case part of the town must be excluded from participation in the Erub, he held that by virtue of the inaccessibility of one row to the other on account of the intervening ditches, one row became the excluded part to the other, and vice versa.

Suddenly it occurred to him again, that the rows of entries might have had protruding roofs, which would make communication with each other possible, hence they were enabled to make an Erub; but in the case of those houses that could not make an independent Erub, he again concluded that apertures were necessary. Finally, however, he recollected, that Mar the son of Pipidatha of Pumbaditha made an Erub for the entire city of Pumbaditha and merely excluded his straw-shed underneath the city. Hence he again concluded, that no apertures for the houses were necessary. In conclusion he said: "I see now, after all this trouble, why my master cautioned me against provoking the comment of the colleges."

"R. Simeon, however, holds, that it is sufficient, if three courts," etc. Said R. Hama bar Guria in the name of Rabh: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Simeon." R. Itz'hak, however, said, that one house in one court is sufficient.

Asked Abayi of R. Joseph: "Whence does R. Itz'hak adduce his statement? From a tradition or an opinion?" Answered R. Joseph: What is the difference? (The Halakha prevails according to R. Simeon?) Rejoined Abayi: Shall we learn the Gemara as we do a song?

MISHNA: Should a man (on the eve of Sabbath) be at the east of his domicile and say to his son: "Place my Erub towards the west," or being at the west of his domicile say to his son: "Place my Erub towards the east": if the distance from the place where he stands to his domicile be within two thousand ells and to his Erub farther than that, he must take his Sabbath-rest at his domicile, but must not take it where his Erub is deposited; if the distance to his Erub, however, be within two thousand ells, and to his domicile farther than that, he must take his Sabbath-rest where his Erub is placed and not at his domicile. If a man has deposited his Erub within the limits (allowance of seventy and two-thirds ells) of a town, he has (legally) accomplished nothing and it counts for nothing; if he, however, deposited the Erub outside of the legal limit, be it but a single ell, whatever ground he gains in one direction, he loses in the opposite direction.

GEMARA: What is meant by "towards the east"? "Towards the east of his son" said R. Itz'hak, "and towards the west also of his son." Rabba bar R. Shila, however, says, that both "towards the east" and "towards the west" refer to the house, but the question will arise how will it be possible for the house to be farther than the Erub, because if he told his son to make an Erub there, the son must have stood between the house and the Erub? In this case, the house was diagonally opposite the place where the son stood while the Erub was directly opposite (as shown in illustration).

"If he, however, deposited the Erub outside of the legal limit, etc. Is it possible to assume, that he really overstepped the legal limit? Read: "If he placed the Erub outside of the seventy and two-thirds ells allowed the town."

"Whatever ground he gains in one direction, he loses in the opposite." He loses only what he gains, no more? Have we not learned in a Boraitha: "If he placed his Erub within the allowance (of seventy and two-thirds ells) of the city, he has accomplished nothing and it counts for naught; if, however, he placed his Erub outside of such allowance even one ell, he loses (his right to) the whole city, because the measure of the city will be counted to him in the legal limit effected by the Erub"?

This presents no difficulty. According to the Boraitha, he loses the whole city only when the two thousand ells of his limit terminate in the centre of the city; but if they terminate at the end of the city, which is the case in our Mishna, he loses nothing, as R. Idi said in the name of R. Jehoshua ben Levi: If he measured the limit and it terminated in the centre of a town, he has only half the town; but if it terminated at the end of the town, the whole town becomes as four ells and he may complete his entire limit of two thousand ells outside of the town." R. Idi said, however: "This is merely a prophetic assertion! For what is the difference whether it terminate in the centre of the city or at the end!" Said Rabha: "This is by no means a prophetic assertion. Thou wilt learn this in the succeeding Mishna."

R. Joseph said in the name of Rami bar Abba quoting R. Huna: "If a town was standing on the steep banks of a lake and there was a partition made on the brink of the banks four ells high, the measurement of the legal limits may be commenced from that partition. If there was no partition, however, the measurement must be commenced from the entrance of the house (nearest the lake)." Said Abayi: "Why dost thou require in this case a partition four ells high? Generally four spans are sufficient!" Because usually, no fear is entertained as to the use of the place, while in this case there is constant fear of falling over the banks (hence that place cannot be taken into consideration and the measurement must be made from the houses).

Said R. Joseph: Whence do I adduce this teaching? From the following Boraitha: "Rabbi permitted the inhabitants of Gadar to descend to Hamtan but forbade the people of Hamtan to ascend to Gadar." Why did Rabbi decree thus? We must assume, because the inhabitants of Gadar (who lived above the people of Hamtan on the slope of a mountain) made a partition at the foot of their city while the inhabitants of the city of Hamtan did not make a partition at the foot of their city; hence Gadar which had a partition was safe from falling, and the legal limit, which was measured from any part of the city included Hamtan, but the people of Hamtan, which had no partition and was consequently not safe, could measure their legal limits only from their houses and thus it did not include the city of Gadar.

When R. Dimi came from Palestine, however, he assigned a different reason for the above Boraitha, saying: "Rabbi decreed thus, because the Gadarites would maltreat the Hamtanites; hence he prohibited the latter to ascend to Gadar on a Sabbath." Why on Sabbath, why not also on a week-day! Because on Sabbath there is more drunkenness (and in consequence more brutality). Why did he then permit the Gadarites to descend to Hamtan? Cannot they maltreat the Hamtanites even there? Because a dog that has no home will not bark even in seven years (meaning that in their own homes the Hamtanites could better protect themselves). Is there not danger, however, that the Hamtanites will maltreat the Gadarites? The Hamtanites would not dare do this (because they were in the minority).

R. Safra said: There is a different reason for the Boraitha, viz.: The city of Gadar was built in the form of an arch and the two ends of the arch were more than four thousand ells apart. We have learned in connection with this that the legal limits must be measured from the houses of the individuals; hence when the inhabitants of Gadar measured their limit, it included the city of Hamtan, but when the people of Hamtan, who were opposite the space of the arch, measured their limit, it terminated in the empty space between the two sides of the arch, and that space being over four thousand ells, could not be counted as part of the city.

R. Dimi bar Hinana said: (There is another reason for the Boraitha.) The city of Gadar was a large city whereas Hamtan was a small town and the laws concerning this will be explained in the following Mishna.

MISHNA: The inhabitants of a large town may traverse the whole of a small town (within or adjoining their legal limits); but the inhabitants of the small town must (not) traverse the whole extent of the large town. How then? If an inhabitant of the large town place his Erub in the small town, or an inhabitant of the small town place his Erub in the large town, each may traverse either town and proceed two thousand ells beyond its boundaries. R. Aqiba said: "One has only the right to proceed two thousand ells from the place where he deposited his Erub." Said R. Aqiba to the sages: "Will ye not admit, that in the case of one who deposits his Erub in a cavern, that he has not the right to proceed further than two thousand ells from the place where he has deposited his Erub?" They replied: "True; but when is this the case? If there are no dwellings in the cavern; but if there are dwellings within it, he may not only traverse the whole extent of the cavern, but also proceed two thousand ells outside of it." (Hence, it may be seen) that the ordinance is less rigid as to the interior of a cavern, than to the space above it.

Concerning one who measures (previously mentioned) he is only allowed to carry the legal limits two thousand ells from the place whence he started, even though the end of his measurement terminate in a cavern.

GEMARA: Said R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel: If one took his Sabbath-rest in an abandoned city, he may traverse the entire extent of the city and two thousand ells besides; but if he deposited his Erub in that city, he only has two thousand ells from that Erub. R. Elazar, however, said, whether he merely took his rest there or deposited his Erub, he may traverse the entire extent of the city and two thousand ells outside of it.

An objection was made based upon the statement of R. Aqiba addressed to the sages: "Will ye not admit, that in the case of one who deposits his Erub in a cavern, that he has not the right to proceed further than two thousand ells from the place where he has deposited his Erub?" and their reply: "True; but when is this the case? If there are no dwellings in the cavern." Thus we see, that if there arc no dwellings within it, the sages agree with R. Aqiba? (How then can R. Elazar say, I that one may traverse the whole extent of the city and two thousand ells beyond?) By the statement "if there are no dwellings in the cavern" the sages mean to say, if there is no room for dwellings in the cavern.

Mar Jehudah observed that the inhabitants of Mabrachta placed their Erub in the synagogue of the city of Agubar, so he said to them: "Why do ye not place the Erub a little further? Ye will have more space to the two thousand ells?" Said Rabha to him: Thou quarreller! (Thou disputest the opinion of the sages!) Concerning the law of Erubin no attention is paid to R. Aqiba (because it had been decided long ago, that the more lenient decrees concerning Erubin prevail).

REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ERUBIN OF COURTS AND PARTNERSHIPS.

MISHNA: To one who dwells in the same court with a Gentile, or with one who does not acknowledge the laws of Erub, the latter prove a bar (to his carrying in the court). R. Eliezer ben Jacob, however, said: "At no time can such a prohibition be caused, unless there be two Israelites, who prevent each other."

R. Gamaliel related: "It happened that a Sadducee dwelt with us in one alley (entry) in Jerusalem, and my father said to us (on the eve of Sabbath): 'Make haste and bring all the vessels into the alley, lest the Sadducee bring out his, and thus make it unlawful for you to carry out yours.'" R. Jehudah related the same circumstance with a variation in the language, viz.: "Make haste and do what you require done in the alley, lest he come out and make it unlawful for you to do so."

GEMARA: Abayi and R. Hinana, both sons of Abin, were sitting along with Abayi. The two brothers said: "The Mishna would be correct according to the opinion of R. Meir, who holds that the dwelling of a Gentile as far as the laws of Erubin are concerned is regarded as a dwelling; but what about R. Eliezer ben Jacob? If he regards the dwelling of a Gentile as a dwelling, then it should prove a bar even to one Israelite, and if he holds that it is not regarded as a dwelling, then it should not interfere even with two Israelites." Said Abayi to them: "Does then R. Meir hold, that the dwelling of a Gentile is regarded as a dwelling where the laws of Erubin are concerned? Have we not learned in a Boraitha, that R. Meir holds the dwelling of a Gentile to be like a vacant house, where things may be moved at will? Therefore I say, All agree that the dwelling of a Gentile is not considered as a dwelling as far as Erubin are concerned and that the intent of the Mishna is simply to prevent the Israelite from falling into the ways of the Gentile and disregard the Sabbath entirely, and to this end R. Meir holds, that a Gentile proves a bar even to one Israelite, but R. Eliezer ben Jacob maintains, that it is so rare an occurrence for one Israelite and one Gentile to live in one court, that such a precaution is in that case superfluous."

The text of the above Boraitha is as follows: "The dwelling of a Gentile is, as far as the laws of Erubin are concerned, to be regarded as a vacant house and things may be moved and carried to and from his house and the court; but if an Israelite also dwelt in the same court, the Gentile proves a bar to the Israelite." Such is the dictum of R. Meir; R. Eliezer ben Jacob, however, said, that the Gentile does not interfere, unless there are two Israelites who prevent each other."--Have we not learned in our Mishna that if one dwells in the same court with a Gentile, the Gentile proves a bar? This presents no difficulty: The Mishna refers to the Gentile who is on the spot, while R. Eliezer ben Jacob refers to one who is not at home.

What does R. Eliezer mean to express? Does he hold, that a dwelling without the occupant is also a dwelling, then he should state, that even one Israelite is prevented by it; if he holds, that a dwelling without its occupant is not considered a dwelling, then why does he mention a Gentile, he could say, if there be two Israelites and one is absent from home, he does not prove a bar to the other? Nay; a dwelling without its occupant is not considered a dwelling; but in the case of the Israelite who was absent, if he had proved a bar when at home, the precaution is also enforced when he is not at home, but in the case of a Gentile, no such precaution is necessary for the reason, that he himself does not prove a bar to the Israelite and his interference is merely due to the fact that the Israelite might fall into his ways and disregard the Sabbath. When the Gentile is absent, however, such apprehension does not exist.

If the Gentile is absent he does not prevent the Israelite? Have we not learned in a Mishna, that "if a person quits his house, and he goes to take his Sabbath-rest in another town, whether he be a Gentile or an Israelite, he proves a bar to the other inmates of the court, such is the decree of R. Meir"? This refers to a case of where there is fear that the person will return on the same day.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Eliezer ben Jacob." R. Huna, however, said: "It is customary to hold to the opinion of R. Eliezer, i.e., it is not taught in the colleges that the Halakha prevails according to R. Eliezer ben Jacob, but when a man asks concerning this law, he may be told to follow that dictum." R. Johanan however said: "The people act in accordance with R. Eliezer's decree, but it should not be decided so when the question arises."

Abayi asked R. Joseph: "It is known to us, that all the Mishnaoth taught by R. Eliezer ben Jacob are clean and thorough. Here also R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel, that the Halakha prevails according to R. Eliezer ben Jacob. Now then, if a disciple of a certain master live in the same town as his master and is asked concerning a Halakha established by R. Eliezer ben Jacob (which is therefore correct) may he decide it himself or must he as usual refer the case to his master?" R. Joseph answered: "R. Hisda (who was a disciple of R. Huna) would not even decide the question whether eggs may be eaten with kutach (a dish made principally of milk) as long as R. Huna was living."

R. Jacob bar Abba asked Abayi: "May a disciple decide in the place where his master resides a Halakha, contained in the scrolls of Fast-days?" Abayi replied: R. Joseph decided this question as stated above.

R. Hisda did decide legal questions, during the lifetime of R. Huna, in Khafri.

R. Hamnuna decided questions in the city of Hartha, which belonged to Argaz in the days when R. Hisda lived. (Hartha was not far from Pumbaditha, the residence of R. Hisda.)

Rabhina would examine the slaughtering-knives in Babylon during the lifetime of R. Ashi (who was the head of the college). R. Ashi asked him: "Why does Master do this?" Rabhina answered: "Did not R. Hamnuna decide questions in Hartha during the lifetime of R. Hisda?" Said R. Ashi to him: "On the contrary! We have learned, that R. Hamnuna did not do this." Rejoined Rabhina: "We have learned both, that he did and that he did not, and the case seems to be thus: As long as R. Huna the master of R. Hisda lived, R. Hamnuna did not decide any questions, but upon the death of R. Huna when R. Hisda became the head of the college, R. Hamnuna began to decide questions also, because he was virtually a disciple (and) comrade of R. Hisda and I am also a disciple comrade of Master."

Rabha said: "If a slaughtering-knife is brought to a young scholar for examination, he may examine it, providing he intends to use some of the meat himself."

Rabhina came to the city of Mehuzza (and stopped at an inn). The inn-keeper brought a slaughtering-knife to him for examination, and Rabhina told him to take it to Rabha. Said the inn-keeper: "Dost thou not hold with Rabha, that a young scholar may examine a slaughtering-knife if he intends to use the meat himself?" Rejoined Rabhina: "Yea; but the meat is thine and I merely buy the meat of thee as others do."

R. Elazar of the city of Hagronia and R. Abba bar Tachlipha (R. Aha) were the guests of R. Aha the son of R. Iqua in the city presided over by R. Aha bar Jacob. A calf, which was the third of its mother, was to be prepared and the slaughtering-knife was brought to them for inspection. Said R. Aha bar Tachlipha: "Must we not respect the elder (meaning R. Aha bar Jacob)?" Said R. Elazar to him: "Thus decided Rabha: A young scholar may examine the slaughtering-knife if he intends to use the meat himself." Accordingly R. Elazar examined the knife but was afterwards punished for it.

Why was R. Elazar punished for it? Rabba had really allowed it? Because R. Aha bar Jacob was an exceptionally wise and extremely old sage.

Rabha said: A disciple has no right to decide questions of law. If, however, he sees a person committing a prohibited act, he may even in the presence of his master correct such a person.

Rabhina while in the presence of R. Ashi (his master) observed a man tying an ass to a tree on Sabbath. He admonished him and told him that it was not allowed; but the man paid no attention to him, whereupon Rabhina said to him: "Thou art under a ban for this." Then he (Rabhina) said to R. Ashi: "Can this action of mine be construed as disrespectful to thee because it was done in thy presence?" R. Ashi answered: "It is written [Proverbs xxi. 30]: 'There is no wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord,' and that means, where the honor of the Lord is concerned, the respect due a teacher is not to be considered."

Rabha said: "If a disciple decide a point of law in the presence of his master, it is considered as a capital offence; but if he does this in the absence of his master while the master is still in the same city, it is not a capital offence, but is nevertheless prohibited." Zera said in the name of R. Hanina: It is not a capital offence, but he is nevertheless called a sinner, as it is written [Psalms cxix. ii]: "In my heart have I treasured up thy saying, in order that I may not sin against thee." (This signifies that if one did not treasure up his knowledge but uttered it in the presence of his master, he commits sin.)

R. Hamnuna propounded a contradictory question to the above verse, viz.: It is written [Psalms xl. 10]: "I announce thy righteousness in the great assembly," and himself explained it by saying: "The former verse was proclaimed by David when Ira the Yairite, who was his master, was still living and the latter when Ira was dead."

R. Abba bar Zabhda said: "He who sends his gifts to one particular priest to the exclusion of all others brings famine into the world, as it is written [II Samuel XX. 26]: "And Ira the Yairite was a priest unto David." Why a priest unto David? Was he not also a priest to the rest of Israel? The inference then is, that David presented him with all his gifts and immediately following this verse, it is written [ibid. xxi. 1]: "And there was a famine in the days of David three years."

R. Elazar said: A disciple who decides a point of law in the place of his master, if intrusted with a position of importance, is eventually deposed, as it is written [Numbers xxxi. 21-24] that Elazar the priest quoted a law and although he quoted it in the name of Moses, still he was deposed from office on that account; for although Joshua was ordered to stand before Elazar [Numbers xxvii. 21], we do not find one instance where Joshua ever availed himself of Elazar's services.

R. Levi said: He who decides a point of law in the presence of his master will die childless, for it is written [Numbers xi. 28], that Joshua, the son of Nun said, "My lord Moses, forbid them," and [Chronicles vii. 27] it merely states, "Now his son, Jehoshua his son," whence we see that Joshua had no children.

There was an entry in which a man by the name of Lachman bar Risthak resided. He was asked to rent his right to the ground occupied by him to the other inmates; but he would not do this. So the matter was brought to Abayi for decision and he told them as follows: "All of you, resign your rights to your grounds to one man in the entry and thus it will constitute a case of where one Israelite and one Gentile occupy the same entry; when one Gentile occupies the same grounds with one Israelite he does not interfere with the Israelite." How can this remedy us? Why was it decreed, that one Gentile does not interfere with an Israelite, because it is of rare occurrence, that they should occupy the same court, but in our case it is different. We all live there? Said Abayi: "In your case there is also an unusual occurrence; for it seldom happens, that all the inmates of one entry should resign their rights to one man."

Subsequently R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua related this statement of Abayi to Rabha. Said Rabha: "If so, then the entire law of Erubin was made void in that entry." Nay; they mad can E rub between themselves also. Rejoined Rabba: "This is still worse. In that case it will be said that an Erub may be made where a Gentile lives." Answered R. Huna: "It will be proclaimed, that the carrying is not done on account of the Erub, but because every inmate has resigned his right to the ground to one man and hence it is private ground." "To whom will ye proclaim this? To the children?" continued Rabha. "I have a better plan. Let one man go and ask Lachman bar Risthak to permit him to deposit something in his (Lachman's) yard, which will then be considered as rented for an entire year, and R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel, that if ground had been rented by an Israelite from a Gentile or vice versa for one year or even for one season when the crops are harvested, in fact if any dealings at all have been had on this order with the Gentile, an Erub may be placed in the entry where he lives with impunity."

Abayi asked of R. Joseph: "How is it, if there are several who had rented apartments from a Gentile and one of them forgot to make an Erub. Would he prove a bar to the others or not?" Answered R. Joseph: "The statement of R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel was made in order to make the law more lenient and not to make it more rigid."

When R. Na'hman heard the dictum of R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel quoted above, he said: "How fine is this Halakha!" Then he heard another dictum of R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel stating, that one who had imbibed a quarter of a lug of wine, must not decide any legal questions. Said R. Na'hman: "This Halakha is preposterous! I know that my head is not quite clear until I drink a quarter of a lug of wine." Said Rabha to him: "Why should master say this? Has he not heard the dictum of R. A'ha bar Hanina, viz.: it is written [Proverbs xxix. 3]: 'He that keepeth company with harlots wasteth his wealth,' and this means, that one who declares one Halakha to be fine and another to be bad loses the beauty (wealth) of the Thorah." Answered R. Na'hman: "Thou art right. I shall do this no more."

Rabba bar R. Huna said: One who is tipsy should not pray; but if he had done so his prayer is nevertheless acceptable. One who is intoxicated, however, and prayed, his prayer is considered as a blasphemy. What is meant by tipsy? If a man were compelled to speak to the king and had still sense enough to do so, he is merely tipsy; but one who would not be able to do this is considered intoxicated.

Said Rami bar Abba: "One who after drinking had walked a mile or slept a little is again considered sober." Said R. Na'hman in the name of Rabba bar Abbahu: This is the case if he had drunk only a quarter of a lug of wine; but if he drank more, then the walk tires him still more, and the interrupted doze inebriates him still more.

Will a walk of one mile then neutralize the effects of the wine? Have we not learned, that Rabbon Gamaliel while travelling at one time rode upon an ass from the city Akhu to Khazib and was followed by R. Ilayi. R. Gamaliel noticed some loaves lying on the road, so he said to Ilayi: "Take the loaves up," and meeting a Gentile later said to him: "Mabgai, take the loaves away from Ilayi." Ilayi then asked the Gentile: "Whence art thou?" and he answered: "From the cities of Burganin." "What is thy name?" asked Ilayi again. "I am called Mabgai," was the answer. "Dost thou know R. Gamaliel?" was the next question, "or does R. Gamaliel know thee?" "Nay," answered the Gentile. Thus it is obvious, that R. Gamaliel knew the name of the Gentile by inspiration [and three things may be deduced from his actions, viz.: "Firstly, that bread must not be passed by (but should be gathered up); secondly, that we must be guided by the majority of wayfarers (i.e., on account of the majority of wayfarers being Gentiles, the bread is presumed to belong to them and hence R. Ilayi was told to give it to the Gentile); and thirdly, that leavened bread belonging to a Gentile, even if remaining over from the Passover, may be made use of by Israelites after the Passover."]

Upon his arrival at Khazib, R. Gamaliel was asked by a man to nullify a vow. Said R. Gamaliel to his companions: "Have we drunk a quarter of a lug of Italian wine?" and they answered: "Yea, we did." "Then," quoth R. Gamaliel, "let us walk on, the man following us until the effects of the wine wear off," and they walked on for three miles. When they came to the steps leading up to the city of Tyre, R. Gamaliel dismounted, wrapped himself in a robe, sat down and nullified the man's vow, and from these actions we have learned many things; namely: "A quarter of a lug of Italian wine inebriates a man; when a man is inebriated, he must not decide any legal questions; a walk neutralizes the effects of wine; and a vow must not be nullified while riding, standing, or walking, but in a sitting position."

Thus we see, that a three miles' walk is required to destroy the effects of wine, how can it be said, that one mile is sufficient? In a case of inebriation through Italian wine it is different, because that wine is very strong, but for ordinary wine a walk of one mile is all that is necessary.

The master said: "One must not pass by bread." Said R. Johanan in the name of R. Simeon ben Jochai: This was said in the earlier generations when the daughters of Israel had not yet resorted to witchcraft, but in the latter generations when they began to practise it, bread may be passed by, lest it be bewitched.

We have learned in a Boraitha: Whole loaves of bread may be passed by, because they may be bewitched, but pieces of bread should not, as there is no fear of their being bewitched.

R. Shesheth said in the name of R. Elazar ben Azariah: "I could exempt the entire world from divine judgment since the destruction of the Temple to the present day; for it is written [Isaiah li. 21]: "Therefore, hear now this, O thou afflicted, and drunken, but not with wine." (Hence if all the world is drunken, they should not be judged.)

An objection was made: "We have learned, that a drunken man's purchase is a valid purchase, his sale is a valid sale; if he has committed a capital offence, he should be executed; if he committed a crime involving the punishment of stripes, he must be given the stripes. The rule is, that he is in all respects considered as a sober man with the exception that he is absolved from prayer." R. Shesheth means to say by stating that he can absolve the entire world from divine judgment, that he can exempt the world from the judgment concerning their prayers. Said R. Hanina: All this is said concerning a man whose drunkenness does not equal that of Lot's, but if it is of the degree of Lot's drunkenness, he is exempt from all judgment.

R. Hyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rabh: "One whose mind is not thoroughly at ease must not pray, as it is written: "In his affliction shall he not judge."

It was the custom of R. Hanina to omit saying his prayers on a day when he was in a bad humor, and Mar Uqba would not take his seat on the judge's bench on a day when a hot south wind would blow, saying, that it was too hot to judge with a clear mind. R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak said: When a Halakha is to be decided by a man, his head should be as clear as it is on a day when a north wind which drives away all dark clouds is blowing and the sky is clear and the weather fine.

Abayi said: "When my mother would tell me to hand her some kutach, it so confused me, that I could not study that whole day." Rabha said: "If a flea bit me, I could no longer learn."

The mother of Mar, the son of Rabhina, made her son seven suits of clothes, one for each day of the week.

R. Jehudah said: "The night was made only for sleep." R. Simeon ben Lakish, however, said: "The moon was made only in order to facilitate study at night."

R. Zera was told that all his conclusions were very sagacious, and he replied, that they were all studied during the day.

The daughter of R. Hisda said to her father: "Why does Master not sleep a while?" and he answered: "Very long days will yet come, when study will be impossible" (meaning the days in the grave).

R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak said: "We are all day-laborers." R. A'ha bar Jacob would borrow hours from the day and repay them at night.

R. Eliezer said: One who travelled on the road should, upon his return, not recite his prayers for three days, as it is written [Ezra viii. 15]: "And I gathered them together to the river that runneth into the Ahava, and we encamped there three days: and I looked about among the people." (Which signifies, that one should deliberate for three days and then pray.)

The father of Samuel when on the road would not pray for three days. Samuel himself would not pray in a room where there was any beer, saying, that the odor of the beer confused him. R. Papa would not pray in a house where there was Harsena (a dish made of fish and vinegar) saying, that the odor disturbed him.

R. Hanina said: A man who is angry with another and when under the influence of liquor can be persuaded to a reconciliation possesses one of the qualities of his Creator, as it is written [Genesis viii. 21]: "And the Lord smelled the sweet savor," etc.

R. Hyya said: "One who drinks wine and is not excited thereby, has some of the qualities of the seventy sages in the days of Moses." The inference of R. Hyya is based upon the word Yaïn (wine), which according to the Hebrew method of counting, namely, Yod = 10 and another Yod = 10 and Nun = 50, altogether 70; and also upon the word Sod (secret) Samach = 60, Vav = 6 and Daled = 4, altogether 70; hence when the wine enters, the secrets escape and the man who does not become excited through wine and can retain his secrets, possesses the wisdom of the seventy sages.

R. Hanan said: "Wine was created only to comfort the mourners and to pay the wicked their reward for any good they may have done, on this earth, as it is written [Proverbs xxxi. 6]: "Give strong drink unto him that is ready to perish, and wine unto those who have an embittered soul." (By "one that is ready to perish," is meant the wicked and by "those who have an embittered soul," are meant the mourners.)

R. Hanin bar Papa said: A house where wine does not flow like water cannot be classed among those that are blessed, as it is written [Exod. xxiii. 25]: "And he will bless thy bread and thy water." The bread referred to is that which can be bought with the proceeds of the second tithes and the water which cannot be bought with such money really means wine. If, then, wine is so plentiful in the house, that it flows like water, the house is counted among the blessed.

R. Ilayi said: By means of three things a man's character may be ascertained: "By his wine-cup, by his purse, and by his anger," and others say also by his play (for money).

R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh: There was a case, where an Israelite and a Gentile occupied an inner court and another Israelite occupied the outer court and it was referred to Rabbi for decision. He decided that the outer court must not be used to carry therein. It was then referred to R. Hyya and he decided likewise.

Rabba and R. Joseph both sat in the presence of R. Shesheth, when he finished his lecture, and R. Shesheth concluded by saying, that Rabh decided the above Halakha in accordance with the opinion of R. Meir. Rabba shook his head. Said R. Joseph: Is it possible, that two such great men (as R. Shesheth and Rabba) should be mistaken? If Rabh's dictum were according to R. Meir, why was it necessary to state, that the outer court was occupied by an Israelite? (R. Meir holds, that even one Gentile and one Israelite are sufficient to make it unlawful to carry in one court.) If we assume, that Rabh merely related the circumstance as it occurred, without making a decision, is it not a fact that when Rabh was asked whether, if the Gentile was at his home, the Israelite may carry from the inner court to the outer, he answered that he may, hence we see that the Gentile does not prevent the Israelite occupying the same court from carrying therein; but that the two Israelites prevent each other. Shall we then assume, that Rabh held in accordance with R. Eliezer ben Jacob? Why should it be prohibited for the Israelite to carry from one court to the other? Further on we shall learn, that, according to R. Aqiba, a foot (meaning a man) which is allowed to carry in its place cannot interfere with the right of another place (and in this case each Israelite may carry in his own court, for one of them has the court to himself and the other has but one Gentile in his court, who, according to R. Eliezer ben Jacob, does not interfere with his right to carry), why then should it be prohibited for them to carry between the courts? It might be then, that Rabh holds with R. Aqiba, who says, that a foot which is allowed to carry in its own place nevertheless interferes with the right of another place, then why should the Gentile be mentioned? Each Israelite will prevent the other?

Said R. Huna, the son of R. Jehoshua: It may be assumed that Rabh agrees either with R. Eliezer ben Jacob or with R. Aqiba; but in this case the two Israelites combined in an Erub, and on account of the interference of the Gentile, he prohibited both.

Resh Lakish and the disciples of R. Hanina met in an inn where lived two Israelites and a Gentile, who rented his place from another Gentile. The tenant was not at home but the owner was. The question then arose whether the place of the tenant could be rented from the owner for the Sabbath. Where the tenant had a perfect lease and could not be dispossessed for that day, it is entirely out of the question. If, however, the tenant's lease was conditional, i.e., if the owner could at any time dispossess him, the question arises whether, because of the fact, that he had not yet been dispossessed the tenant retains his right to the place and it cannot be rented, or from the fact, that it is optional with the owner to dispossess the tenant at any time, the place may be rented.

Resh Lakish said: In the meantime, let us rent the place, and afterwards, when we come to our sages in the South, we will ask their opinion. Subsequently, when they came to R. Ephes and asked him, he told them that they had done rightly.

R. Hanina bar Joseph, R. Hyya bar Abba, and R. Assi met at an inn, the proprietor of which was a Gentile and who arrived on the Sabbath. The question then arose, whether his place could be rented from him for the Sabbath or not. If renting a place is equal to making an Erub, then, of course, it would not be permitted on Sabbath, but if renting a place was merely the resigning of it by one man to another, then it may be done, because that is allowed on Sabbath. R. Hanina advised renting it but R. Assi objected. Said R. Hyya bar Abba to them: Let us depend upon this elder (meaning R. Hanina) and rent it and then we will ask R. Johanan. When they asked R. Johanan he told them, they had done what was right.

The men of Neherdai when hearing of this were surprised, saying: "Did not R. Johanan say at another time, that 'renting a place for the Sabbath was equivalent to making an Erub,' hence, as the Erub must be effected on the preceding day, the renting must be done likewise." Nay; R. Johanan means to state that as an Erub may be effected with anything, no matter how little in value, a place may also be rented for any amount, be it ever so small; and as one man may combine an Erub for five others occupying the same court, so may one rent also for others.

Samuel said: "There is no such thing as resigning the right of one court to another court, nor resigning the right to the space of a ruin. (This signifies, that if two courts opened into an entry or into the street and besides had a door between them, there is no necessity for them to combine an Erub, and, in consequence, they are not benefited if the right of one court is resigned to the other.) And as for a ruin, it means, that if there were two houses opening into a ruin between them, neither can use the ruin, unless they combine an Erub; but the space enjoyed by each cannot be resigned by one to the other. R. Johanan, however, said that both in the case of the court and of the ruin the right to the space may be resigned by one to the other.

It was necessary for us to be told of both instances wherein they differ; for if we had been told, that Samuel only prohibited the resigning of the space by one court to the other, we might have assumed, that he did so because each court had a right in itself without combining a joint Erub, but as for a ruin, he might have held, that as an Erub must be effected by the two houses on each side, if the use of the ruin is desired, the resigning of the space was permitted. If the difference concerning the ruin only were related, it might be said, that R. Johanan permits the resigning of the space of the ruin only; because an Erub must be effected by the houses desiring its use, whereas in the case of the court, he agrees with Samuel. Hence both instances are quoted.

Abayi said: The prohibition of Samuel regarding the resigning of the space by one court to another refers only to two courts that had a door between them. If, however, one court was contained within the other and did not have a separate entrance to the street, they may mutually resign their space, because they are bound to combine an Erub. Rabha said: In such a case, they at certain times may do so and at other times they must not (and this will be explained at the end of this chapter).

When R. Hisda met R. Shesheth his lips would tremble; for knowing that R. Shesheth was so well versed in Mishnaoth and Boraithoth, he was afraid to render a decision lest R. Shesheth would contradict him with another Mishna or Boraitha. On the other hand R. Shesheth's whole body would tremble when he met R. Hisda, for knowing that the latter was very shrewd, he was afraid of R. Hisda's sagacity.

R. Hisda propounded the following question to R. Shesheth: "If there were two houses on each side of a wide street (public ground) and some Gentiles made a partition around the street on the Sabbath, what is the law? According to those who maintain, that it is not allowed for one court to resign its space to another, there is no question; because if the two courts had desired to make an Erub on the preceding day they could have done so and still they are not allowed to resign their spaces to each other; so much the more in our case, where the two houses could not have combined an Erub on the preceding day on account of the intervening public ground which had not yet had a partition, they are not allowed to resign their space to each other. I am asking, however, considering the Tana who maintains, that the two courts may resign their space to each other. Shall I assume, that it is permitted in the case of the two courts because they could have made an Erub on the preceding day, but in the case of our two houses which could not have made an Erub on the preceding day, it is not permitted or, as there is a partition around the intervening public ground, they may do so?"

R. Shesheth answered: "Nay, it is not permitted." R. Hisda queried again: "How is it, if two Israelites living in the same court with a Gentile and not having made an Erub or rented the place of the Gentile, the latter died on the Sabbath? May they mutually resign their space to each other? According to the Tana who holds, that one may rent a place on the Sabbath, there is no question, because if they did not make an Erub they may rent the place from the Gentile and then resign their places to each other; thus if two things may be done on the Sabbath, one certainly may be done. I ask thee according to the Tana who prohibits renting on the Sabbath. May the two Israelites in this case where the Gentile is dead and they need not rent his place resign their places to each other or not?" Rejoined R. Shesheth: "I say that they may; because if they had chosen to rent the place yesterday and then effect an Erub they could have done so, but Hamnuna does not allow them to do this."

R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: "If a Gentile have in his court a door, four spans wide and four ells high, opening into a valley, even should he lead cattle, camels, and wagons through the entry to the court all day long, he does not interfere with the Israelites inhabiting the court, because his door is of more use to him than the common entry, and serves to separate him from the others."

The schoolmen asked: "How is the law, if the door of the Gentile opened into a woodshed?" R. Na'hman bar Ami said in the name of some learned men: "Even if the door of the Gentile open into a woodshed and the common entry into the street, he also does not interfere with the Israelites inhabiting the court." Rabba and R. Joseph both say: "If the woodshed was not more than of two saahs' capacity, the Gentile does interfere with the Israelites, because he cannot derive as much comfort from the woodshed as he can from the street, but if the woodshed was larger than that the Gentile does not interfere. With Israelites it is the reverse: if the woodshed, into which the separate door opens, be no more than of two saahs' capacity and the Israelite had not combined in the Erub with the others, he does not interfere with them, because a woodshed of that size may be used by him on the Sabbath; but if the woodshed be larger, he does interfere with the other Israelites."

Rabha bar Haklayi asked of R. Huna: "How is the law if a Gentile have a door opening into a woodshed?" and R. Huna answered: "The sages have already decided this. If the woodshed be of two saahs' capacity, he interferes with the Israelites, but if of more than two saahs' capacity he does not."

It happened that some warm water was spilled and more was needed for a child on the Sabbath. So Rabba said: "Let some warm water be brought from my house." Said Abayi to him: "Why! no Erub has been made!" Rejoined Rabba: "Let us depend upon the combine made in the entry (of this court)," but Abayi persisted: "We have no part even in the entry. "Finally Rabba said: "Let a Gentile be told to bring it." Subsequently Abayi said: "I had a mind to dispute even this last order of my master, but R. Joseph would not permit me to do this; for R. Joseph said in the name of R. Kahana: 'Where a biblical ordinance is in question the case should be discussed before the act is committed, but in the matter of rabbinical ordinances the deed may be accomplished and then the decision may be asked for.'"

Then R. Joseph asked Abayi: "Upon what grounds dost thou desire to dispute this last order of the master?" and he answered: Upon the teaching we have learned in a Boraitha, viz.: While the sprinkling of an unclean man (with the ashes of the red heifer) by a clean man is only a rabbinical ordinance, the Sabbath should not be violated by the performance of this rite even if it be necessary for the fulfilment of a commandment, and in the same manner requesting a Gentile to per. form an act on the Sabbath being also against the rabbinical ordinance, it should not be done on the Sabbath. Rejoined R. Joseph: "Canst thou discriminate between the performance of an act which is against the rabbinical ordinance and a case where no act at all was committed? The Gentile was not told by Rabba to warm the water but merely to bring it from his house through the entry, and this is certainly not prohibited."

Said Rabba bar R. Hanan to Abayi: "How is it possible, that in a court where two such great men as Rabba and thou reside, no Erub was made either in the court or in the entry?" Answered Abayi: "How can I help it? The master does not usually pay attention to such trifles; I am engaged all the week long in study, while the inmates of the court do not trouble themselves about it. Should I make up my mind to present them with the bread in my basket, it would be merely a sham, for if they were to demand it, I could not in reality part with it as I cannot spare it; hence even if I should have this in mind, it would be useless; for we have learned in a Boraitha, that if one of the inhabitants of the entry demanded wine or oil and was refused, the combine is made invalid." Rejoined Rabba bar R. Hanan: "Then thou couldst have in mind to give them a quarter of a lug of vinegar from the cask thou hast in the house, and thou surely wouldst not use up that on the Sabbath." Abayi replied: "We have learned in another Boraitha, that it is not allowed to combine an Erub with material which is in bulk because it might be, that the very part which was intended for the Erub may be used." "But," insisted Rabba bar R. Hanan, "we have learned in another Boraitha that this may be done." Said R. Oshiya: "Concerning this, there is a difference of opinion between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel." It happened again that some warm water needed for a child was spilled. Said Rabha: "Let the mother be asked whether she is in need of warm water, and, if so, a Gentile may be told to warm it and bring it to her and it will serve for the child also." R. Mesharshia remarked: "The mother has been eating dry dates for some time (then she certainly does not need any warm water)." Rejoined Rabba: "She is not quite herself and knows not what she eats."

Another case of this kind happened with a child. So Rabba said: Let the belongings of the men be taken from the men's room into the women's apartment; I shall then resign my place for the benefit of others and the warm water may be brought from my house.

Said Rabhina to Rabba: "Did not Samuel say, that it is not allowed to resign the space of one court to another?" and Rabba answered: "I hold with R. Johanan who permits this to be done." Rejoined Rabhina: "If thou dost not hold with Samuel, why then didst thou order the belongings of the men to be transferred to the women's apartments? Thou shouldst have resigned thy place to them and they their place to thee, then all of you will be enabled to carry, which according to Rabh is also permissible." Rabba replied: "In this respect I hold with Samuel in order that it should not appear as a farce if I resign my place to the others and they their place to me."

The text states, that Rabh permits the mutual resigning of places and Samuel prohibits it. Said R. Ashi: Rabh and Samuel differ in the same point as R. Eliezer and the sages (in Chapter II., last Mishna, where R. Eliezer forbids the inmate of a court who had forgotten to join in the Erub to carry and permits the other inmates to do so).

"R. Gamaliel related: It happened that a Sadducee," etc. Whence this reference to a Sadducee? The Mishna is not complete and should read thus: A Sadducee is considered the same as a Gentile, and R. Gamaliel said: "He is not considered as a Gentile," and then relates the incident: "It happened, that a Sadducee dwelt with us in one alley in Jerusalem, and my father said to us: 'Make haste and bring out all your vessels into the alley, before the Sadducee can do this and thus prevent you from doing so.'" We have also learned to this effect in a Boraitha, viz.: "An Israelite who lives in the same court with a Gentile, a Sadducee, or a Bathusee, is prevented by, them (from carrying therein). R. Gamaliel, however, said this does not apply to a Sadducee or a Bathusee, and it happened that a Sadducee lived in the same alley with him in Jerusalem, so he said to his children: "Make haste and carry out all your vessels into the alley, before that unworthy one can come out and prevent you from doing so; for so far he has resigned his place to you (but later he may change his mind)." So said R. Meir. R. Jehudah, however, gave another version of the affair, viz.: Make haste and do what is necessary for you in the alley, before it becomes dark; for after dark the Sadducee will prevent you from doing so (meaning that the Sadducee, like a Gentile, cannot resign his place to the Israelites). Shall we assume then, therefrom, that if the Israelites do a thing before the Sadducee that he cannot prevent them later?

Have we not learned in a Mishna?" One who, after resigning his place, carries out intentionally or inadvertently into the court, prevents the others from doing so. So said R. Meir?" Said R. Joseph: "Say, that he does not prevent the others." Abayi says: There is no difficulty. The Mishna by stating that he prevents the others means to say, if he had previously carried out things (before the others did so) as we have learned in a Boraitha: If after resigning his place, a man carried out things into the court, either intentionally or inadvertently, he prevents the others from doing so, so said R. Meir. R. Jehudah said "only if he did so intentionally." All agree, however, that such is only the case, if the other inmates of the court had not carried out things before he did, but if they had done so, he does not prevent them at all, whether he had carried out things intentionally or unintentionally.

The master said: "R. Jehudah, however, gave another version of the affair. Then R. Jehudah holds, that the Sadducee is considered as a Gentile, and in the Mishna we have learned, that R. Gamaliel said: "Lest the Sadducee bring out his vessels," etc. This presents no difficulty. There are two kinds of Sadducees. One who publicly violates the Sabbath is considered as a Gentile, and one who does so secretly, is not considered as a Gentile. According to whose opinion will the following Boraitha be: "One who publicly violates the Sabbath, cannot resign his place?" According to the opinion of R. Jehudah.

Once a man went out on the Sabbath with a bundle of spices in his hand, and seeing the approach of R. Jehudah the Third, he concealed it. Said R. Jehudah the Third: According to R. Jehudah a man of this kind may resign his place, as we have learned in another Boraitha: An apostate who does not violate the Sabbath in the markets may resign his place, but one who does violate the Sabbath in the markets cannot do so; for it was said, that only an Israelite may resign his place or accept ground resigned to him by another, but from a Gentile the place must be rented. How may a place be resigned by Israelites? One says to the other: My place is sold to thee or my place is resigned to thee, and no token of acceptance is necessary.

MISHNA: Should one of the householders of a court forget, and not join in the Erub, neither be nor the other inmates of the court are allowed to carry anything into or out of his house, but he and they may carry into or out of their houses. If the other inmates have resigned to him their common right to the court, he is permitted to carry therein, but they must not do so. Should there be two persons who have neglected to combine in an Erub, they mutually prevent each other; for one individual can resign his right to the court or can acquire that right; but two persons, though permitted to jointly resign their right, cannot jointly acquire the right to the exclusive use of the court.

From what time is the right to be conferred? Beth Shammai hold, "While it is yet daylight," but Beth Hillel maintains "even from dusk (on the eve of Sabbath)." Whoever resigns his right (to the court) and afterwards either intentionally or inadvertently carries within it, prevents (renders it unlawful for) the others from doing so. Such is the dictum of R. Meir. R. Jehudah, however, said: If he carries (within the court) intentionally, he prevents them, but if inadvertently, he does not.

GEMARA: Is it unlawful only to carry into and out of his house, but carrying into and out of the court it is lawful? How was the case? If he resigned his right to the house why should it be unlawful (to carry into) the house; if he did not resign his right to the house, why should they all have a right to the court? In this case, the man had resigned his right to the court alone but not to his house, and the sages maintain, that by resigning his right to the court he did not also resign his right to his house, and there are men who live in houses that have no court. Why then is it lawful for him to carry in and out of their houses? Because he is considered as a guest.

"If the other inmates have resigned to him," etc. Will they then be considered as his guests? One man can be the guest of five, but five men cannot be considered the guests of one. Can we adduce from this clause in the Mishna that this resigning of the right (to a place) can be repeated mutually several times? The Mishna may mean to state that the other inmates had already previously resigned their rights to the one man, in which case it becomes lawful for him, but not for them.

"Should there be two persons," etc. Is this not self-evident? The case is, if after having forgotten to join in the Erub, one of the two persons resigned his right to his house and also the right to the part of the court renounced to him by the others. We might assume that this could be lawfully done. We are therefore told that the other inmates having resigned their rights to the two persons jointly, one of them individually cannot resign his right, because he had not an individual right at that time.

"For one individual can resign his right," etc. This was just stated in the Mishna, what need is there of the repetition? We have learned both concerning resigning and acquiring a right? The latter part of the clause, which teaches that two persons may resign their right, but must not acquire it, is essential. This, however, is also self-evident? We might assume, that a precautionary measure is necessary prohibiting two to resign their right, lest one resign his to two; therefore we are told, that such a precaution is not necessary.

"Two persons cannot jointly acquire the right." Why this repetition again? Here we are told, that two persons must not acquire the right even when presented with the ground in question outright, so that they have the privilege of transferring it to others.

Abayi asked of Rabba: "If five men inhabited one court and one of them had forgotten to join in the Erub, must he resign his right to each of the others individually or can he do so collectively?" Rabba answered: "He must do so to each individually." Rejoined Abayi: "We have learned, that one who had not joined in an Erub, may resign his right to another that had, and two persons who had joined in an Erub may resign their right to one who had not; two who had not joined in an Erub may also resign their right to two others who had not, but one who had not joined in an Erub must not resign his right to another in the same condition nor may two who had not joined in an Erub resign their right to two others, who were similarly situated. It says, then, that one who had not joined in an Erub, may resign his right to one who had. The one who had, certainly must have had another person to combine an Erub with him, then it seems to be sufficient if he (who had not joined) resigned his right to the one man only and not to the other also?" Rabba replied: "Yea, he certainly had a companion in the Erub, but it may be the case, that the companion died and he was left alone."

Rabha asked R. Na'hman: "May an heir (whose father died on the Sabbath) resign his right or not? Shall I say, that because he could not prepare the Erub, on the preceding day, not having his own property, he cannot resign his right on the Sabbath; or that he, being a descendant of his father, has also inherited his father's right?" Answered R. Na'hman: "I hold, that he may, but the disciples of Samuel maintain, that he must not." Rabha objected: We have learned: This is the rule: A thing that had been permissible on part of the Sabbath is permissible for the entire Sabbath, and that which was prohibited for part of the Sabbath was also prohibited for the entire Sabbath. What is meant by "had been permissible on part of the Sabbath?" e.g., a door which was used for making the Erub and had become closed up during the Sabbath, and "by prohibited for part of the Sabbath" is meant, e.g., two houses, each one of which stood on the opposite sides of a wide street and a partition was made by Gentiles on the Sabbath. The exception is as regards one who resigned his right, i.e., although a man had forgotten to join in an Erub before the Sabbath, he was not permitted to carry on part of Sabbath, still he may on the Sabbath resign his right to the place and carry. It says, however, that only the man may carry but not his heir? Replied R. Na'hman: "Learn: instead of 'the exception is as regards one who resigns his right,' the exception is the law pertaining to the resigning of a right."

Rabha raised another objection: We have learned: "If one of the householders of a court died and left his right to the ground to one living in the market, if the death took place while it was yet day before the Sabbath, the man living in the market impedes the inmates of the court; but if the death took place after dusk, he does not. If a man, however, living in the market, was possessed of a house and having died left his right to his place to one of the inmates of the court, then the reverse is the case, i.e., if he died before Sabbath set in, the inmate of the court does not impede the others, (because he could have joined in an Erub); but if the man died on the Sabbath, he does impede the others." Now if thou sayest, that the heir may resign the right, let him do so, why should he impede the others? Answered R. Na'hman: "This means, that he impedes the others only until he resigns his right."

R. Johanan said: The above Boraitha is according to Beth Shammai, who hold, that it is not allowed to resign a right on Sabbath as we have learned in our Mishna: From what time may the right be resigned? Beth Shammai hold "while it is yet daylight," and Beth Hillel maintain: "From dusk."

Said Ula: Why do Beth Hillel hold, that it may be done on Sabbath? The reason of Beth Hillel is based upon an instance where a man was about to separate heave-offerings for another without being told to do so. In the meantime this other man came along and saw that the heave-offerings were being separated for him, whereupon he said to the man: "Separate it from the finer grain." In that case the heave-offering is valid. Why? Because by the statement "separate it from the finer grain" he demonstrated his approval of the man's action and his intention to have done this at all events. The same is the case with a man who resigns his right on the Sabbath; for he demonstrates that his intention had been to join in the Erub on the preceding day, but he had forgotten.

Said Abayi to him: If this be the reason of Beth Hillel, what about the case of a Gentile who lived in the same court with two Israelites and happened to die on the Sabbath? The Israelites are permitted in that event to resign their rights to each other, but can it be said that their intention dated from the preceding day? Hence the reason of Beth Hillel is simply this: While Beth Shammai prohibit the resigning of the right to a place because they hold, that it is equal to selling the place and selling or buying is prohibited on the Sabbath, Beth Hillel however hold, that resigning the right to a place is simply abandoning the place, and that is permissible on the Sabbath.

MISHNA: Should a householder be in partnership in wine with two of his neighbors (residing in the same alley), they do not require an Erub; if he be in partnership with one in wine and with another in oil, they do require an Erub. R. Simeon said: Neither in one case nor in the other do they require an Erub.

GEMARA: Said Rabh: "Such is the case if the wine was contained in one vessel." And Rabha said: "This may be inferred from the Mishna itself; for the latter clause of the Mishna states, that if the householder be in partnership with one in wine and with another in oil, they require an Erub. It would therefore be correct if in the first clause the wine is contained in one vessel and in the second clause there are two separate vessels; but were there two vessels in the first clause also, what difference would it make whether one vessel was filled with oil and the other with wine, or both with wine?" Rejoined Abayi: This is no argument. Wine can be mixed with wine (hence, even if it be in two vessels it can be mixed and an Erub made with it is valid), but oil and wine cannot be mixed, and even though there are two separate vessels the Erub cannot be made therewith.

R. Simeon said: "Neither in one case nor in the other do they require an Erub." Is it possible that R. Simeon holds, that even where one vessel contains wine and the other oil, no further Erub is necessary? Said Rabba: "The case referred to applies to a court between two entries (alleys) and R. Simeon holds to his theory, as we have learned in the case of the three courts opening into each other and also into the street, that communication between the middle court and the two outer or between the two outer ones and the middle one is permissible; thus in this case R. Simeon means to imply, that the court made an Erub with one of the entries by means of wine and with the other by means of oil, hence no additional Erub is necessary, and communication between the court and both entries is permissible."

Abayi objected: "How canst thou compare the two instances? In the case of the three courts communication between the two outer is prohibited, whereas here it is said that no additional Erub whatever is necessary?" Learn also here, that no additional Erub is necessary to allow of communication between the court and the entries, but if the inmates of either of the entries desire to carry in the other they must make an additional Erub.

R. Joseph, however, said: "R. Simeon and the sages differ in the same point as R. Johanan ben Nouri and the sages in another Mishna as follows: 'If oil floated on wine and a man who had bathed before sunset (and hence was not yet ritually clean) touched the oil, the sages hold, that the oil becomes unclean, but the wine is not affected. R. Johanan ben Nouri, however, maintains, that the wine and the oil are attached to each other and therefore both become unclean.'" In our Mishna, the sages hold with the sages of the Mishna quoted, and R. Simeon holds with R. Johanan ben Nouri.

We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Elazar ben Tadai said: "In either case they require an additional Erub." Even if both vessels contain wine an additional Erub is necessary? Answered Rabba: The case is thus: If two men each bring a jug of wine and pour the wine together, there is no question but what that constitutes a legal Erub, but in this instance R. Elazar ben Tadai means to state that if two men bought a cask of wine jointly and had not yet separated their shares, the Erub is not valid because it cannot be made with anything owned in partnership, and he holds thus for the reason that he does not accept the theory of premeditated choice. The sages, however, permit this mode of procedure, because they accept the theory of premeditated choice.

R. Joseph said: "R. Elazar ben Tadai and the sages differ on another point, namely: The question whether the inmates of the court can depend upon the combine made in the entries." All agree that carrying in the entries is permissible if the Erub has been made there, but R. Elazar ben Tadai holds, that this is not permitted in the court because the combine made in the entries cannot be depended upon, while the sages hold that it may be depended upon.

R. Joseph continued: "Whence do I know, that this is the point of difference? From the statement of R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh, to the effect that the Halakha prevails according to R. Meir, and the subsequent statement of R. Brona in the name of Rabh, that the Halakha prevails according to R. Elazar ben Tadai. Therefore, we must assume, that R. Meir and R. Elazar have one and the same reason." Said Abayi: "This may be so; but why did Rabh say at one time that the Halakha prevails according to R. Meir and at another time according to R. Elazar ben Tadai? Would it not be sufficient to state, that the Halakha prevails according to one of the two?" (And R. Joseph answered:) "Rabh desires to inform us that wherever the laws of Erub are concerned and two Tanaim differ as to the details, but agree as to the main issue of the Halakha, and we say that the Halakha prevails according to both, we need not abide by the more rigorous decisions of each but, on the contrary, should accept the more lenient decrees of both."

Which R. Meir is referred to by Rabh? The one figuring in the following Boraitha: In courts an Erub must be made with bread, but it is not allowed to do so with wine. In the entries a combine must be effected with wine, but if the inmates desired to do so with bread, it is permissible. An Erub must be made in the courts and a combine in the entries in order that the growing children should not forget the laws of Erub and say, "Our parents did not make an Erub." Such is the decree of R. Meir; the sages, however, say: Either an Erub or a combine must be effected (i.e., if one was omitted the other can be depended upon).

R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh said: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Meir." R. Huna said: "The custom prevails according to R. Meir," and R. Johanan said: "The masses only act in accordance with the dictum of R. Meir."

MISHNA: Should five different companies take their Sabbath-rest in one hall (triclinium), Beth Shammai hold, that each company requires a separate Erub, but Beth Hillel hold, that one Erub suffices for all of them. The latter school admit, however, that if any of these companies occupy distinct chambers or attics, each company requires a separate Erub.

GEMARA: Said R. Na'hman: "The two schools differ only as regards a low centre-partition, but if there was a partition ten spans high between each of the companies, all agree that each company requires a separate Erub." According to another version, R. Na'hman is supposed to have said: "They differ not only as regards a low centre-partition, but also concerning partitions between each company."

R. Jehudah the Sagacious said: The schools of Shammai and Hillel do not differ where partitions that reach to the ceiling of the hall are concerned, they agree that in that event each company requires a separate Erub. Wherein they do differ, however, is if the partitions do not reach the ceiling. Said R. Na'hman in the name of Rabh: The Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah the Sagacious.

R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak said: We can infer this from the Mishna itself. The latter clause of the Mishna states, that Beth Hillel also agree with Beth Shammai if the companies each dwell in distinct chambers or attics. What is meant by distinct chambers and attics? Shall we say, that they are really chambers and attics? Then it would be self-evident. We must say, then, that they are similar to chambers and attics, i.e., that the reference is to partitions which reach to the ceiling. Hence the deduction that the decree of R. Jehudah the Sagacious is correct.

We have learned in a Boraitha: The difference of opinion between the two schools centres in the question whether the companies deposited their Erubin elsewhere. But if the Erub is deposited in the hall occupied by them, all agree that one Erub is sufficient for all. According to whose opinion will be the statement of the following Boraitha, that if five men combined an Erub, one Erub is sufficient for all of them? This is in accordance with the opinion of Beth Hillel.

MISHNA: Brothers (or associates) who take their meals at their father's (or at one) table, but sleep each in his separate house (in the same court), must each one prepare a separate Erub. Therefore if one of them had forgotten and not prepared an Erub, he must resign his right (to the common court). When is this the case? When the Erub had been deposited in some other place; but if the Erub has been placed with them, or if there are no other inhabitants in the court, they need not prepare any Erub whatsoever."

GEMARA: From this Mishna it may be adduced, that an Erub should be made in the place where a man sleeps and not where he takes his meals (and further, we will observe, that Rabh holds, that an Erub must be made where the man takes his meals). Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh: The Mishna means to say, that the brothers did not actually eat at their father's table but merely received from their father the means with which to obtain their meals.

The Rabbis taught: One who had a vestibule, a gallery, or a balcony in the court of another, and did not join in an Erub with the other inmates of the court does not impede the other inmates. If he had a hay-loft, a cattle-pen, a woodshed, or a granary in the court of another and did not join in an Erub, he does impede the others. R. Jehudah, however, said: "Nothing except a dwelling-house can prove an interference," and he continued: "It happened that an inhabitant of Naph'ha, who had five courts in Usha, did not join in an Erub with the inmates of those courts and the question was laid before the sages whether this was an impediment to their carrying within the courts and the sages replied: 'Nothing but an actual dwelling-house can prove an impediment.'"

What is meant by a dwelling-house? A house occupied as a dwelling. What is to be understood by "occupied as a dwelling"? Rabh said: "The house where a man takes his meals," and Samuel said: "The house wherein a man sleeps."

An objection was made: The shepherds, those that guard the fig-trees, the inhabitants of huts in the country and the guards of the fields, when passing the night in a town have the same rights as the townsmen, but when passing the night at their posts, they have only the right to two thousand ells from the place where they are situated. (From this we can see, that the place where one passes the night is considered as his abode?) This is no proof! For we can testify, that those men would be much better satisfied if their meals were brought to them at their posts (hence their posts are not only their places of abode but also their eating-places, and as for those who pass the night in the town, they evidently also take their meals in the town for the time being).

The Rabbis taught: Concerning five women who receive from their husbands the means for securing their food and five slaves who receive the means from their masters to procure their sustenance and who live in separate houses in the court, R. Jehudah ben Bathyra permits the women to carry within the court and prohibits the slaves to do so; but R. Jehudah ben Babba on the contrary allows the slaves to carry but prohibits the women to do so.

Said Rabh: "What reason has R. Jehudah ben Babba for his decree? Because it is written [Daniel ii. 49]: 'Daniel remained in the gate of the king,' the inference is, that in the same manner as Daniel did not always remain in the gate of the king, but his office being such that his place was there, so it is also with slaves who, while in the service of their master, are considered as being always at their master's side." It is self-evident that if a son eat and dwell with his father, he need not make an Erub as stated previously. As for a woman who has a husband and a slave who belongs to a master there is a difference of opinion between R. Jehudah ben Bathyra and R. Jehudah ben Babba. How about a disciple, however, who dwells in the same court with his master and derives his sustenance from his master?

Come and hear: When Rabh still dwelt with R. Hyya he said: "We need not join in an Erub because we depend upon the table of R. Hyya," and when R. Hyya still dwelt with Rabbi he also said: "We need not make an Erub because we derive our sustenance from Rabbi."

R. Hyya bar Abhin asked of R. Shesheth: "What about the disciples of the college, who eat in the inns of the valley and pass the night at the college? When the legal limit of two thousand ells is measured where must the starting point be? The college or the inn where they take their meals?" R. Shesheth answered: "The college."

Rami bar Hama asked of R. Hisda: If a father and son, or a master and his disciple, lived in two courts, one inside of the other, and the outer court opened into an entry, what is the law concerning them? Are they to be considered as if they were two distinct individuals who cannot mutually impede each other because each one of them has a right to carry in his own court and a man who is permitted to do so in his own court cannot interfere with a man in another place; hence both father and son, or master and disciple, may carry each in their respective courts; or, shall we consider them collectively because the son or the disciple who lives in a separate court but eats at his father's table has a certain right to his father's court. Thus the father or the master is not in sole possession, but shares it with another. The consequence is that the father or the master is in duty bound to make an Erub in his own court and, on account of this, he becomes one who can interfere with the right of another, and prevents his son from carrying in his own (the son's) court? Then again if they are considered as distinct individuals, are they in duty bound to combine an Erub covering the two courts? Finally if the two courts had separate openings into the entry, are they considered as separate courts and thus the entry becomes valid by the addition thereto of a cross and side beam, or they are considered as one court, and if one court only opens into an entry, the entry cannot be made valid by the addition of a cross and side beam?

Answered R. Hisda: We have learned this in a Boraitha: A father and his son or a teacher and his disciple, providing there are no other inmates in the court occupied by them, are considered as individuals, and need not make an Erub at any place. Nevertheless the entry into which their court opens becomes valid by the addition thereto of a cross or side beam.

MISHNA: If (the householders dwelling in) five courts that open into each other and also open into one common alley (entry) have joined in an Erub for the courts, but have not combined the alley, they are permitted to carry (things) in the courts, but must not do so in the alley; if they did combine the alley, however, they are permitted to carry both in the courts and in the alley. If they had combined both the courts and the alley, but one of the householders forgot and did not join in the Erub, they arc nevertheless permitted to carry both in the courts and in the alley. Should one of the householders (dwelling) in the alley have forgotten to join in the Erub, it is permitted to carry (things) in the court but not in the alley, inasmuch as the alley (bears the same relation) to the courts as the court (does) to the houses within it.

TRACT ERUBIN. 173

GEMARA: According to whose opinion is our Mishna? We must say that it is in accordance with R. Meir, who holds that an Erub is needed in the court, and a combination in the alley. How, then, could that part of the Mishna be explained, which states that if a combination in the alley is made it is allowed to carry both (in the courts and in the alley); and this is certainly according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one of the two is sufficient (i.e., either an Erub in the courts or a combination in the alley)? Are then the two parts of the Mishna based on different opinions? This presents no difficulty. The latter part of the Mishna refers to a case where a combination had already been made in the alley; hence it is according to R. Meir's opinion. Now, then, what is the reason of R. Meir in stating that if one of the householders in the court forgot and did not join in the Erub, it is nevertheless permitted to carry both in the courts and in the alley? R. Meir may hold as follows: The most essential feature of this case is to make an Erub in the courts and a combine should also be made in the alley for the benefit of the growing children in order that they may not forget the laws of Erubin. Hence if the combination has been made both in the courts and in the alley, in which the majority participated, there is no fear of the children forgetting the laws.

R. Jehudah said: "Rabh does not learn in the Mishna that the five courts opened into each other but merely that they all opened into one common alley." This was corroborated by R. Kahana. What reason did Rabh have to learn thus? He holds, that if several courts open into one common alley, a cross and side beam suffice to make that alley valid. If, however, only one court open into the alley, a cross and side beam do not suffice. Samuel, however, said: "Even if only one court or one house open into an alley, a cross and side beam suffice for the alley." R. Johanan said: Even if a ruin open into an alley, a cross and side beam suffice.

Abayi asked of R. Joseph: "Does R. Johanan hold, that even if the path leading to a vineyard open into an alley, a cross and side beam suffice for the alley?" R. Joseph replied: "Nay; R. Johanan meant to say a ruin which (in an emergency) could be inhabited; but a path which could not under any circumstances be inhabited, is out of the question."

Said R. Huna bar Hinana: R. Johanan's statement concerning a ruin is but in accordance with his theory expressed in his decision regarding the Mishna (Chapter IX., Mishna I, of this tract)where R. Simeon says that roofs as well as courts and woodsheds constitute the same kind of premises for the carrying of all utensils contained therein when the Sabbath-rest began," etc. This was commented by Rabh as follows: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Simeon provided no Erub was combined by the inmates of each separate court," meaning, thereby that if no Erub was combined, the inmates will not carry out any vessels from their houses into the court. Samuel and R. Johanan, however, declare that the Halakha prevails according to R. Simeon, even if an Erub was combined, as there is no apprehension that the inmates will carry out any vessels from their houses into the court, and as in this case there is no apprehension that the vessels will be carried out of the houses, so also in the case of a ruin, R. Johanan holds, that there is no fear of the inmates carrying vessels from the court into the ruin by way of the alley.

R. Brona sate and repeated the Halakha decreed by Samuel (to the effect that even if one court or one house opened into an alley, a cross and side beam was sufficient for the alley). Said R. Eliezer, one of the schoolmen, to R. Brona: "Did Samuel indeed say this?" and R. Brona answered: "Yea." R. Eliezer then asked to be shown where Samuel resided, and R. Brona showed him. R. Eliezer then came before Samuel and said: "Did master decree thus?" and the answer was "Yea." Rejoined the schoolman: "Didst thou not state previously that where the laws of Erubin are concerned, we must hold strictly to the literal text of the Mishna and the Mishna distinctly teaches: 'The alley bears the same relation to the courts as the court (does) to the houses within it.'" Samuel remained silent.

Does the silence of Samuel signify, that he accepted R. Eliezer's view or that he did not care to reply? Come and hear: A certain Aibuth bar Ihi dwelt in an alley and erected a side-beam therein. Samuel told him that this complied with the legal requirements. After the death of Samuel, R. Anan came and destroyed the side-beam. Said Aibuth: "In an alley where I live by the direct permission of our master Samuel, a mere disciple like R. Anan dares to come and destroy my side-beam." Hence we see, that Samuel did not accept the opinion of R. Eliezer! This is not conclusive evidence! The case of the alley could be explained as follows: The sexton of the synagogue took his meals with this Aibuth bar Ihi, but lodged in the synagogue. Aibuth was of the opinion that the residence is determined by the place where he takes his meals, hence the sexton and he were the occupants of one house; (and Samuel declared his alley to be valid in conformity with his original decision, that if one court or one house opened into an alley a cross and side beam is sufficient for the alley) but Samuel, who held that the residence of a man is determined by his lodging-place, may have accepted the opinion of R. Eliezer, and taking into consideration that there were two dwellings in the alley, that of Aibuth and that of the sexton, he made the alley valid by the addition of a side-beam.

MISHNA: If two courts be one within the other, should the inmates of the inner court prepare an Erub and those of the outer court fail to do so, the inmates of the inner court may carry within it, but those of the outer court must not carry within their (own) court. If the inmates of the outer court prepare an Erub, but those of the inner court fail to do so, neither are allowed to carry within their respective courts. If each have prepared a separate Erub, they are permitted to carry within their own limits. R. Aqiba holds, however, that the inmates of the outer court are prohibited to carry within it and that the right of thoroughfare possessed by the inner court renders the outer court prohibited; but the sages hold, that the right of thoroughfare does not render it so.

Should one of the inmates of the outer court forget to join in the Erub, it is permitted to carry within the inner court, but carrying within the outer court is prohibited. If one of the inmates of the inner court forget to join in the Erub, carrying in either court is prohibited. If the inmates of both courts deposit their Erub in one place, and one of the inmates of either the outer or inner court forgot and did not join in the Erub, carrying, in either court is also prohibited. Should each court be the property of an individual (or inhabited by only one household), neither require an Erub.

GEMARA: When R. Dimi came from Palestine, he said in the name of R. Janai: The latter clause of the Mishna stating, that if one of the inner court forget to join in the Erub, carrying in either court is prohibited, is merely a continuation of the dictum of R. Aqiba, who holds, that a foot (i.e., a man) which is allowed to carry in its own place nevertheless interferes with the right of another place. The sages, however, hold, that as a foot which is allowed to carry in its own place does not interfere with the right of another place, so also a foot which is not allowed to carry within its own place does not interfere with the right of another place and thus the inmates of both courts may carry within their own limits.

An objection was made based upon a previous clause in the Mishna, which states that if the inmates of the outer court prepare an Erub, but those of the inner court fail to do so, neither are allowed to carry within their respective courts, and this is certainly not in accordance with the opinion of R. Aqiba, because even had the inmates of the inner court made an Erub he would still prohibit the outer court to carry within their own court. (Hence we must assume, that this is in accordance with the opinion of the sages, who hold that a foot which is allowed to carry within its own place does not interfere with the right of another place, but one which is not allowed does interfere.) Therefore we must rather accept the statement of Rabhin in the name of R. Janai: There are three different opinions concerning this subject, viz.: The first Tana of our Mishna holds that a foot which is allowed to carry within its own place does not interfere with the right of another place, but a foot which is prohibited does interfere with the right of another place. R. Aqiba holds that even a foot which is allowed, also interferes with the right of another place; but the last sages of our Mishna maintain, that as a foot which is allowed does not interfere with the right of another place, so also a foot which is prohibited does also not interfere.

"If the inmates of both courts deposit their Erubin in one place," etc. What is meant by "one place"? Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh: This refers to the outer court and is called "one place," because it is designated for the use of both courts (as the inmates of the inner court must pass through the outer).

We have also learned in a Boraitha (in support to R. Jehudah): "If the Erub was placed in the outer court, but one of the inmates either of the outer or inner court forgot to join in the Erub, carrying in either of the courts is prohibited. If the Erub was deposited in the inner court, but one of the inmates of that court forgot to join in the Erub, carrying in either court is also prohibited. If one of the inmates of the outer court forgot to join in the Erub, carrying in either court is prohibited. Such is the dictum of R. Aqiba; the sages, however, maintain that in the last instance carrying is permitted within the inner court, but prohibited within the outer court."

Rabba bar Hanan asked Abayi: "Why do the sages permit carrying within the inner court, because they can close their door and say all the inmates of our court have joined in the Erub? Why should R. Aqiba not take the same view, let him also say, that they can close their door and assert their right to carry within their own court?" Abayi answered: "The Erub deposited in the outer court accustoms the inmates of the inner court to make use of the outer." Said Rabba bar Hanan again: "And the sages, do they not hold that the Erub of the outer court accustoms the inmates of the inner court to walk in the outer?" The sages may maintain, that the inmates who have deposited their Erub can say to the one who forgot to join: We have included thee in our combination for thy convenience, but not to our detriment. Why can they not do this according to R. Aqiba also? According to R. Aqiba, the inmates who have joined in the Erub may say to the one who had forgotten: "We will resign our right to the place in thy favor." Why can this not be said according to the sages? Because the sages do not admit of the resigning of one's right to a place in one court in favor of one who resides in another court.

"Should each court be the property of an individual," etc. Said R. Joseph: "Rabbi taught, that if there was a third court between the two also belonging to an individual, it is not permitted to carry in either of the three." Said R. Bibhi (to the schoolmen): "Do not listen to R. Joseph! Rabbi did not teach this; for I myself said it in the name of R. Ada bar Ahabha and gave as a reason that the outer court will be traversed by (the inmates of) three (courts); therefore I also prohibited carrying within the middle court, lest a mistake be made and things be carried in the outer court also." R. Joseph then exclaimed: "Lord of Abraham! I confounded the word 'Rabbim' (many) with Rabbi; for before I was ill I heard from R. Bibhi that the outer court will become a court for many (three) and when recovered from my illness I quoted the Boraitha in the name of Rabbi." Samuel, however, said: "It is always allowed to carry within courts for many (even if there be four or five) provided there is only one household in each court, but if there be two in one court it is not permitted."

Said R. Elazar: According to Samuel, if a Gentile live in one of the courts he is considered as many others and he impedes the outer courts.

R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel said: "If there were ten houses one within the other and the house on the outside opened into the court it is not necessary for the inmate of each house to combine in an Erub with the other inmates of the court, but it is sufficient if the inmate of the innermost house, who must pass through all the others, do so," but R. Johanan says that, each inmate must combine; even the one living in the house opening directly into the street. Even the one living in the uttermost court? Is not the uttermost court to be regarded as a vestibule? By uttermost he means to say the one next to the uttermost.

Upon which point do Samuel and R. Johanan differ? Their point of difference is regarding the definition of a vestibule. Samuel holds, that all the houses leading to the innermost are considered as vestibules hence they require no Erub, while R. Johanan maintains that only the uttermost house, through which all the other inmates must pass, can be considered a vestibule, but even the one next to the uttermost through which the eight other inmates must pass is also not a vestibule.

R. Na'hman in the name of Rabba bar Abahu quoting Rabh said: There were two courts between which stood three houses opening into each other and the two houses on each side of the middle house opened into their respective courts. If the inmates of the courts desired to place their Erub in the middle house, they used the houses opening into the courts as thoroughfares to the middle house. Thus the house at one court becomes as a vestibule to the inmates of that court and the house at the other court becomes a vestibule to the inmates of the other court, while the house in the centre being used to deposit the Erub therein, it need not be combined in the Erub itself. Consequently none of the three need combine in the Erub of the courts.

REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE PREPARATION OF ERUBIN FOR COURTS SEPARATED BY APERTURES, WALLS, DITCHES, AND STRAW-RICKS. COMBINATION OF ERUBIN IN ALLEYS.

MISHNA: If there be an aperture, four spans square, and less than ten spans high (from the ground), between two courts, the inmates of each court may prepare two separate Erubin; or if they prefer it, may combine in one Erub. If the aperture be less than four spans square or over ten spans from the ground, they are each obliged to prepare a separate Erub, and must not combine in one.

GEMARA: Shall we say that this anonymous Mishna, is in accordance with R. Simeon ben Gamaliel, who holds that the law of "lavud" (attached) applies for a distance of less than four spans and not for a distance of less than three spans as maintained by the sages? Nay; this Mishna may be even in accordance with the opinion of the sages, for the question of "lavud" does not arise here. It is merely a case of an aperture which is less than four spans square, hence it is not considered a door and this is admitted by the sages also, who hold that if an aperture is four spans square or more, it is considered a door, but if less than four spans square it is not.

"If the aperture be less than four spans square," etc. Why this repetition? Is this not self-evident? The first clause of the Mishna states, that if there be an aperture four spans square and less than ten spans high from the ground, the inmates of the courts may either prepare separate Erubin or combine in one. Hence if the aperture be less than four spans square and more than ten spans high, it is obvious that they cannot have their choice? The Mishna means to teach us, that if the aperture was partly less than ten spans high from the ground and partly more than ten spans high the inmates of the court still have their choice of either making separate Erubin or combining in one, and only if the entire aperture was over ten spans high from the ground, they are obliged to make each a separate Erub.

This explanation of the Mishna has reference to the following teaching of the Rabbis, viz.: If the entire aperture, with the exception of a small part, was higher than ten spans from the ground (e.g., if the aperture was twelve spans square and was eight spans high from the ground, thus two spans of the aperture were within ten spans from the ground and ten spans were over ten spans from the ground), or if the entire aperture with the exception of a small part was less than ten spans from the ground (e.g., if it was twelve spans square and only two spans were over ten spans from the ground), the inmates of the courts may either each make a separate Erub or combine in one. If the entire aperture with the exception of a small part was higher than ten spans from the ground the inmates have their choice; why is it necessary to state, that if the entire aperture with the exception of a small part was within ten spans from the ground, the inmates have their choice, is this not self-evident? After having stated the law in the former case, it applies the more to the latter.

R. Na'hman said: "The case of where the aperture is less than four spans square or over ten spans from the ground, applies only to courts, but as for houses, the aperture may be at any distance from the ground, even over ten spans, and, nevertheless, the inmates are permitted to join in an Erub." Why so? Because a house is considered solid, and every portion is regarded as occupied.

R. Abba asked of R. Na'hman: "If in the attic of a house there was a hole for the purpose of fastening a ladder therein, may the inmate of the attic join in the Erub regardless of whether there was a ladder fastened in the hole of the attic or not, i.e., should the house be considered solid and occupied and no ladder is necessary, or is the house only considered solid as far as the walls are concerned but not the interior, and a ladder is essential?" and he answered: "A ladder is not necessary." R. Abba understood R. Na'hman to say, that a permanent ladder was not necessary, but for the time that the Erub was to be combined it was necessary. It was taught, however, by R. Joseph bar Minyumi in the name of R. Na'hman that neither a permanent nor a temporary ladder was necessary.

MISHNA: If there be a wall ten spans high and four spans wide between two courts, the inmates of each must prepare separate Erubin and must not join in one. If fruit happen to lie on the wall, they may ascend from their respective sides and partake thereof, provided they do not bring any of it down with them. Should there be a breach in the wall, not wider than ten ells, they may prepare separate Erubin or if they prefer it join in one, because the breach is considered as a door. Should the breach, however, be wider than ten ells they must both join in one Erub but must not prepare two separate Erubin.

GEMARA: How is it, if the wall did not measure four spans in width? Said Rabh: "In that case, the atmosphere of two separate premises predominates at the wall and one must not handle anything even the size of a hair lying on the wall." R. Johanan, however, says to the contrary: "In that case the inmates of both courts may lay down fruit on the wall (or even take it down from the wall because it is regarded as ground under no jurisdiction)." R. Johanan will therefore explain the Mishna thus: "If the wall was four spans wide it is permitted to ascend on either side and partake of fruit lying on the wall, but it is not permitted to bring up any. If, however, the wall was less than four spans wide, one may carry fruit up on the wall and eat it there." This statement of R. Johanan is but in accordance with his own theory, as related by R. Dimi upon his arrival from Palestine in the name of R. Johanan, viz.: "An object less than four spans square, standing between public and private ground, may be used by both the occupants of the public and private ground as an aid on which to shoulder a burden on the Sabbath, but they should be careful not to confound the burdens placed on the object so that a burden placed by an occupant of public ground be taken up by an occupant of private ground and vice versa."

Can Rabh dispute this assertion of R. Dimi? Is it not identical with the Boraitha concerning a man standing on the doorstep and passing things to a mendicant in the street or to the master of a house (see Tract Sabbath, p. 8)? Rabh does not dispute the Boraitha in that instance, because it concerns a biblical law, but in this case where rabbinical law is dealt with, the Rabbis assume the privilege of reënforcing ordinances so as to preclude the possibility of transgression.

Rabba bar R. Huna in the name of R. Na'hman said: If between two courts there was a wall, which was ten spans high from the ground of one court, but on a level with the ground of the other, the wall is ceded to the latter court and considered part of its ground, but to the former court it is an ordinary wall ten spans high. Why so? Because the use of the wall is more convenient for the latter than for the former, and where an object is more convenient for one than for another it is generally ceded to the former.

Said R. Shezbi: "R. Na'hman rendered the same decision concerning a ditch that was situated between two courts and was on a level with the ground on one side."

If a man comes to diminish the size of the wall referred to in the Mishna (either by heaping up earth at the bottom or by erecting posts or benches at its side; such was the original definition of the manner by which the size of the wall was diminished) and this was done to the extent of four spans, or more, he may make use of the entire wall, but if less than four spans he can use only as much of the wall as has been diminished. What do you mean to say? In either case there is an objection. If by diminishing the wall to the extent of less than four spans the wall is actually diminished, why should it not be allowed to use the entire wall, and if this does not constitute a diminution at all, why should it be allowed to use that part (where the earth was heaped up or the posts erected to the extent of less than four spans)?

Said Rabhina: In this case the Mishna does not mean to say, that the wall was diminished by heaping up earth or erecting posts but simply that a part of the wall was removed at the top. If the breach made in this manner exceeded four spans it is considered as a door, and the entire wall may be used, and if it was not quite four spans the entire wall must not be used, but that part of the wall containing the breach may, because its height is lessened.

R. Yechiel said: "If a basin was set down (bottom side up) at the bottom of the wall, the wall is diminished thereby. How can a basin serve to diminish the wall? A basin may be handled on the Sabbath, and is it not a fact that any vessel which may be handled on Sabbath cannot serve to diminish a wall because it can be removed? R. Yechiel means to say, if the basin was fastened to the ground. And if it is fastened to the ground may it not be removed nevertheless? By the statement "it was fastened to the ground," is meant if it was fastened so that a hoe or a pick-axe was required to remove it.

An Egyptian ladder does not diminish a wall but a ladder of Tyre does. What is meant by an Egyptian ladder? One that has not four rungs. So said the school of R. Janai.

Said R. A'ha the son of Rabha to R. Ashi: "Dost thou know why an Egyptian ladder does not diminish a wall?" and R. Ashi answered: "Didst thou not hear the statement of R. A'ha bar Ada in the name of R. Hamnuna, quoting Rabh, to the effect that it was an article which may be handled on the Sabbath and any article which may be handled on the Sabbath cannot serve to diminish a wall?" If such be the case, why can a ladder of Tyre serve to diminish a wall, may it not also be handled on Sabbath? A ladder of Tyre can serve because it is so heavy that it would require the efforts of several men to remove it.

Abayi said: If a wall ten spans high was between two courts and a ladder four spans wide was placed at each side of the wall: if the ladders were placed so that they are three spans apart, i.e., the ladder placed on the other side was three spans further up or down alongside of the wall than the other ladder, the wall is not diminished; but if they are not three spans apart the wall is diminished. If the wall, however, was four spans deep so that a man can walk on it, it makes no difference how far apart the ladders are.

R. Bibhi bar Abayi said: "If one erected two benches one above the other at the foot of a wall, and the lower one was four spans wide while the upper was less, the wall is thereby diminished. If the lower bench however was less than four spans wide and the upper four, or more, the wall is also diminished thereby, providing the two benches were less than three spans apart." R. Na'hman said in the name of Rabba bar Abahu, that the same rule applies to a ladder where there is empty space between the rungs (i.e., where one side of the ladder is not closed with boards).

R. Na'hman said again in the name of Rabba bar Abahu: If a cornice four spans square protrude from a wall and a ladder, no matter how narrow, has been placed against the cornice, the size of the wall is thereby diminished, provided the ladder was placed directly against the cornice, but if placed underneath the cornice against the wall, the cornice was merely enlarged but the wall was not diminished. R. Na'hman says again in the name of the same authority: a wall which is nineteen spans high must have an additional cornice (a ladder which should be placed in the centre of the wall so that the space should not attain ten spans at the top or at the bottom). If the walls, however, measure twenty spans two cornices are needed to make them valid. (One cornice a trifle less than ten spans from the ground and another above that also a trifle less than ten spans from the lower.)

Said R. Hisda: "Providing the cornices are not exactly opposite each other (to prevent a ladder being placed on the bottom cornice)." R. Huna said: "If a peg be placed on a pillar in public ground ten spans high and four spans wide (which is legally private ground) the pillar is diminished." Said R. Adha bar Ahaba: "Providing the peg is three spans high." Abayi and Rabba both said: "Even if it is not as high as three spans." Why so? Because the peg makes the pillar useless. R. Ashi, however, said: "Even if the peg be three spans high it does not diminish the pillar and does not make it private ground because a peg of that kind can be used as a hanger."

R. A'ha the son of Rabha asked R. Ashi, "What is the law if several pegs be placed on the pillar in question?" and he answered: "Did you not hear what R. Johanan said concerning a well, that its enclosures of earth are counted in with the ten spans (makes it a legal private ground), why then should they be counted, are they not useless?" We must assume that, because one can place an object upon the enclosures and thus use them. The same is the case with the peg, one might also place something upon it also.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: "If a wall be ten spans high it requires, in order to become a valid wall, a ladder fourteen spans in height, because the ladder must be placed against the wall at an angle and the distance from the foot of the ladder to the wall being four spans, the ladder loses that much before it reaches the top of the wall." R. Joseph said: "Even if the ladder be a trifle over thirteen spans high it may be used (because should it lack one span of reaching the top of the wall the deficiency is not taken into consideration)." Abayi, however, said: It matters not if the ladder be even a trifle over eleven spans high (because should it lack three spans of reaching the top of the wall, it is considered as being at the top, for the law of "lavud" is applied in all cases where there is a deficiency of three spans or less). R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua, however, said: The ladder may be only a trifle over seven spans in height (because it is not compulsory to place the ladder at an angle, and if placed straight at the wall, together with the three spans allowed by the law of "lavud," it reaches the top. Should the ladder even be placed at an angle it may be considered as straight at the wall and the same rule applies).

Rabh said: "I have a tradition, that a ladder standing straight against a wall also diminishes its size, but I know no reason for it." Said Samuel to him: "Does Abba not know the reason for this? Why should a ladder be worse than two benches placed one above the other? Surely it is more difficult to scale a wall by means of benches than by means of a ladder."

Rabha in the name of R. Hyya said: "Trunks of Babylonian fig-trees when placed against a wall need not be fastened, because their weight is so great, that it is very difficult to remove them, although they may be handled on Sabbath." R. Joseph in the name of R. Oshiya said: "The same applies to Babylonian ladders, which are so heavy, that there is no fear of their being removed."

R. Joseph asked Rabba: "If a man had a ladder which he desired to place against a wall and the ladder being too narrow, i.e., less than four spans wide, be hewed out in the wall itself, steps on each side of the ladder, how far up should those steps be hewn out?" Rabba answered: "For a distance of ten spans." Asked R. Joseph again: "How is it if a man hews out steps four spans wide in the wall itself? How far up must he do this?" and the answer was: "The entire height of the wall." "What is the difference between the case of the ladder where steps had to be hewn out additionally and this case where the steps were all hewn out of the wall?" "In the first instance the ascent of the wall is so much easier because the ladder can be placed against the wall at an angle, while in this instance the ascent is much more difficult; hence the steps should reach the entire height of the wall."

R. Joseph asked Rabba again What is the law if a man used a tree, which grew right at the wall, for a ladder? I ask thee, taking into consideration the difference of opinion between Rabbi and the sages. According to Rabbi, who holds, that rabbinical ordinances were not surrounded with precautionary measures for the sake of twilight, it may be said, that in this case, where the tree will be used during the whole Sabbath day, even Rabbi might decide that it would not be allowed to make use of the tree; and on the other hand, even according to the sages, who disagree with Rabbi as regards the precautionary measures for the sake of twilight, it may be said, that the tree might be considered as a door; which, however, cannot be used because it is regarded as if a lion lie across it; nevertheless, it is a door, and being such, the wall may be used. Now, shouldst thou decide, that the wall may be used if a tree grow at its side, how would it be if a grove such as is used in idolatrous Worship, grow alongside of the wall? I ask thee in this instance taking into consideration the difference of opinion between R. Jehudah and the sages. We are aware that R. Jehudah permits the depositing of an Erub even in a grave, notwithstanding the fact that no benefit must be derived from a grave, but for the reason that after the Erub has been deposited for the moment of twilight the grave is of no further use as the Erub need not be watched. In this case, however, R. Jehudah might prohibit the use of a grove, because it serves a distinct purpose, namely, that of a walk to the wall, and it is a law that no benefit must be derived from a grove used for idolatrous worship. On the other hand, even according to the sages, who prohibit the use of a grave for the depositing of an Erub, it might be permitted to use the grove because it is virtually a door to the wall and is merely regarded as if a lion were lying across it, which temporarily makes it unfit for use."

Rabba answered: "A tree may be used but a grove must not." R. Hisda opposed this: "On the contrary," said he, "the lion lying across the tree which renders it unfit for use temporarily is the rabbinical ordinance concerning the Sabbath-rest, i.e., the tree must not be used on account of the Sabbath, while the grove must not be used for another reason altogether hence it should be permitted to use the grove and the use of the tree should be prohibited."

It was also taught, that when Rabhin came from Palestine, he said in the name of R. Elazar, according to another version R. Abahu said in the name of R. Johanan: (This is the rule:) Whenever the prohibition is based upon the Sabbath-rest laws, such prohibition must stand, but whenever the prohibition is based in some other law, it need not hold good. A R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak taught: "Concerning a tree the same divergence of opinion as exists between Rabbi and the sages remains, and concerning a grove the same difference of opinion as exists between R. Jehudah and the sages remains."

MISHNA: If two courts be separated by a ditch, ten spans deep and four wide, the inmates of each court should prepare separate Erubin and must not join in one, even though the ditch be filled with stubble or with straw. Should it however be filled with earth or pebbles, the inmates must join in one Erub and not prepare two separate ones. If a board four spans wide had been put across the ditch, and likewise, if two projecting balconies, one opposite the other, have been connected by means of such a board, or plank, the inmates of the courts may prepare separate Erubin, or if they prefer it, they may join in one; if the board, however, was less (than four spans) wide, they must each prepare a separate Erub, and not join in one.

GEMARA: The Mishna states, that if the ditch was filled with stubble or straw, the inmates of each court must make a separate Erub, because the straw is not considered firm enough to afford a safe passage over the ditch, i.e., it does not constitute a solid filling for the ditch, but in the succeeding Mishna we learn, that if there be between two courts a straw-rick, the inmates of each court must prepare a separate Erub, thereby demonstrating that straw can form a solid partition? Answered Abayi: As for a partition all agree that a straw-rick can form a partition, but as for straw serving as a filling for a ditch it depends upon whether the owner has devoted it entirely for that purpose. If he did and will not remove it, it may constitute a solid filling for the ditch, but if he did not and intends to subsequently remove it, it cannot be considered such.

"Should it however be filled with earth or pebbles." Even if the man who did this, does not declare that he has devoted the earth or the pebbles for that purpose entirely? Have we not learned in a Mishna, that if a man filled a room (which had contained a corpse) with straw or pebbles and declared that he does not intend to make any further use of either the straw or the pebbles, the room is regarded as filled up and is not considered a tent, but if no such declaration was made, the room is still considered a tent. Thus we see, that one must declare the straw and pebbles to be devoted for such purpose only, and our Mishna does not state anything in regard to this? Said R. Assi: This Mishna treating of Erubin is in accordance with the opinion of R. Jose in a Tosephta (in Tract Oholoth) who holds, that in the case of straw no express declaration is necessary.

R. Huna, the son of R. Jehoshua, however, said: Thou wouldst prove a contradiction from a law pertaining to uncleanness to a Sabbath-law? Leave out the prohibition of Sabbath; for a thing which must not be handled on Sabbath is at all events sacrificed even if it be a purse of money; because it must not be handled on Sabbath. (With straw it is different, because that is food for animals, and hence may be handled on Sabbath.)

R. Ashi, however, said: Thou wouldst base a contradiction on an ordinance concerning a room to that concerning a ditch. A ditch was made to be filled up, but is then a room also made to be filled up?

"If a board four spans wide had been put across the ditch." Said Rabha: "When must the board be four spans wide? If it was laid crosswise across the ditch, but if it was laid lengthwise across the ditch it makes no difference how wide the board is, because the width of the ditch was decreased to less than four spans.

"If two projecting balconies, one opposite the other," etc. Said Rabha: The statement in the Mishna, "one opposite the other," might be construed to signify, that if they were not directly opposite each other, no connection could be made; such is the case, however, only if they are three spans or more distant one from the other. Should they be less apart than three spans, it matters not whether they are directly opposite, diagonally so, or even one above the other, a connection may be made and it is simply considered a crooked balcony, but a balcony nevertheless.

MISHNA: If there be between two courts a straw-rick, ten spans high, the inmates of both courts must prepare separate Erubin, and must not join in one. Cattle maybe fed from each side of the rick (and no fear need be entertained, that it will become less than ten spans high). Should the rick become less than ten spans high, the inmates must join in one Erub and not prepare two.

GEMARA: Said R. Huna: "(Cattle may be fed from each side of the rick), providing the straw is not removed by a man and placed in the crib of the cattle (because the straw was designated as a partition since the preceding day, hence it must not be handled)." Did we not learn in a Boraitha: "If a house which was filled with straw stand between two courts, the inmates of each court must make a separate Erub, but must not join in one, and may remove the straw from the house to their respective courts and place it in the crib for the cattle?" Thus we see, that it is allowed for the inmates of each court to remove the straw to their respective courts and place it in the crib; why does R. Huna prohibit this? I will tell thee: In a house, on account of the roof, it will become noticeable if the heap of straw becomes lower than ten spans, but a straw-rick standing in the open air might be overlooked as to its height.

(The above Boraitha continues as follows:) "If the heap of straw contained in the house became less than ten spans high, neither of the inmates of either court are permitted to carry unless the inmates of one court resign their right to the place in favor of the inmates of the other." Thus, if the heap of straw was ten spans high, it still serves the purpose of a partition, even though it does not reach the ceiling. We may adduce therefrom, that any partition if it be only ten spans high, though it should not reach the ceiling, is valid. From the statement in the Boraitha, that neither of the inmates of either court are permitted to carry we can also infer, that any dwellings which may have been added on the Sabbath are included in the prohibition? This is not conclusive evidence! It may be that the Boraitha refers to a case where the heap of straw was diminished to less than ten spans' height before the Sabbath set in.

The Boraitha continues further: "The one wishing to make use of his court should lock up the house and resign his right to the ground." What, do both? Lock the house and resign his right to the ground? Yea; both are necessary, for the man is accustomed to use the house on Sabbath, and he might perchance, if he leave it unlocked, come and use it.

Continuing, the Boraitha states: "If he did so, he must not carry, but his neighbor may." Is this not self-evident? We might assume that the man's neighbor must also do as he did, hence we are told, that the Tana holds repeated resignation of the ground to be prohibited.

MISHNA: How are alleys (entries) to be combined? A man places a cask of wine (in the alley) and says: "This shall be for all the inmates of the alley," and he may transfer the right of possession (which he has in the cask) to them either through his adult son or daughter, or through his Hebrew man-servant or maid-servant, or through his wife; but he cannot transfer his right of possession through his minor son or daughter, or through his Canaanitish bond-man or bond-woman, because their hand is virtually the same as his.

GEMARA: Said R. Jehudah: The person that accepts the transfer of ownership should lift the cask of wine at least one span from the ground at the time of acceptance (saying, I have accepted this for the other inmates). Said Rabha: These two things were said by the old sages of Pumbaditha, namely: This statement of R. Jehudah just quoted and the other one is: When a man pronounces the benediction over a goblet of wine, if he tastes a whole mouthful he has acquitted himself of the duty properly, otherwise he does not.

An objection was raised: We have learned in a Boraitha: How are alleys to be combined? A cask of wine, oil, dates, or figs, or any other fruit, is brought, and if belonging to the one who brought it, he should transfer his right of possession to the other inmates; but if the others have a share in it to commence with, he need only inform them (that he has combined the Erub for them). While transferring the right of possession, the cask should be lifted off the ground a trifle? By a trifle the Boraitha also means a span.

It was taught: At the combining of alleys, the right of possession need not be transferred. So said Rabh; but Samuel maintains, that this must be done. At the combining of the legal limits, however, Samuel declares that the right of possession must be transferred, while Rabh holds, that it is not necessary.

Samuel may be right in his opinion, because he holds in accordance with our Mishna, which teaches, that at the combining of alleys, the right of ownership must be transferred, and at the combining of legal limits nothing is said about transfer, but upon what does Rabh base his opinion? There is a difference of opinion among Tanaim concerning this ordinance as R. Jehudah said in the name of Rabh: "It happened that the daughter-in-law of R. Oshiya went to the bath-house, and not returning before dusk, her mother-in-law made an Erub for her. When this was told to R. Hyya, he declared it unlawful. Said R. Ishmael bar R. Jose to him: Thou Babylonian! So strict art thou with Erubin. Then said my father: Whatever can be made more lenient with regard to Erubin, should so be made."

Said R. Zera to R. Jacob, the son of the daughter of Jacob: When thou goest to Palestine, go out of thy way and pass through Tyre and ask of R. Jacob bar Idi how the case was: Did the mother-in-law make an Erub with her own material, and on account of not transferring her ownership to her daughter-in-law, R. Hyya held it to be unlawful, or did she make it with material belonging to her daughter-in-law and R. Hyya held it to be unlawful because the daughter-in-law was not informed?" R. Jacob bar Idi answered, that it was on account of the ownership not having been transferred.

R. Na'hman said: "We are in possession of a tradition which teaches us, that whether Erubin of legal limits or Erubin of courts or combinations of entries are concerned, a transfer of ownership must be effected. Now the question arises as to Erubin of cooked articles, whether a transfer of ownership is necessary or not." Said R. Jose: "What question is this? Did R. Na'hman not hear the dictum of R. Na'hman bar R. Ada in the name of Samuel, that in the case of Erubin of cooked articles a transfer of ownership must also be effected?" Replied Abayi: "Assuredly he did not hear this dictum or he would not have asked." Rejoined R. Jose: "Did not Samuel say that in the case of Erubin of courts a transfer of ownership is not necessary and still R. Na'hman maintains that it is?" Abayi then said: "How can this be compared? In the case of Erubin of courts and legal limits there is a difference of opinion between Rabh and Samuel, while R. Na'hman accepts the more rigorous decrees of each, but in this instance how could R. Na'hman override the absolute decree of Samuel alone?"

There was a guard of the arsenal living in the neighborhood of R. Zera. His neighbors asked him to rent them his place for the Sabbath, but he refused. So R. Zera was asked whether the place may be rented from the man's wife, who was willing to do so. He answered them: "Thus said Resh Lakish in the name of a great man, i.e., R. Hanina: A man's wife may effect an Erub without the man's knowledge (or against his will)."

The same case occurred in the neighborhood of R. Jehudah bar Oshiya, and when asked concerning the law in the matter, he did not know. R. Mathna could not solve the problem either. When R. Jehudah, however, asked, he answered in the name of Samuel the dictum attributed above to R. Hanina.

An objection was raised: We have learned in a Boraitha: "If women made an Erub or combined in an alley without the knowledge of their husbands, the Erub and the combination are both unlawful." This presents no difficulty. The Boraitha refers to a case, where the husbands distinctly forbid their wives to do so, whereas Samuel refers to a case, where the husbands did not forbid them. Such seems to be the case, for were it not so Samuel would contradict himself as he said elsewhere: If one of the inmates of the alley who, as a rule, combined with the others, refused to do so at one time, the other inmates may enter his house and take his share against his will. Thus we see, that only if the man, as a rule, combined but (out of spite) refused in one instance, then and then only the other inmates may take his share by force; but if he was not in the habit of combining, this would not be allowed. Hence this bears it out.

Can we assume that the following Boraitha is in support of the decree of Samuel? (It teaches:) "It is permitted to compel a man to take a share in the erection of a side and cross beam to an entry, if he refuses to do so voluntarily." In the case of an entry it is different, because there were no partitions (hence it was difficult to watch the entry). According to another interpretation, Where an act is committed out of spite, with the intention to injure another, it is different (i.e., a man may be compelled to desist as explained in Chapter IV., page 109).

it was taught: R. Hyya bar Ashi said: "A side-beam may be made of a grove." R. Simeon ben Lakish said: "A crossbeam may be made of a grove." One who says, that a crossbeam may be made of a grove certainly permits a side-beam also to be made of a grove; but he who says, that a side-beam may be made thus, does not permit a cross-beam. Why so? Because a cross-beam must be sound enough to hold a brick one span thick, and as a grove (being used for idolatry) must be burned, it is considered as if it were already burned, hence not sound enough to hold a brick of the prescribed thickness.

MISHNA: If the quantity of food (required for the combination) become diminished, one may (himself) add thereto and transfer his right of possession without notifying the other inmates (to that effect). If, however, new inhabitants have (since) arrived in the alley, he adds sufficient to make up the required legal quantity, transfers his right of possession to them and notifies them to that effect. How much is this legal quantity (of food required for the combination of alleys)? If those who join therein are numerous, it must be sufficient for two meals for all of them; but if they be few, the size of a dried fig for each is sufficient.

R. Jose said: "To what does this regulation apply? To the original (first) preparation of the Erub; but to extend the Erub (for later use) any quantity, however small, is sufficient. Nor did the sages direct that (where the combinations of an alley had been effected) an Erub should be prepared for the several courts (contained in the alley) except that the children might not forget about the law of Erub.

GEMARA: What food does the Mishna refer to as having become diminished? Shall we assume, that it was but one kind of food, then even had it been totally destroyed, it was not necessary to notify the other inmates; if on the other hand there were two kinds of food, then, even, if it became diminished, the man was in duty bound to notify the other inmates, as we have learned in a Boraitha: "If the food was all of one kind and was totally destroyed, one need not notify the other inmates; but if the food was of two different kinds, one must notify the other inmates." (It was assumed that the same law applied to food that had merely become diminished, but the Gemara answered:) "The Boraitha refers to food that had been totally destroyed, but with food that had become diminished, it is different."

"How much is this legal quantity?" etc. What does the Mishna mean to say by "numerous"? Said R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel: "Eighteen persons." Eighteen and not more? Say, from eighteen on and upwards. Then why state eighteen in the first place? Said R. Itz'hak the son of R. Jehudah: My father explained this to me thus: If the food were divided equally amongst all and the share of each for two meals would not amount to the size of a dried fig, then those who took part were "numerous," and it is sufficient if the share of each did not amount to the size of a dried fig; but if the share of each amounted to more than the size of a dried fig, those who took part are considered few, and even if each received but the size of one dried fig, it is sufficient. (Thus both are the more lenient constructions of the law.) Incidentally we are told by R. Jehudah that eighteen dried figs are sufficient for two meals.

MISHNA: The Erub (of courts) or combination (of alleys) maybe effected with all kinds of nutriment except water and salt. Such is the dictum of R. Eliezer. R. Jehoshua, however, said: Only a whole loaf of bread is a lawful Erub. Should even a whole saah of flour be baked into one loaf, and that be broken, it must not be used for an Erub, while a small loaf of the value of an Eesar (a small coin; probably the Roman "as") if it be whole, may be used for an Erub.

GEMARA: Have we not already learned the first clause of this Mishna (in Chapter III., Mishna i), that the Erub or combination may be effected with all kinds of nutriment except water and salt? Said Rabba bar bar Hana: This Mishna repeats the ordinance solely on account of R. Jehoshua, who maintains, that only a whole loaf is a lawful Erub, but not a broken loaf. Hence we are taught that with all kinds of nutriment it may be effected, including a broken loaf.

What reason has R. Jehoshua for his assertion? Said R. Jose ben Saul in the name of Rabbi: "In order to prevent enmity (lest one say he deposited a whole loaf and another a broken loaf, etc.)." Said R. A'ha the son of Rabba to R. Ashi: "How is it if all deposited broken loaves?" and R. Ashi answered: "There is fear that the next time the Erubin are deposited there will be the same strife. One will deposit a whole loaf and another a broken one, etc."

R. Johanan ben Saul said: "If from a whole loaf of bread the legal first dough (offering) has been removed or from a whole loaf of bread made of Therumah and ordinary flour the legal one-hundredth part had been removed, the loaf is still considered whole, and an Erub may be effected therewith." Did we not learn in a Boraitha, that the loaf remains whole, and may be used for an Erub if the legal one-hundredth part had been removed, but if the quantity of the legal first dough had been removed it does not remain whole and must not be used for an Erub? This presents no difficulty. R. Johanan refers to the loaf of a baker who must remove only a small piece for the first dough, while the Boraitha refers to a loaf of a householder as we have learned in a Mishna (Tract Chalah): "The prescribed quantity for the first dough is one twenty-fourth. One who prepares the dough for his own use or for the wedding (feast) of his son must also give one twenty-fourth; but a baker, or even a woman who prepares the dough for sale in the market, need only give one forty-eighth as the legal first dough."

R. Hisda said: "If a man made a loaf whole again by joining the broken pieces with a stick of wood, so that it appeared like an unbroken loaf, he may use it for an Erub."

Said R. Zera in the name of Samuel: "It is permitted to make an Erub with bread made of rice or millet." Said Mar Uqba: "Samuel the Master explained to me that rice-bread may be used for an Erub but not millet-bread." R. Hyya bar Abbin in the name of Rabh said: It is also permitted to make an Erub with lentil-bread.

MISHNA: A man may give money to the wine-seller or baker in order to acquire the right to join in the Erub. Such is the dictum of R. Eliezer; but the sages hold, that money cannot acquire the right for a person to join in the Erub. They admit, however, that if a man give money to another person (with the commission to effect the Erub for him) it will acquire for him the right to join in the Erub, since no Erub can be effected for a man without his knowledge. Said R. Jehudah: To what do these (preceding) regulations apply? To the Erubin of limits; in the Erubin of courts, however, a man may be included with or without his knowledge; for advantages may be conferred on a person, even though he be not present, whereas, he must not be deprived of his right in his absence.

GEMARA: What reason has R. Eliezer for his dictum? The person giving the money to the wine-seller or the baker did not draw his purchase toward him, hence no sale or purchase was effected.

Answered R. Na'hman in the name of Rabba bar Abahu: "R. Eliezer makes this case analogous with the case mentioned in the Mishna (Tract Cholin, Chapter V., Mishna 4) concerning a man who purchases one dinar's worth meat and the butcher is compelled to slaughter for him an ox worth one thousand dinars. The question there is propounded by the Gemara: 'How can the sale be effective? No drawing towards himself was accomplished by the purchaser?' and the answer was that the Meshi'kha (drawing) was dispensed with for the sake of the advantage which was to be conferred on the purchaser on the four days or periods enumerated. In this case of our Mishna the Meshi'kha is also dispensed with and for the same reason, or according to the reason of another sage in the mentioned Tract (Cholin) who said that according to biblical law a sale is effective when the money for the purchase is paid."

"They admit, however, that if a man give money to another," etc. What is meant by "another person"? Said Rabh: "A householder," and Samuel agrees with him, meaning, that this other person must be a householder and not a baker (or a wine-seller). Samuel added, that only if the man gave money to the baker he cannot acquire the right to join in the Erub, but if he gave him a vessel he does acquire the right. Also if when giving him the money, he does not say to him: "With this money thou shalt give me bread sufficient to make an Erub," but says: "For this money thou shalt go and effect an Erub for me," then it is as if he merely commissioned him to effect his Erub and he acquires the right to join in the Erub.

"Said R. Jehudah: To what do these ordinances apply?" etc. R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel said: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah, not only in this case, but in all instances where R. Jehudah decrees concerning Erubin, the Halakha prevails in accordance with his dictum." Said R. Hana of Bagdad to him: "Does Samuel hold, that even in the case where R. Jehudah declares an entry, from which the side and cross beams had been removed, valid, the Halakha prevails accordingly?" Answered R. Jehudah: "Did I not state particularly concerning Erubin, but not concerning partitions?"

Said R. A'ha the son of Rabha to R. Ashi: "If it is said, that the Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah, then there must be some who disagree with him?" Did not R. Jehoshua ben Levi say, that whenever we find in a Mishna the statement: "Said R. Jehudah. 'When is this the case?' or 'When do these regulations apply?'" it is not to be accepted as a refutation of previous decrees, but merely as a further explanation of the decree of the sages? [How can it be said, that it is not to be accepted as a refutation? Did we not learn in a previous Mishna, that if additional inhabitants came into the alley, the right of possession must be transferred to them and they must be notified, whereas R. Jehudah states, that no notification is necessary? The previous Mishna refers to a court between two alleys when the inhabitants newly arrived must be notified that the Erub was effected in one of the alleys (and R. Jehudah would agree to this also). Did not R. Shezbi say in the name of R. Hisda, that the previous Mishna distinctly states, that the colleagues of R. Jehudah differ with his dictum in this last Mishna?] Answered R. Ashi (the previous question of R. A'ha): Wouldst thou make a contradiction from one man to another? Samuel may hold one thing and R. Jehoshua ben Levi another.

Referring again to the statement of R. Jehoshua ben Levi, R. Johanan said, that whenever R. Jehudah says: "When is this the case?" he means to explain the previous teachings, but whenever he says, "When do these regulations apply?" he means to differ from the foregoing opinions.

REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ERUBIN OF LIMITS. THE QUANTITY OF FOOD REQUIRED FOR SUCH ERUBIN, AND FURTHER REGULATIONS CONCERNING ERUBIN OF COURTS.

MISHNA: How are the (legal) limits to be combined? A man places a cask (of wine) and says: "This is for all my townsmen or for all who go to the house of mourning, and for all who go to the house of feasting." Whosoever joins in the combination while it is yet day (on the eve of Sabbath) is permitted to do so; after dusk, however, it is prohibited, because an Erub must not be deposited after dark.

GEMARA: Said R. Joseph: "Legal limits should not be combined except for religious duties." Is this not expressed in the Mishna? It says for all who go to the house of mourning or the house of feasting? R. Joseph teaches that the limits should not be combined except for religious duties, lest it might':, be assumed, that the Mishna merely makes this a general assertion; because people are wont to go to such places on the Sabbath.

The Mishna states "while it is yet day." Shall we adduce, therefrom that the Mishna holds, there is no such thing as, the theory of premeditated choice? 'For were it said, that the Mishna accepts the theory, the fact that the man would make, use of the legal limits on the Sabbath would demonstrate that he had the intention to do so on the previous day. Said R. Ashi: By "while it is yet day" is meant if the man was notified, of the combination while it was yet day, even though he did not' agree to it until after dusk; but if he was not notified while it was yet day, he could have no intention to do so previously, and hence he cannot join in the combination.

R. Assi said: "A child that is only six years old may go out in the legal limits which have been combined by its mother." An objection was made based upon a Boraitha stating: "A child still dependent upon its mother may go out in the limits combined by its mother; but if it is no longer dependent upon its mother it must not." Said R. Jehoshua the son of R. Idi: "R. Assi means to say still more, that even if the father had combined him in his Erub towards the north and his mother combined an Erub for herself towards the south, a child even six years old prefers to go with its mother."

Another objection was made: We have learned in another Boraitha: A child which is dependent upon its mother may go out with her in the limits which she has combined until it reaches the age of six years. (Hence when it is six years old it must not?) R. Assi might say that until six years includes six years.

We have learned in a Boraitha: A man should not combine an Erub for his adult son or daughter or for his Hebrew man or maid servant, or for his wife, unless he notifies them to that effect. He may however combine an Erub for his Canaanitish bond-man or bond-woman or for his minor son or daughter even without their consent because their hand is virtually the same as his. If, however, all those mentioned in the Boraitha have combined an Erub for themselves in one direction, and the master combined an Erub for them in another, they must all make use of the one which the master combined, excepting only his wife, because she can object.

Why should the wife only be excepted? Cannot the other persons mentioned in the first clause of the Mishna also object? Said Rabba: "The wife and those equal to her (mentioned with her) are meant to be excepted, and by 'all those mentioned in the Boraitha' is meant the persons enumerated in the latter clause of the Boraitha."

The master said: "Excepting only his wife, because she can object." Shall we say, that only if she objects she may use her own limits, but if she does not, she may go out in the limits combined by her husband? Does not the Boraitha mean to state that he must notify them and obtain their consent? (Then why must she object if she previously did not give her consent?) Nay; the Boraitha means to state that he must merely notify them, and if they make no answer it is the same as if they agreed to it.

The Boraitha states again, however, that if they made an Erub for themselves and the master made another one for them they must utilize that of the master; this must have been the case where they did not object when notified that the master would combine the Erub for them. "Excepting only the wife who can object?" How is this consistent? Said Rabha: "Is the fact of their making a separate Erub not sufficient objection?"

MISHNA: How much is the legal quantity (of food required to effect the combination of limits)? Sufficient food for two meals for everyone who joins therein; for work-day meals but not for Sabbath-meals. Such is the dictum of R. Meir; but R. Jehudah said: For Sabbath-meals, but not for work-day meals. Both (sages), however, intend to render the observance of this regulation more lenient. R. Johanan ben Berokah said: It is sufficient to effect the combination if the loaf used therefor be worth a Pundian, when the price of flour is one selah for four saah. R. Simeon said: Two-thirds of a loaf (is sufficient), such as go three to one kabh of flour. (The time it takes to eat) half (of such a loaf, is the prescribed time for remaining) in the house of a leper, and the half of a half of such a loaf (which were it unclean) would make the body unclean.

GEMARA: How much food constitutes food for two meals? Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh: "Two loaves as used by the peasants in the field." R. Ada bar Ahabha said: "Two loaves as baked by the inhabitants of N'har Pepitha (Papa)."

R. Joseph said to R. Joseph the son of Rabha: "In accordance with whose opinion does thy father hold concerning the two meals. Doubtless with that of R. Meir? I also hold with R. Meir; for if the opinion of R. Jehudah were accepted, why do people say, that the stomach always has room for sweet things?"

"R. Johanan ben Berokah said," etc. We have learned in a Boraitha, that there is not much difference between the quantity prescribed by R. Johanan and that prescribed by R. Simeon. How can this be said? According to R. Johanan one kabh will provide four meals, and according to R. Simeon one kabh will produce nine meals? Said R. Hisda: "Deduct one-third as the profit of the dealer." Then according to R. Johanan one kabh will provide six meals and according to R. Simeon nine. Say in accordance with the dictum of R. Hisda at another time, that one half should be deducted as the profit of the dealer. Then according to one a kabh contains sufficient for eight meals and according to the other, nine. Hence we have already heard that there was not much difference between R. Simeon and R. Johanan.

Now there is a contradiction in two of R. Hisda's statements? This presents no difficulty. One of his statements referred to a case where the wood for the baking was furnished while the other refers to a case where the purchaser had to furnish it himself.

The Rabbis taught: It is written [Numbers XV. 20]: "As the fruit of your doughs shall ye set aside a cake for a heave-offering," which signifies, that the first of the doughs that were prepared at that time should be set aside. How much was the dough prepared in the desert? It is written [Exodus xvi. 36]: "But the omer is a tenth of an ephah." They usually prepared an omer for each person (and an ephah is three saahs), whence they adduced that three saahs being equal to seventy-two lugs, an omer is equal to seven and one-fifth lugs, and when dough measures that quantity it is subject to the first dough offering. These seven and one-fifth lugs, according to Babylonian measure, are only six lugs in Jerusalem, and five in Sepphoris. From this it was also adduced that one who eats that much in a day is healthy and blessed. One who eats more than this is a glutton and one who eats less than that has a weak stomach.

MISHNA: If the inhabitants of a court and the inhabitants of a balcony should have forgotten to combine an Erub, whatever is above ten spans from the ground is considered as belonging to the balcony, and whatever is less than ten spans high from the ground is considered as belonging to the court. If the earth dug out of a ditch, or a stone, be ten spans high, they belong to the balcony; but if less than ten spans high they belong to the court. When is this the case? If the earth (heap) or the stone be close to the balcony, but if some distance away from the balcony, even though they be ten spans high, they belong to the court. What is considered close? Whatever is less than four spans distance.

GEMARA: If the object standing between the court and the balcony is easily accessible to both the same as a door, it is considered as if it were an aperture between two courts. If it is not easily accessible but both the inmates of the courts and of the balcony can throw things on it with equal facility it is equal to a wall between two courts. If both the inmates of the court and the balcony can with equal ease deposit things upon that object it is considered as a ditch between two courts; but if the object be easily accessible to one but was not as easily reached by the other, it is the same as the ditch mentioned by R. Shezbi in the name of R. Na'hman, which was level with the ground of one court. If the object was easily accessible to one but could only be reached by throwing by the other, it is the same as the wall mentioned by Rabba bar R. Huna in the name of R. Na'hman, which was level with the ground of one court. The question, however, is concerning an object which by the inmates of the court could only be reached by throwing and by the inmates of the balcony could only be reached by letting down an article upon it. Rabh said: "It must not be used by either"; but Samuel said: "It is given to those who can reach it by letting down something upon it because that is the easier way of reaching it; and it is a rule that whoever can reach an object the more easily is entitled to it."

An objection was made: Come and hear: If the inhabitants of a court and the inhabitants of an attic had forgotten to combine in an Erub, the inhabitants of the court may utilize the lower ten spans and the inhabitants of the attic may use the upper ten spans. How so? If a cornice project from the wall at a distance of less than ten spans from the ground it may be used by the inhabitants of the court, but if it project at a distance of less than ten spans below the attic, it may be used by the inmates of the attic. If, however, the cornice was just between the ten spans above the ground and the ten spans below the attic it appears that neither can make use of it, and this would be in accordance with the opinion of Rabh and an objection to Samuel. Said R. Na'hman: "The case treated of by the above Boraitha is where the entire wall was only nineteen spans high and if the cornice was less than ten spans high from the ground it was easily accessible to the court-inhabitants the same as a door would be, but not so easily reached by the inhabitants of the attic (hence the court is entitled to it). If the cornice was above ten spans from the ground it was easily accessible to the inmates of the attic but not so to the court-inhabitants, who would have to throw in order to reach it (hence the attic is entitled to it)."

R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel said: "If between two courts there was a small alley, into which the doors of the courts did not open, but which contained a well four spans distant from the wall of each court, the inhabitants of each court may put up a projecting board no matter how small on top of the wall, and draw water from the well through their windows. (In reality this was unnecessary, because the alley was not used as a thoroughfare, but as the two courts had not joined in an Erub and used the well in common the boards were erected as a sign)." R. Jehudah himself continued: "A projecting board is not necessary, for even any small stick is sufficient."

Said Abayi to R. Joseph: "The statement of R. Jehudah on his own account was also made in conformity with the opinion of Samuel, for according to Rabh, where a place is not used as a thoroughfare it cannot prove an impediment to the adjoining grounds."

Said R. Na'hman in the name of Rabba bar Abahu, quoting Rabh: If there were three ruins between two houses, each house may use the adjoining ruin by throwing therein, but the middle ruin must not be used by either of the two houses.

R. Brona was sitting and proclaiming this Halakha. Said R. Eliezer, one of the schoolmen, to him: "Did Rabh indeed say this?" and he answered: "Yea; he did." So R. Eliezer requested that he be shown where Rabh resided. This was done, and coming before Rabh he inquired: "Did Master indeed say this?" and he answered, "Yea." Said R. Eliezer: "Did Master not say, that if an object is not easily accessible to both, it must not be used by either?" Answered Rabh: "Dost thou then think, that I had reference to three ruins, that stood one after the other between two houses? I was speaking of ruins that stood two on one side and one of the size of both on the other (as shown in accompanying illustration). Now as regards the ruins into which the windows open, from the fact that access is gained by means of windows, or in other words through the atmosphere, they are permitted to be used in accordance with the opinion previously rendered that a place where there is no thoroughfare does not prove an impediment to adjoining ground. Even in this case, where the ruins being naturally broken it might be said that the atmosphere of one mingling with the other renders both unlawful for use, I have already decided, that atmosphere cannot produce such a condition. As for the other ruin, which both can reach by means of the small opening at the bottom it is not as if they were reached through the atmosphere but by actual contact. Hence the ruin being directly between the two houses cannot be used unless an Erub had been combined."

MISHNA: If a man deposit his Erub (for the combination of courts) in a vestibule, gallery, or balcony, it is not a lawful Erub. Should a man reside in any such place, who has not joined in the Erub, he cannot prevent the other inmates of the court (from carrying therein). If a man deposit his Erub in a hay-loft, or in a stable, or in a woodshed, or in a granary, it is a legal Erub, and one who dwells there (if he had not joined in the Erub) impedes the other inmates of the court. R. Jehudah said: If the householder has reserved the right of access thereto (to such a loft, stable, shed, or granary), he who dwells there does not impede the other inmates of the court.

GEMARA: Said R. Jehudah the son of R. Samuel bar Silas: In all cases where the sages decree that if a man reside in a certain place (and had forgotten to join in the Erub) he does not impede the others, an Erub which he might deposit in such a place is not legal, excepting only in the case of a vestibule belonging to an individual, and in all cases where the sages decree that an Erub must not be deposited in a certain place, it is permitted to effect the combination of alleys in such a place, excepting only the atmosphere of an entry (that is, in the air above the ground of the entry).

R. Jehudah again said in the name of Samuel: "If a company was seated at table on the eve of Sabbath and the Sabbath set in, the bread lying on the table may be depended upon to serve as an Erub and according to another version it may serve as the combination of the alley." Said Rabba: "They do not differ. Those who say that the bread serves for an Erub (of the court) refer to a case where the table was situated in the house, and those who say that it may serve as a combination of alleys refer to a case where the table was in the court." Said Abayi to him: I know of a Boraitha, which will bear out thy opinion, viz. 'Erubin of courts must be made in the courts, combinations of alleys must be effected in the alleys.' After deliberating upon this Boraitha we decided that it could not be so, for we have learned in our Mishna that if a man deposit his Erub (of courts) in a vestibule, gallery, or balcony, it is not a lawful Erub, and the conclusion was that the statement of the Boraitha to the effect that the Erubin must be made in the courts in reality means, that they should be made in the houses contained in the courts, and the combination of alley should be made not in the alleys proper but in the courts opening into the alleys."

"R. Jehudah said: If the householder has reserved the right of access," etc. What is meant by the right of access? The privilege as held by Bunayis ben Bunayis (according to the Aruch Ben Nanas), who was a very wealthy man and would loan his houses for the use of the other inhabitants, but would reserve the right to store his utensils in such houses. At one time he came before Rabbi; said Rabbi: "Make room for a man who has a hundred golden minas." Later another man came along and (thinking that he was the wealthier) Rabbi said: "Make room for a man who has two hundred golden minas." Said R. Ishmael the son of R. Jose to Rabbi: "Rabbi, the father of this (first) man (Bunayis) hath a thousand ships in the sea and a thousand cities on land." Said Rabbi to him: "When thou shouldst see his father, tell him, not to send his son to Rabbi dressed so poorly, because it is Rabbi's wont to honor rich men."

R. Aqiba would also honor rich men, as Rabha bar Mari preached: "It is written [Psalms lxi. 8]: 'May he abide forever before God: ordain that kindness and truth may guard him,' which signifies: When can he abide forever before God? If rich men guard him with kindness and truth so that he know not want."

Rabba bar bar Hana said: "What is meant by the right of access? If a man have in the house (any utensil) even a plough-share." Said R. Na'hman: "The disciples of Samuel said on the contrary: Only an utensil which may not be handled on the Sabbath gives a man the right of access to a house, but an utensil which may be handled on Sabbath does not, because he might come and remove it." The same was also taught in a Boraitha.

MISHNA: If a man leave his house and goes to take his Sabbath-rest in another town (without previously joining in the Erub), be he a Gentile or an Israelite, he thereby prevents the other inmates of his court from carrying within it. Such is the dictum of R. Meir. R. Jehudah saith: "He does not prevent the others." R. Jose saith: "A Gentile prevents the others, but an Israelite does not, as it is not usual for an Israelite to return on the day of rest." R. Simeon saith: Even if the man left his house and had gone to take his Sabbath-rest with his daughter, in the same town, he does not prevent the other inmates, since he has in thought renounced his abode for the time being.

GEMARA: Said Rabh: The Halakha prevails according to R. Simeon, but only if the man went to take his Sabbath-rest with his daughter; if, however, he went to take his Sabbath-rest with his son he does not renounce his own abode for the time being; for people say: "If thou hearest a dog bark in a house thou canst enter without fear; but if thou shouldst hear little pups squeal and their mother bark at thee, do not enter" (meaning that a father is not apt to quarrel with his daughter and return to his abode, but he may do so with his daughter-in-law and be compelled to return to his own home).

MISHNA: If there be a well between two courts it is not lawful to draw water therefrom (on Sabbath), unless a partition be made ten hands high either below (within the water) or at the edge of the well. R. Simeon ben Gamaliel said: "Beth Shammai hold, that the partition must be made below; but Beth Hillel maintain that it must be made above." Said R. Jehudah: The partition is not more effective than the wall which is between the two courts.

GEMARA: Said R. Huna: "By saying that the partition must be made below, Beth Shammai mean, that it should be within the well but not so as to touch the water, and Beth Hillel by maintaining that it should be made above, mean, that it should be erected over the well. Both agree, however, that the partition must not be outside of the well proper, but within its enclosures." Beth Hillel's reason for the decree is that wherever water is concerned the ordinances are to be construed in as lenient a manner as possible, as we have learned from R. Tabla's question and Rabh's answer (see page 24).

"Said R. Jehudah: The partition is no more effective," etc. Said Rabba: R. Jehudah and R. Hananiah ben Aqabia said virtually the same thing. R. Jehudah said what we have learned in the Mishna and R. Hananiah ben Aqabia as we have learned in the Boraitha, viz.: "In a balcony four ells square a hole four spans square may be cut out and water may be drawn through that hole (and although there were no partitions surrounding the balcony, it is considered as if it reached the ground by the application of the law of Gud Achith). So said R. Hananiah ben Aqabia." (This is virtually the same as the opinion of R. Jehudah in our Mishna.) Said Abayi to Rabba: "Perhaps this is not so! R. Jehudah, who says, that no separate partition is necessary, does so because he holds, that the wall between the two courts suffices as a partition for the well also; consequently he considers the wall as reaching down as far as the well; but, in the case of the balcony, where there is no partition at all to commence with, the balcony must first be inclined into a standing position and then be considered as reaching down as far as the well. Now while R. Jehudah may hold that the wall may be considered as if it reached down to the well, it does not follow that he also permits of a previous imaginary inclination of the balcony in addition to the supposition that it reaches down to the well and thus forms a valid partition. On the other hand, R. Hananiah ben Aqabia, who permits of both the imaginary inclination of the balcony and the supposition that it reaches down as far as the water, may have applied this only to a balcony which was erected above the sea of Tiberias, which is surrounded by cities, banks, and woodsheds, but in the case of a balcony erected above any other waters he might not have permitted even as much as R. Jehudah."

Said R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua: If the well stood in a corner between two courts, the partition to be erected on the other side of the well (which is not between the two walls) should be ten spans high and a span and a trifle wide on each side (and when applying the law of Lavud to the partition on both sides a partition will be effected on every side of the well, providing the well was only four spans square).

MISHNA: If a canal runs through a court, it is not lawful to draw water therefrom (on Sabbath), unless there be a partition ten spans high where the canal flows into the court and another where it flows out again. R. Jehudah said: "The wall above is to be considered a partition." R. Jehudah further, said: "It happened, that water was drawn from the canal around, the walls of a town (the moat) on the Sabbath with the sanction of the elders," but the sages replied: "That was done, because, the canal was not of the legal size (of four spans width)."

GEMARA: The Rabbis taught: If a partition was made where the canal flowed into the court but not where it flowed out of the court, or if it was made where the canal flowed out: but not where it flowed in, it is not lawful to draw water therefrom on the Sabbath unless there was a partition both where the canal flowed into and out of the court. R. Jehudah, however, said: "The wall above the canal may serve as the partition.

Said R. Jehudah: "It happened that water was drawn from "the canal flowing into the city of Sepphoris from the walls, around it (the canal flowing from the moat) with the sanction of the elders," but the sages said to him: "Wouldst thou place this in evidence? In that case the canal was not ten spans deep nor four spans wide."

We have learned in another Boraitha: "A canal which flows between two walls which contained apertures, if it was less than three spans wide, a bucket may be let down from the apertures and water drawn from the canal; but if it was over three spans wide this must not be done (on Sabbath). R. Simeon ben Gamaliel, however, says, that if the canal was less than four spans wide, water may be drawn therefrom, but if over four spans, this must not be done." In which class of legal ground can such a canal be placed? Shall we say: in the class of unclaimed ground? Then the statement of R. Dimi in the name, of R. Johanan to the effect that there is no unclaimed ground less than four spans will not be in accordance with the opinion of all the sages but merely with that of part of them; for according to the sages of the above Boraitha, even three spans may constitute unclaimed ground? Zera said: "The sages of the Boraitha do differ with R. Simeon ben Gamaliel concerning this point whether unclaimed ground maybe three spans or four, and the statement of R. Dimi is merely in accordance with the opinion of part of the Tanaim."

Why should a canal between two walls containing apertures not be considered as the holes in unclaimed ground; for prior to its entering the space between the two walls it was undoubtedly over four spans wide, and hence unclaimed ground (as holes in public or private ground are considered as part of public or private ground respectively, see Tract Sabbath, p. 11)? Abayi bar Abhin and R. Hanina bar Abhin both declare, that this theory (of holes being equal to the ground) does not exist where unclaimed ground is concerned.

R. Ashi, however, said: Even if the theory does apply to unclaimed ground it applies only then, if the ground is near to the hole (in a wall of the ground), but if it is a distance off as it must be in the case of this canal, the theory can under no circumstances be applied. Rabhina, however, said: The three, respectively four spans discussed in the Boraitha do not apply to the canal, but to partitions which were erected at the entrance and outlet of the canal at each end of the alley, and both parties to the dispute merely adhere to their respective theories concerning Lavud, one side maintaining that three spans constitute "Lavud," and the other that even four spans accomplish this object.

MISHNA: If there be a balcony above the water, it is not lawful to draw water therein on the Sabbath, unless a partition be made ten hands high, either above or below the balcony. Thus, also, if there be two balconies, one above the other: Should a partition have been made for the upper and not for the lower, it is unlawful to draw water through either, unless they have been combined by an Erub.

GEMARA: Our Mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Hananiah ben Aqabia, who holds, that in a balcony four ells square, a hole may be cut out four spans square, etc., as, related previously (page 207), but R. Johanan in the name of R. Jose ben Zimra said: "Hananiah ben Aqabia permitted this to be done only in the case of a balcony erected above the waters of the sea of Tiberias for the reason as stated previously, but not above other waters."

The Rabbis taught: Three things were allowed by R. Hananiah ben Aqabia to the inhabitants of Tiberias, viz.: To draw water through a balcony on Sabbath; to deposit fruit in pea-stalks (although, while in the field, dew had settled on the fruit it is not considered as being wet, and hence not subject to defilement); and to wipe themselves with a towel when emerging from the bath (as there is no fear of their wringing the towel).

Rabba bar R. Huna said: "Do not say, that the imaginary hanging partition of the balcony makes it lawful, only to draw water through the balcony but not to pour out water through it, for it is also permitted to pour out superfluous water through. that balcony." Said R. Shezbi: "Is this not self-evident? For is this not identical with a sewer mentioned in the next Mishna?" From the succeeding Mishna, where the sewer is supposed to absorb the water, it is allowed to pour water into it even if it be full and run over into the street because the intention was to have the sewer absorb the water, but in this case, where the waters are not stationary, we might assume that it is not allowed to pour out more water to commence with; hence we are told by Rabba bar R. Huna that this may be done.

"Thus, also, if there be two balconies, one above the other," etc. Said R. Huna in the name of Rabh: (The Mishna states, that if a partition had been made for the upper and not for the lower, it is unlawful to draw water through either.) When is this the case? If the balconies were not quite four spans apart, but if they were four spans apart it is allowed to draw water through the upper. This is merely in accordance with the mentioned theory of Rabh, that one man cannot impede (the actions of) another through atmosphere.

Rabba said in the name of R. Hyya and R. Joseph made the statement in the name of R. Oshiya, as follows: The law concerning robbery is applicable also on Sabbath. What is meant thereby? If there was a ruin belonging to a man and another man made use of it during the week, it might be assumed that he had acquired the right to it for the Sabbath and may carry therein (for under ordinary circumstances, if a man robbed another of an article and such article is in his possession it is considered as belonging to him until the victim of the robbery reclaims his right to it by law); but we are given to understand that in this case as soon as the Sabbath sets in the property reverts to its rightful owner (without his recovering same by law).

Said Rabba: "This above statement (that the law of robbery is applicable also on Sabbath) would be contradictory to our Mishna, which says that if there were two balconies one above the other, and a partition was made for the upper, it is prohibited to draw water through either, etc., and for this reason: During the week the upper balcony undoubtedly makes use of the lower and thereby acquires a temporary right to it. If, then, by using the lower balcony during the week the upper balcony does so wrongfully, and on Sabbath the lower balcony reverts to its rightful owners, to the exclusion of the inmates of the upper balcony, how can the upper balcony prove an impediment to the lower, which it cannot use?" Said R. Shesheth: "The Mishna refers to a case, where the partition made for the upper balcony was joint property of both upper and lower." If the partition was made jointly, of what benefit would a partition made to the lower be to the upper; as long as a share in the partition of the upper balcony is owned by the lower, the upper cannot be used until both combine an Erub? As soon as the lower balcony erects a partition for itself, it exposes its intention to sever all connection with the upper and thus either balcony may draw water through their respective grounds.

MISHNA: If a court be less than four ells square, it is not permitted to pour water therein on Sabbath, unless a sewer is made, which has a capacity of two saahs exclusive of the walls, either outside or within the court. If the sewer has been made outside it must be covered up (with boards), while on the inside it need not be covered up. R. Eliezer ben Jacob said: "Into a gutter, which is covered up to the extent of four ells in public ground, it is permitted to pour water on the Sabbath"; the sages, however, hold, that even though the court or roof be one hundred ells long, it is not permitted to pour water down the gutter (direct); but the water may be poured out on the roof, so as to drop down into the gutter. (In computing the four ells) mentioned in the first clause of this Mishna, the hall may be added. Thus, also, if there be two habitations facing each other (in one court) and the inmates of one have made a sewer, but were not joined in making it by the inmates of the other habitation, those who made the sewer are permitted to throw water into it, but those that did not make it, are not permitted to do so.

GEMARA: What is the reason that water must not be poured into a court less than four ells square? Said Rabba: "A man generally consumes two saahs of water every day. If his court be four ells square or more he pours out the water in order to lay the dust; but if it be less than four ells square, he merely would throw out the water in order to have it run out into the street (and that is prohibited as a precaution, lest he should pour out the water into the street direct)."

R. Zera said: "A court of four ells square absorbs two saahs of water, hence, even should part of it run out into the street, it was not the intention of the man who poured it out that it should, but if the court is less than four ells square it does not absorb that quantity of water and part of it must needs run out into the street, hence it is prohibited to pour it out." Wherein lies the difference between Rabba and R. Zera? Said Abayi: "If the court was oblong, say eight ells by two. It absorbs the water undoubtedly, but as for laying the dust in a court of that size a man would not trouble himself to pour out water for that purpose." An objection was made based upon our Mishna, which states in computing the four ells square of the court the hall may be added. Would this not prove that the reason is according to R. Zera? "According to Rabba," explained R Zera, "the Mishna might refer to a hall which, surrounding the court, made it in the form of a square, e.g., if the court was four ells long by two wide, and the hall added two ells to the width."

"R. Eliezer ben Jacob said: 'Into a gutter,'" etc. Our Mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Hananiah, for we have learned in a Boraitha: "Hananiah said: 'Even if the roof be one hundred ells long, it is not permitted to pour water on it, as it is not made for the purpose of absorbing the water, but for the purpose of throwing it off into the street.'"

It was taught in a Boraitha: "All these regulations concerning the pouring of water apply only to summer but during the rainy period one may pour as much water as he chooses into the court." Why is this so? Said Rabha: "Because it is the intention of the man to have the court absorb the water." Said Abayi to him: "Unclean water is certainly intended to be absorbed by the ground, still it is not permitted to pour it down the gutter." Rejoined Rabha: "Why should this not be permitted during the rainy season? Can it be the intention of the man that the water should run out into the street in order that his court should not become muddy? It is already muddy. Then the reason might possibly be in the manner of a precaution, lest the man pour the water into the street direct or others seeing water running out of a court, might assume that it is allowed to pour out such water into the court even during the dry season? The precaution is unnecessary. Those who see water running out of the court will naturally conclude that it is rain-water, because of the rainy season of the year, and there is no fear of the man pouring out the water into the street, because his court being already muddy, he will not mind pouring more water into it." Said Abayi: "According to thy explanation, then, during the rainy season the quantity of water is immaterial, even if it be a kur or two it may be poured out nevertheless."

"If there be two habitations facing each other," etc. It was taught: Rabba said: "They must not pour water into the sewer, provided they did not combine an Erub, but if they did combine an Erub, they may pour water into the sewer." And if they did not combine an Erub, why should it not be allowed? They merely throw the water down the sewer! Said R. Ashi: "This is merely a precautionary measure, lest they fill some vessels with water and then carry them to the sewer."

REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE COMBINING OF ROOFS ON SABBATH.

MISHNA: All the roofs of a town are considered one private ground (although the houses underneath are occupied by several), provided there be not one roof ten hands higher or ten hands lower than the rest. Such is the dictum of R. Meir; the sages, however, hold, that each roof constitutes a separate private, ground. R. Simeon said: Roofs, as well as courts and wood-stores, constitute one private ground, for the carrying of all such utensils as were actually situated there when the Sabbath set in, but not for the carrying of such utensils as were still in the house, when the Sabbath set in.

GEMARA: Abayi bar Abhin and R. Hanina bar Abhin were sitting alongside of Abayi, and were conversing between themselves: "It is right according to the sages, who hold, that, in the same manner as the houses are separated below, so are also the roofs above; thus, unless an Erub is made between the houses, it is not permitted to carry from one roof to the other; but what is the opinion of R. Meir? Does he hold, that as the houses are separated so are also the roofs, why does he state, that all the roofs constitute one private ground; or if he holds that above ten spans there is nothing but private ground, what difference does it make to him, whether a roof be ten spans higher or lower than the rest?" Said Abayi to the two brothers: "Have ye not heard the dictum of R. Itz'hak bar Abhdimi to the effect, that R. Meir said thus: 'Where there are two distinct premises both of which, however, are legally private ground, e.g., a pillar, ten spans high and four spans wide standing in private ground, and which must not be used to shoulder burdens thereon on the Sabbath, lest a heap of the same size standing in public ground be used for the same purpose,' so it is also in this case, where a roof is ten spans lower or higher than the rest the same precautionary measure applies."

The two brothers hearing this from Abayi thought, that according to R. Meir the same case applied to a mortar or kettle, ten spans high; said Abayi to them: "My master told me, that R. Meir said, this precaution applied only to a pillar and a millstone because for these two objects special places are designated, but as for other utensils, even if they be ten spans high, the precaution is unnecessary."

"The sages, however, hold, that each roof constitutes a separate private ground." It was taught: Rabh said: "On every roof things must not be handled except within a limit of four ells," but Samuel said: "They may be handled in the whole extent of the roof." If the roofs are separated and the separation is apparent, all agree, that carrying things on those roofs is permissible (because in this case the walls underneath are considered as if they reached up to the tops of the roofs) but they differ concerning roofs that are separated, where the separation is not apparent. Rabh holds that things must not be carried on those roofs (where the separation is not apparent) except for a distance of four ells, because he does not admit, in this case, the theory of Gud Assik (possibility of the walls reaching up to the tops of the roofs), while Samuel, who does admit the theory, holds, that carrying is permitted in the entire extent of the roofs (because he admits of the possibility of the walls reaching the tops of the roofs).

An objection was made based upon our Mishna: The sages hold, that each roof constitutes a separate private ground. This is in accordance with Samuel's opinion but is contradictory to the opinion of Rabh. The disciples of Rabh said in his name, that the statement, "things must not be handled except within a limit of four ells," meant to signify, "two ells in each adjoining roof" (but in the one roof things may be handled throughout its entire extent).

Abayi said: "If a man erected an attic on top of his house and provided it with a small door four spans wide, he may carry things in all the roofs." (The reason for this statement is, that the fact of the man having made an attic and provided it with a door is proof, that the other inmates had resigned their right to the use of the roof in his favor.) Said Rabha: "It may happen, that the small door with which the attic was provided may prevent the man from using the other roofs" (even according to R. Meir). How so? If the door in the attic faced a garden below and the partition made by the attic separated his roof from the others, it might be said, that he made that door merely so as to be able to watch his garden and renounced his right to the use of the roofs.

(It was taught:) Roofs, level one to the other in which, according to R. Meir, it is permitted to carry things, and a single roof which may be used according to the sages, may according to Rabh be used throughout their whole extent, while according to Samuel, it is only allowed to use them for an extent of four ells. Would not this be a contradiction by Rabh to his previous statement and by Samuel to his own former dictum? This can be explained thus: Rabh's previous statement referred to a case, where the separation between the roofs was not apparent while in this case the separation is apparent and Samuel's former dictum referred to a roof that had less than two saahs' capacity, while in this case it refers to a roof that has a capacity of more than two saah. Why should a roof of that size not be allowed to be used? The possibility of the walls reaching the tops of the roofs is not admitted, for the reason that partitions which enclose dwellings are made downwards and are not supposed to extend upwards, and of a space which is not enclosed by partitions of dwellings and has a capacity of over two saah, only four ells may be used.

It was taught: Concerning a ship, Rabh said, one may carry things throughout the whole extent of the ship, because the space of a ship is enclosed with partitions, and Samuel said, one may carry only to the extent of four ells. Why so? Because the partitions were not made for the purpose of making the space inhabitable but merely to keep out the water. Said R. Hyya bar Joseph to Samuel: "According to whose opinion does the Halakha prevail? According to thy opinion or according to Rabh's," and Samuel answered, "The Halakha prevails according to Rabh."

R. Giddel in the name of R. Hyya bar Joseph said: "Rabh agrees with Samuel's opinion, concerning a ship that was in dry dock and turned over, that it was only permitted to carry things for a distance of four ells." For what purpose was the ship turned over? If people lived within it, why should it not be allowed to carry things throughout its whole extent? Is the bottom of the ship not equal to a roof, when the ship was turned over? Nay; the ship was turned over for a coating of tar.

R. Jehudah said: When we shall arrive at the final conclusions of R. Meir we shall find that all roofs are considered as one private ground in their own right, i.e., that carrying from one roof to the other is permissible; also that all courts are considered as one private ground and likewise all woodsheds, but from the final conclusions of the sages we shall learn, that roofs and courts constitute one private ground, i.e., that it is permitted to carry things from the roof to the court and vice versa, which, according to R. Meir is not allowed. The woodsheds, however, are considered according to the sages a separate private ground, i.e., things may be carried from one woodshed to another but not from a woodshed into a court. The final conclusions of R. Simeon denote, that all roofs, courts, and woodsheds are considered as one private ground.

We have learned one Boraitha in support of Rabh and another in support of R. Jehudah. The one supporting Rabh reads as follows: "All roofs of the town are considered as one private ground; but it is prohibited to carry things from the roofs to the courts, and vice versa." Vessels which were situated in the court before the Sabbath set in, may be carried in all the courts, and those situated in the roofs before the Sabbath set in may be handled in all the roofs, provided there is not a roof ten spans higher or lower than the rest. Such is the dictum of R. Meir; but the sages said: Every roof constitutes a separate ground and things must not be carried in it for a distance of over four ells. This bears out the statement of Rabh in which he says that when the separation between the roofs is not apparent one must not carry except in a limit of four ells.

In support of R. Jehudah we have learned the following Boraitha: Rabbi said: "When we learned the Law at R. Simeon's in the city of Thequa, we would carry towels and oil from one roof to another, from that to the court, and from that to another, and from the other court to a woodshed, and from that to another, until we would come to the springs where we would bathe."

Said R. Jehudah: "It happened in a time of danger, that we brought up the sacred scrolls from a court to a roof, from the roof to another court, and from that to a woodshed in order to read therein." The sages answered: "Acts committed during a time of danger do not serve as evidence."

"R. Simeon said: 'Roofs as well as courts and woodsheds,'" etc. Said Rabh: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Simeon, providing no Erub was made, but if an Erub was effected, it is not so, because there is fear, lest the utensils from the houses be carried out on the Sabbath and are then carried about in all the courts." (R. Simeon himself admits, that they form one private ground for the carrying of such utensils as were actually within the courts or roofs when the Sabbath set in but nor for such utensils as were within the house.) Samuel, however, as well as R. Johanan, said: "There is no difference whether an Erub was made or not."

R. Hisda opposed this: According to Samuel and R. Johanan there will be two kinds of vessels in the court, one kind, which had already been situated in the court when the Sabbath set in, and the other, which was brought out from the house during; Sabbath. Is then not the precautionary measure decreed by Rabh really necessary? Simeon holds to his theory that precautionary measures are not necessary.

Come and hear: "Five courts which opened into each other. and also opened into one alley, the inmates of which had all forgotten and not combined an Erub, (the inmates) are prohibited to carry in or carry out from the court into the alley, or from the, alley into the court. The utensils which were situated in the courts when the Sabbath set in may be carried in the courts, but the utensils which were situated in the alley must not be carried even in the alley. R. Simeon, however, permits this to be done (even to carry the utensils of the court into the alley) because he used to say: as long as many people lived there and had forgotten to combine an Erub, the roof, the court, the balcony, the gallery, the woodshed, and the alley are all considered the same legal premises." Thus we see that R. Simeon makes this decree only if no Erub was made, but if an Erub was made he would not do so; hence he contradicts Samuel and R. Johanan? Nay; R. Simeon states this merely to supplement the statement of the sages and says to them: "As far as I am concerned it makes no difference whether an Erub was made or not, but according to your opinion, grant me, that when no Erub was made the courts, the roofs, etc. all constitute the same legal premises." The sages, however, answered: "Nay; according to our opinion, each constitutes separate premises."

Said Rabhina to R. Ashi: "Is it possible that R. Johanan said this? Did not R. Johanan say, that the Halakha prevails according to an anonymous Mishna, and we have learned previously (Chapter VII., Mishna 2) concerning a wall between two courts, if there was fruit on the wall, the inmates of both courts may partake of the fruit providing they do not carry any of it down with them? Hence we see that it is not permitted, according to that Mishna, to carry things from one court into another even if an Erub was made by each court!" (R. Ashi answered:) By carrying it down is meant carrying it down into the houses, but carrying it down into the courts is permitted.

Asked Rabhina again: "Did not R. Hyya teach (in addition to the quoted Mishna), 'providing the inmates of each court do riot take it down into their respective courts and eat it'?" Said R. Ashi: "If Rabbi did not teach this in the Mishna, whence does R. Hyya adduce that explanation (I think that my interpretation of the Mishna is correct)?"

It was taught: "If there were two courts, which had a ruin between them and the inmates of one court combined an Erub, while the inmates of the other did not, R. Huna said that the court that had not the Erub is entitled to the ruin (i.e., the vessels situated in their court may be transferred to the ruin) but the court that had combined the Erub is not entitled to the ruin for fear that they might carry out vessels, which were situated in their houses on the Sabbath, into the court, and thence into the ruin."

Hyya, the son of Rabh, however, said: (I heard from my father) that even the court that had an Erub combined may be entitled to the ruin and I explain my father's dictum to signify, that the utensils contained in either court may be transferred to the ruin. If thou shouldst explain my father's dictum to signify, that neither of the courts may make use of the ruin, because he understood R. Simeon's decree to mean "if they had made an Erub they became separate premises," hence, in this case, one of the courts having combined an Erub interferes with others also, I will answer it by saying, that such would be the case if there were an occupied court between them, in which event there might be vessels which were situated in the court when the Sabbath set in and also vessels which had been carried out of the houses, so that it would be impossible to distinguish which could and which could not be carried throughout all the courts. When, however, as is the case here, a ruin is between the two courts where there are no vessels which are actually situated there, the danger of confusion is removed and hence my explanation is, that it is permitted for both courts to transfer their vessels to the ruin.

MISHNA: If a large roof adjoin a small one, the owners of the large roof are permitted to carry things thither from the house, but the owners of the small roof are prohibited to do this. If a large court opens into a small one, through a breach in the wall, the inmates of the large court are permitted to carry things through the breach, but the inmates of the small court are prohibited to do so, because the smaller court is considered as an entry to the larger.

GEMARA: Why does the Mishna teach both cases, concerning a roof and a court? According to Rabh, the object is to demonstrate that in the same manner as courts are divided by partitions so should the partitions between roofs be apparent. According to Samuel, the object is to show, that a roof is on a par with a court, i.e., as the latter is used by many, so also is the former.

Rabba, R. Zera, and Rabba bar R. Hanan were sitting together and Abayi sate close by. They said: "From this Mishna we may adduce, that the inmates of the larger court control the actions of the smaller, whereas the inmates of the smaller court exert no influence over those of the larger. How so? (For instance:) If vines were planted in the larger, other seed must not be planted in the smaller; but if the vines were planted in the smaller, any other seed may be planted in the larger. If a woman who was to be divorced stood in the smaller court and the bill of divorce was thrown to her from the larger court, she is thereby legally divorced, but if she stood in the larger and the bill was thrown to her from the smaller court, she is not legally divorced. If the congregation assembled for prayer stood in the larger and the reader who was to recite the prayer for them was in the smaller, they have acquitted themselves of their duty; if they were in the smaller court, however, and the reader was in the larger, they have not. If there were nine men in the larger court and one man in the smaller, that one man is counted in with the nine and it constitutes a legal assembly for prayer or for the commission of religious acts, but if there were nine men in the smaller and one in the larger that one man cannot be counted in. If there was a filthy thing in the smaller court (on account of which the Shema prayer could not be recited) the larger court may nevertheless recite the prayer; but if the filthy thing was in the larger court the inmates of the smaller are not allowed to do so."

Said Abayi to them: "According to this then, a partition, which under ordinary circumstances should facilitate the observance of laws, would prove a detriment; for were there no partition between the larger and smaller court and vines were planted anywhere within the two courts, a man would simply be obliged to measure off four ells whence the vines grew and could then plant whatever he chose."

Rabha, through R. Shmaiah ben Zera, sent the following query to Abayi: "Do we not find as a matter of fact that a partition at times proves a detriment? Did we not learn in a Boraitha, that concerning the partitions of a vineyard there are instances where they make the observance of laws more lenient and on the other hand there are instances where they make it more rigorous." How so? If the vines are planted hard by the partition, one may on the other side of the partition plant whatever he chooses. If there were no partition, however, he would have to measure off four ells whence the vines grew and then plant whatever he chose. This is an instance of leniency caused by the partition. When does it make the law more rigorous? If the vines were planted to within eleven ells of the partition, it is not allowed to plant other seed anywhere within those eleven ells; but if there were no partition, four ells would suffice between the vineyard and the place where other seed was to be planted. Rejoined Abayi: "Why base thy query upon a Boraitha, if in thy opinion the partition is the main issue? Why not cite the following Mishna? (Kilaim, Chapter IV., Mishna 2:) 'If the space between the vineyard and the fence which surrounds it be less than twelve square ells, no other seed may be sown therein; but if it measure that superficies, a vacant space must be allowed for the cultivation of the vines growing near it, and the rest of the ground may be used for saving (other seed).'" We must say, that because in the Mishna the partition is not the issue, but it is a question of the space between the four ells allowed for the cultivation of the vineyard and the four ells allowed to the hedge or fence, and if such space is four ells wide (i.e., if the whole is twelve) other seed may be sown therein, but if less than four, it is abandoned. Hence we might say, that the same issue is treated of in the Boraitha?

illustration A illustration B

R. Jehudah said: "If there are three woodsheds opening into each other, of which the two outer are enclosed while the middle one is not (see illustration A), and there is a man in each of the wood sheds, the men are considered as a caravan and are entitled to as much room as they desire. If the middle one, however, was enclosed, but the two outer ones were not (see illustration B), and there was a man in each of the three woodsheds, they are entitled to a space of six saahs' capacity, i.e., two saahs to each man. (For the reason, that in the first instance the middle woodshed is smaller than either of the two outer ones and is virtually absorbed by them, while in the latter case, the middle woodshed is the larger, but cannot absorb the two outer ones, hence the men cannot be considered as a caravan.)"

The schoolmen propounded a question: "How is it if (in the latter instance of the woodsheds, illustration B) there were two men in the middle woodshed and one each in the outer sheds? Shall we assume that the two men of the middle shed, having a right to either shed, are considered as being in either one of the two outer sheds, and three persons being in one place, thereby form a caravan, or shall we say, that as there are two men in the middle woodshed, each one of them can occupy either court, in which event there would be two people each in the outer courts and no caravan is formed--consequently they are entitled only to a space of two saahs' capacity for each man? If the latter instance should apply, how would it be if there were two men in each of the outer sheds and one man in the middle shed? Whichever court he might occupy, there would be three men, and thus a caravan would be formed, or, because there is doubt which he would occupy, having a right to either, it would not be considered as a caravan?" The answer was: "All ordinances pertaining to Erubin should be construed in their most lenient form."

Said R. Hisda: "If a court was five spans higher at the edges than in the centre and a partition of five spans height was added to the edges, it does not constitute a valid partition; for either the edges must be ten spans high to commence with or the partition must be made ten spans high." Mareimar, however, maintained, that the two may be counted together and constitute a legal partition.

Rabhina met R. A'ha the son of Rabha and asked him: "Does the master teach anything pertaining to partitions?" and he answered: "Nay." The Halakha prevails, that the edges of the court and the partitions are counted together and constitute a legal partition.

R. Oshiya propounded a question: "How is it if new habitations are added to a court on the Sabbath (i.e., if a wall between two courts had become broken and thus new dwellings were added); do they impede the inmates of that court or not?" Said R. Hisda: Come and hear: (We have learned this in our Mishna:) "If a large court opens into a small one, through a breach in the wall, the inmates of the large court are permitted to carry things through the breach, but the inmates of the small court are prohibited to do so." Rejoined Rabba: "Perhaps the Mishna refers to a breach that was made before the Sabbath set in." Said Abayi: "The Master should not say 'perhaps'; it is certain, that the breach was caused on the eve of Sabbath; because didst not thou, Master, say thyself at one time, that thou didst ask of R. Huna and of R. Jehudah concerning an Erub which was made through an aperture or a door which had accidentally become closed up on the Sabbath and they told thee, that if that happened after the Sabbath set in, the Erub is valid for the whole Sabbath, having been valid at the beginning (and they certainly would not contradict a Mishna)!"

It was taught: If a wall between two courts was destroyed on the Sabbath, Rabh said, that it is not permitted to carry things in either of the courts for a distance of over four ells, but Samuel maintains, that the inmates of each court may carry as far as the ruins of the wall. The statement herein attributed to Rabh was not made by him outright, but was inferred from the occurrence as follows. Rabh and Samuel were both sitting in one court on Sabbath and suddenly the wall of the court caved in. Said Samuel to the other inmates of the court: "Take a garment and hang it up in place of the wall." Rabh turned away his face from Samuel. Said Samuel: "If Abba (Rabh) is angry let him take his girdle and fasten the garment with it to the wall." If according to Samuel it is allowed to carry as far as the ruins of the wall, why did he order that a garment should be fastened as a partition? Samuel did not order this to be done in order to make a partition but merely to prevent outsiders from peering into the court. And Rabh! if he holds that it is not allowed to carry he should have said so? It was Samuel's domain, and he could not contradict him at that time. Why then did he turn away his face? (Surely he is not responsible for Samuel's actions.) In order to show that he did not agree with Samuel's opinion but still adhered to his own.

MISHNA: If a court (through an incavation of its walls) is laid open to public ground, whosoever brings anything from private ground into such a court, or from the court into private ground, is culpable. Such is the dictum of R. Eliezer, The sages hold, however: Whoever brings anything from the court into public ground, or from public ground into the court. is absolved; since the court (through the incavation of its walls and consequent opening) has become like unclaimed ground.

GEMARA: Does R. Eliezer hold, that if a court by reason of the incavation of its walls is laid open to public ground, it becomes public ground? Yea! He holds to his theory as expressed elsewhere (Baba Bathra), that if the public had taken a certain path through a meadow (although there was no path) and used it constantly, it remains a path (and the same is the case with this court; if it was laid open into public ground it becomes the same as public ground). This is not so! Did not R. Giddel say in the name of Rabh, that R. Eliezer (in the passage quoted) referred to a case where the original path had been lost and could not be found, and if we would assume that in the case of the court he holds, that only the space which had been lost to the public, i.e., where it is not apparent that the wall had been standing, becomes as public ground, but the whole court is certainly not to be considered such; did not R. Hanina say, that the sages and R. Eliezer differ as to the entire space up to where the wall was standing? Hence we must say, that R. Eliezer holds the entire court to have become as public ground! The statement of R. Hanina should be modified to the effect, that they differ only as to the space that had been occupied by the wall and not up to the wall; thus R. Eliezer does not consider the entire court as public ground. If you wish, I may say, that (the place where the wall stood is still apparent, and) the sages differ with R. Eliezer merely as to the adjoining places to public ground. R. Eliezer holds them to be the same as public ground, while the sages say that, as there had at one time been a court there, it is now not public ground.

MISHNA: In a court (the corner walls of which had fallen in on Sabbath so) that (it) has been laid open to public ground on two sides; also in a house (which by a similar accident) was laid open on two sides; or in an entry the cross and side beam of which had been removed, it is permitted to carry things on that same Sabbath; but it is not permitted to do so on the succeeding Sabbaths. Such is the dictum of R. Jehudah; but R. Jose said: If it were permitted for that particular Sabbath, it would also be permitted for the future; but since it is prohibited for the future, it is also prohibited on that same Sabbath.

GEMARA: How is the case with the-walls treated of in the Mishna? If the breach caused by the incavation does not exceed ten ells, (it is regarded as a door) so what difference does it make upon how many sides the court has been laid open? If the breach, however, exceeded ten ells, then it would be the same even if one side only were laid open. Said Rabh: The breach does not exceed ten ells but in a corner it is not customary to make a door.

"A house which was laid open on both sides," etc. How would it be if the house were laid open only on one side? We would say, that the edge of the roof is supposed to reach down to the bottom and thus serve as a substitute for the wall by application of the law of "Gud Achith." Cannot the same rule apply to two sides of a house? Let the edge of the roof on both sides be supposed to reach down to the bottom? Said the disciples of Rabh in the name of their master: "The Mishna refers to a house where the corner walls had fallen in and where the roof was not flat but slanting, so that with the walls it also fell."

Samuel said: "In the case of a court the Mishna does refer to an instance where the breach exceeded ten ells, but it also states that the walls had caved in on both sides because further, when treating of a house, it must specify two sides, hence it does so also when courts are in question." Why must two sides be mentioned in the instance of a house? Cannot the edge of the roof be supposed to reach down to the bottom of both walls? Then again does Samuel hold to the supposition, that the edge of the roof reaches to the bottom of the wall? Was it not taught that concerning a gallery in a valley, Rabh said, it is permitted to carry throughout the whole extent of the valley, because the edges of the gallery are supposed to reach down to the ground and thus form a partition for the entire valley, whereas Samuel maintained that this supposition cannot be considered and hence it is only permitted to carry for a distance of four ells? This would not present a difficulty, for in that case Samuel maintains, that the edges of the gallery must not be supposed to reach down to the ground because there must be four distinct partitions, but where only three are necessary he would admit the feasibility of such a supposition. The difficulty concerning the two sides of the house where the breach measured over ten ells still remains! In the same manner as the disciples of Rabh referred to a house where the corner walls had fallen in together with their slanting roof, Samuel may refer to a house, the corner walls of which had sustained a breach four ells in width on each corner, or eight ells in all, and five ells in length on one side, and five ells and a trifle on the other side, or slightly over ten ells in all. Hence it would be necessary to suppose that the edges of the roof reach down on four sides of the breach two in width and two in length and that would be contrary to the theory of Samuel!

Why does Samuel not hold with Rabh? Because the Mishna does not mention a slanting roof and Rabh does not hold with Samuel because he (Rabh, as we have seen in the instance of the gallery in the valley) permits of the supposition, that the edges of a gallery or a roof can reach down on four sides.

"R. Jose said: If it were permitted for that particular Sabbath," etc. The schoolmen propounded a question: "How is R. Jose's dictum to be construed? Does he mean to permit it entirely or to prohibit it entirely?" R. Shesheth as well as R. Johanan said: "He means to prohibit it entirely." We also learned to this effect in a Boraitha, viz.: R. Jose said: As they are not permitted to carry on subsequent Sabbaths, so are they also prohibited to do so on that particular Sabbath.

It was taught: R. Hyya bar Joseph said, the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, and Samuel said: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah. Did Samuel indeed say so?" Did not R. Jehudah reply to R. Hana of Bagdad that Samuel decreed: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah in all cases pertaining to Erubin, but not where partitions are concerned?" Said R. Anan: "Samuel himself explained to me that if the courts were laid open towards unclaimed ground the Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah but if they were laid open towards public ground the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose."

MISHNA: If an attic be built over two houses, also if bridges are open at both ends, it is lawful to carry things underneath on the Sabbath. Such is the dictum of R. Jehudah; but the sages prohibit it. Moreover, R. Jehudah further said: It is lawful to combine, by means of an Erub, an alley that is open at both ends, but the sages prohibit it.

GEMARA: Said Rabba: Do not say that the reason of R. Jehudah is because a private ground requires according to biblical law only two partitions, but because he holds (Gud Achith) that the ends of the roofs (in this case of the attic or the bridge) are supposed to reach down to the bottom.

SUNDRY REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE SABBATH.

MISHNA: If a man (on Sabbath) find tephilin (on the road), he should match them and bring them (into the nearest town or village) in single pairs (i.e., one for the head and one for the arm). Rabbon Gamaliel said: "He may bring in two pair at a time." To what does this rule apply? To old tephilin (phylacteries), but if they be new, he need not bring them in (at all). If he find them tied up in pairs, or all tied together, be should remain with them till dark and then bring them in. In times of danger (religious persecutions), however, he covers them up and passes on. R. Simeon said: He should hand them to his companion (i.e., the man standing next to him), who in turn hands them to his companion, and so on from hand to hand until the outmost court is reached. So, likewise, his child, he should hand it to his companion, who in turn hands it to his companion and so on from hand to hand, even (if it have passed through the hands of) an hundred (men), R. Jehudah said: "In like manner, a man may pass a cask of wine (which he has found on the road on the Sabbath) to his companion, and he in turn to his companion (and so on from hand to hand) even beyond the legal limits; the sages, however, objected: "The cask cannot be conveyed further than its owners have the right to walk."

GEMARA: He may only carry them in single pairs? Shall we assume that this anonymous Mishna is not in accordance with R. Meir, who decrees (Tract Sabbath, page 257) that a man may clothe himself in as many garments as he chooses? Said Rabba: In both instances the decree of R. Meir is based upon the custom of the week-days (when a man may also put on as many clothes as he chooses), and as the above-mentioned Mishna treats of "saving from fire" the Rabbis permit a man to wear as much clothing as he chooses. In this instance, however, where there is no danger, (and as a man only wears one pair of tephilin on a week-day, hence he may wear only one pair on a Sabbath). Thus this Mishna can also be in accordance with the decree of R. Meir.

"Rabbon Gamaliel said: He may bring in two pair." What is the reason of R. Gamaliel's dictum? Does he hold, that on Sabbath also tephilin should be worn? Then he should only have permitted one pair to be brought in? If, however, he holds that on Sabbath tephilin should not be worn and it is merely to save the tephilin that it was permitted for a man to wear them on his head and arm, why does he only permit two pair at a time; he could have permitted more? Said R. Samuel bar R. Itz'hak: "On the head there is only room for two." On the hand, however, there is room for but one? As there is room for two on the head, according to R. Samuel, there is room for two also on the arm.

Shall we say that the first Tana of the Mishna differs with Rabbon Gamaliel upon the point advanced by R. Samuel bar R. Itz'hak maintaining that there is only room for one on the head or arm while R. Gamaliel holds there is room for two? Nay; all agree that there is room for two, but they differ as to the legality of wearing tephilin on the Sabbath. The first Tana holds that they should be worn on Sabbath, while Rabbon Gamaliel holds that they must not.

Who of the Tanaim ever held, that on Sabbath tephilin must be worn (in order that it might be said the first Tana of the Mishna is in accordance with his opinion)? That was R. Aqiba; as we have learned: It is written [Exod. xiii. 10]: "And thou shalt keep this ordinance in its season from year to year." And elsewhere [Tract Menachoth] where there is a dispute between R. Jose the Galilean and R. Aqiba, it concludes with the statement that R. Aqiba holds the wearing of tephilin on Sabbath to be legal. Does R. Aqiba indeed hold that Sabbath is (also) a proper time for the wearing of tephilin? Have we not learned in another Boraitha as follows: R. Aqiba said: "Lest we should assume that it is required to wear tephilin on Sabbath or on festivals, it is written [ibid. 9]: 'And it shall be unto thee for a sign upon thy hand,' which means, that tephilin should be worn, when a sign is required, but Sabbath and festivals being signs in themselves, it is not necessary to have another. "Therefore we must say, that the first Tana of our Mishna does not hold according to R. Aqiba but in accordance with the Tana of the following Boraitha: "He who stays awake at night may either wear tephilin or not, so said R. Nathan; Jonathan Qitoni, however, said: 'It is not allowed to wear tephilin at night.'" If R. Nathan, then, holds that tephilin may be worn at night, he also holds, that they may be worn on Sabbath. This is no evidence! It may be that he holds that they may be worn at night, but not on Sabbath; for have we not learned that R. Aqiba held the night to be a proper time for wearing tephilin, but not so the Sabbath?

We must say, therefore, that the first Tana of our Mishna is in accord with the opinion of the Tana of the following Boraitha: "Michal the daughter of Qushai used to wear tephilin, and the sages did not object to it; the wife of Jonah would go to Jerusalem for the festivals and the sages did not object to that" [whence we see that the duty of wearing tephilin is a (positive) commandment which is not dependent upon the time, i.e., if it said, that they must not be worn at night or on Sabbath, the law would be dependent upon the time, and that duty which is dependent upon time need not be performed by women. If such were the case then the sages would have prevented Michal from wearing tephilin because of the commandment: "Thou shalt not add to the law"]. Hence we see that tephilin may be worn on Sabbath, according to the sages.

It may be, however, that the sages hold to the opinion of R. Jose, who said, that while the laying of hands upon sacrificial offerings is only obligatory for men, still, women, when bringing their offerings, may, if they choose, perform that duty, and the proof that the sages hold thus is that when the wife of Jonah would go to Jerusalem for the festivals, a duty which no one disputes is entirely dependent upon the time, the sages had no objection. Therefore we must say that the first Tana of our Mishna is in accord with the opinion of another Tana, viz.: the Tana of the following Tosephta: "One who finds tephilin on the Sabbath should bring them in single pairs, whether the finder be a man or a woman, whether the tephilin be old or new. Such is the dictum of R. Meir. R. Jehudah, however, prohibits new tephilin to be brought in but permits old." Now we see that they differ only as regards new and old tephilin, but not as to whether a man or woman may bring them in, whence we see that the duty of tephilin is not dependent upon the time. Then the question again arises, "does not this Tana hold in accordance with the opinion of R. Jose?" This would not be consistent; for neither R. Meir nor R. Jehudah are in accord with R. Jose. R. Meir is not in accordance with R. Jose as we have learned in a Mishna (Tract Rosh Hashana): "One must not prevent children from blowing the cornet." From this we see that only children are not to be prevented, but women are, and as the above Mishna is anonymous and it is traditional that all anonymous Mishnaoth are in accordance with R. Meir, we see that he (R. Meir) is not in accordance with R. Jose, and that R. Jehudah is not in accordance with R. Jose is to be seen in the following Boraitha in Siphra: It is written [Levit. i. 4]: "And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering," this is a law which applies to a man but not to a woman. For the reason that this dictum is by anonymous teachers we, in accordance with what we have learned elsewhere, ascribe it to R. Jehudah.

R. Elazar said: If a man found whole strands of wool dyed purple-blue, the same as is used for show-threads (vide Numbers xv. 38) in the market and it is not known whether they were intended for the preparation of show-threads, they are not suitable for such purpose, but if he found threads of that kind of wool they are suitable for that purpose. Why should the strands not be suitable, because it is possible that they were intended for other purposes, e.g., for garments? Why not assume the same to be the case with threads? The threads are referred to as being already twisted into the form required for show-threads. Even so, it might be that they were intended for fringes on a garment? Nay; the threads mentioned were already cut to a size suitable for show-threads and a man would not go to the trouble of preparing them so carefully if they were to be used for any other purpose.

Said Rabha: And what about tephilin? The Mishna distinctly states, that only old tephilin may be brought in, because of the certainty that they are actually tephilin, but as for new ones, even though they be made exactly like tephilin, they must not be brought in for fear that they be only ordinary amulets. Hence we see that they apprehended lest a man take the trouble to prepare amulets exactly like tephilin (why should he not do so with the blue thread for show-threads)? Said R. Zera to his son Ahabha: "Go and tell them, that I have found another Boraitha which explicitly teaches that if the threads were found cut off to the required size of the show-threads, they are suitable for that purpose, for a man will not go to the trouble of cutting off the threads for any other purpose." Rejoined Rabha: "And if Ahabha taught that Boraitha, did he then encircle it with jewels? Our Mishna states explicitly, that only old tephilin, but not new, may be brought, which is proof that there is fear, lest a man go to the trouble of making amulets exactly like tephilin." "Therefore," he continued, "whether a man would take the trouble (to cut off the threads) or not is merely a difference of opinion between Tanaim as we have already learned in the Boraitha above: 'R. Meir permitted the bringing in of both new and old tephilin, while R. Jehudah permitted only old tephilin to be brought,' for the latter held that a man would take the trouble to make amulets exactly like tephilin while the former held that he would not."

Now, if the father of Samuel and the son of R. Itz'hak explained the terms in the Mishna "old tephilin" to signify that the straps of the tephilin had already been attached and the legal knot made therein, and "new tephilin" to signify that the straps had already been attached but the legal knot had not yet been made, the question whether a man would take the trouble to imitate the genuine tephilin falls to the ground, and the issue is merely: One holds, that if the tephilin were already fit to be worn they may be brought in, while the other holds, that even if they were not quite prepared they may also be brought in.

R. Hisda said in the name of Rabh: "If one buys tephilin of a man who is not an expert, he must examine two tephilin used for the arm and one used for the head or two of the head and one of the arm (and if he finds them suitable, he may purchase more). "Now, then, let us see! If he purchases the tephilin of one man, what reason is there in examining two used for the arm and one used for the head; why not examine three for the arm or three for the head? And if he purchases the tephilin of several men, he should examine three of each man!

R. Hisda refers to a man who buys tephilin from one expert, but he must examine the tephilin for both head and arm in order to see that both kinds are properly inscribed and it matters not whether he examine two for the head and one for the arm or one for the head and two for the arm.

Did R. Kahana, however, not teach, that he should examine only one each for the head and arm? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi, who holds, that in order to firmly establish (the fact) that the man is an expert or where any other proof must be brought, two only are necessary. If this is according to Rabbi, how shall we explain the final clause of the Boraitha stating, that so shall the second bunch of tephilin be examined and likewise the third? According to Rabbi why is a third required? When bunches of tephilin are concerned, Rabbi also admits that they should all be examined, because the expert probably receives the bunches from different makers and for that reason two of each bunch, one for the head and one for the arm, should be examined. Then why only three? Four or five should be examined? Such is really. the case, any amount should be examined but three only are mentioned as a rule, that in this instance the theory of Hazakah does not apply.

"He should remain with them till dark and then bring them in." Why not bring them in in single pairs? Said R. Itz'hak the son of R. Jehudah: "My father explained the Mishna thus: If the man can bring them all in, pair by pair, before darkness sets in, he may do so, but if he cannot, i.e., if some would still remain, by the time it gets dark, he should rather remain with them until it becomes dark and then bring them all in at once."

"In times of danger, however, he covers them up," etc. Have we not learned that in times of danger he should carry them less than four ells at a time? Said Rabh: "This presents no difficulty. Our Mishna treats of times of danger arising from religious persecutions by the Gentiles while in the Boraitha the danger is supposed to be that arising from robbers." Said Abayi to him: "Thou sayest that our Mishna treats of danger arising from religious persecutions, how then will the latter clause of the Mishna correspond with this? R. Simeon said: 'He should hand them to his companion,' etc. Would this not involve still greater danger?" Answered Rabh: "The Mishna is not complete and should read thus: 'In times of danger, however, he covers them up and passes on.' When is this the case? When the danger arises from religious persecutions, but if it be dangerous on account of robbers he should carry them for a distance of four ells at a time." R. Simeon, however, said: "(In the latter case), he should hand them to his companion," etc.

Upon what point do R. Simeon and the first Tana differ? The first Tana holds that the method adopted by R. Simeon would be too ostentatious and would seem like a violation of the Sabbath, whereas carrying for a distance of less than four ells is by no means objectionable. R. Simeon, however, holds, that when a man is obliged to carry things for a distance of less than four ells at a time, he might forget and carry for a distance of four ells or more, whereas handing the things from one man to another is perfectly safe.

"So, likewise, his child," etc. How came his child on the field or on the road? The disciples of Menasseh taught: "This refers to a child that was born on the road (or in the field)." What does R. Simeon mean to say by "even if it pass through (the hand of) an hundred?" He means to tell us, that although passing it through many hands is not good for the child, still it is preferable to carrying it for less than four ells at a time.

"R. Jehudah said: In like manner a man may pass a cask," etc. Does not R. Jehudah hold in accordance with the Mishna elsewhere [Tract Beitza] that an animal may be led or vessels may be carried only as far as the owner thereof is entitled to walk? Said Rabha: R. Jehudah in the Mishna refers to a cask which had acquired the right to its Sabbath-rest at the place where it was situated, but the contents of which had not acquired such right, and the cask becomes of no consequence to the contents.

R. Joseph objected: We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Jehudah said: "When a caravan was encamped a man may hand a cask to his companion, he in turn to his companion, and so on." Thus we see, that this is said only of a caravan but not under ordinary circumstances? Hence R. Joseph explained, that the dictum of R. Jehudah in the Mishna also applies to a caravan only.

MISHNA: If a man reads in a scroll (of sacred scriptures) on the threshold of the house, and the scroll slips out of his hand, he may draw it back again. If a man reads in a scroll of the scriptures on the roof of his house and the scroll slips out of his hand, he may, if it has not rolled down for a distance of ten spans (from public ground), draw it up again; but if it reached down to a distance of ten spans (from public ground) he should turn the written side over (downwards to the wall), and leave it there till nightfall. R. Jehudah said: "If the scroll be but the breadth of a needle from the ground, the man may roll it back again to himself." R. Simeon said: Even though it be completely on the ground, the man may roll it back to himself, for no ordinance regarding the Sabbath-rest supersedes the veneration due to sacred scriptures.

G E MARA: What was the threshold? Shall we say that the threshold was private ground and the space before it public ground, and no precautionary measure is ordained which would forestall his picking up the entire scroll if it fell into that public ground? Hence we must assume, that this is in accordance with the opinion of R. Simeon, who holds that no ordinance regarding the Sabbath-rest supersedes the veneration due to sacred scriptures. If, then, the first clause of the Mishna is according to R. Simeon, then comes the dictum of R. Jehudah, then again the dictum of R. Simeon, it is obvious, that the first and last clauses of the Mishna are in accordance with the opinion of R. Simeon, while the intervening clauses are R. Jehudah's? Said R. Jehudah: "Yea, so it is." Abayi, however, said: "The threshold referred to, was not private ground but unclaimed ground, and the space before it was public ground. If the scroll had rolled out into that public ground entirely but for a distance of four ells only, the man would not be culpable even if he picked it up and brought it back to the threshold, hence in this case it was allowed him to bring it back to commence with; but if it fell for a distance of more than four ells, he would, should he bring it back, be culpable, because he would have carried more than four ells in public ground; hence it was not allowed under those circumstances to bring it back in the first place."

"If a man reads, etc., on the roof." The Mishna teaches, that he should turn the written side of the scriptures over! Is this then allowed? Have we not learned in a Boraitha, that the scribes who write scriptures, tephilin, or Mezuzoth were not permitted to turn over the vellum in order to prevent it from becoming dirty, but must cover it up with a cloth? Where this can be done it should be done, but where it is impossible, rather than desecrate the sacred scriptures, they should be turned over.

If it fell from the roof and remained hanging alongside of the wall, it did not rest in any place because the wall is perpendicular, and it is necessary that it should actually rest on some object? The Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of R. Jehudah and is not complete but should read thus: He should turn the written side over. When is this to be done? If the wall was a slanting wall; but if it was straight, he may draw it back even if it bc less than three spans from the ground, because R. Jehudah said: "If the scroll be but the breadth of a needle from the ground, the man may roll it back again to himself." Why so? Because it is necessary, that it should rest on some object.

MISHNA: On a ledge outside a window it is permitted to place vessels and to remove them therefrom on the Sabbath.

GEMARA: Where does the ledge project? Shall we assume, that it projects into public ground? Then there is fear, lest they fall to the ground and the man might bring them back into the house. Or shall we say that it projects into public ground, then it is self-evident, that it is permitted. Said Abayi: The ledge is supposed to project into public ground, but the vessels which may be placed are brittle, and hence, should they fall, they will be broken and there is no fear that they will be brought back into the house.

We have also learned to this effect in a Boraitha.. On a ledge outside a window, which projects into public ground, may be placed bowls, goblets, jugs, and glasses, and the whole wall down to within ten spans from the ground may be used, and if there be another ledge underneath (but over ten spans from the ground) the wall underneath the lower ledge may be used entirely, but the upper ledge must only be used to the extent that it faces the window.

MISHNA: A man may stand in private ground and move things that are in public ground; or he may stand in public ground and move things that are in private ground, provided, that he does not move them beyond four ells. A man must not, standing in private ground, make water in public ground on (Sabbath), nor may he standing in public ground make water in private ground. In like manner he must not, standing in one (kind of) ground spit into another. R. Jehudah said: He who (when coughing) has brought up phlegm into his mouth, must not go four ells before expectorating.

GEMARA: Said R. Joseph: If he did so (meaning if he expectorated, etc.) he is culpable and liable for a sin-offering. But is it not necessary in the first place, that there be a transfer from a certain fixed place and that the article transferred rest in another fixed place of four ells square? Yea, the intention of the man, however, brings about that condition. For if this were not so, how could Rabha have said elsewhere, that if a man threw a thing and it fell into the mouth of a dog or into a furnace, he is culpable? Is it not necessary that it rest in a space of four ells? Therefore we must say, that the intention of the man is equal to the deed and such is also the case in this instance.

"R. Jehudah said.: He who has brought up phlegm," etc. Said Resh Lakish: If a man expectorated in the presence of his master, he deserves to be killed, for it is written [Proverbs viii. 36]: "All those that hate me, love death." Do not read "All those that hate me" but "All those who make me hateful" (see Sabbath, page 236).

MISHNA: A man must not, standing in private ground drink in public ground, nor may he, standing in public ground, drink in private ground, unless he places his head and the greater part of his body, within the place in which he drinks. Such is also the law regarding a wine-press.

GEMARA: Is the first part of the Mishna preceding our Mishna in accordance with the opinion of the sages, and our Mishna in accordance with R. Meir? Said R. Joseph: The preceding Mishna refers to objects which are not of absolute importance while this Mishna refers to objects which are a necessity to the man; hence the precautionary measure forestalling the probability of the man's carrying them into the other ground is instituted.

The schoolmen propounded a question: "What is the law regarding unclaimed ground, i.e., if the man stood in private or public ground and drinks out of unclaimed ground and vice versa?" Said Abayi: "The same law applies to unclaimed ground." Rejoined Rabha: This ordinance is merely a precautionary measure! Shall we then institute one precautionary measure as a safeguard to another?" Answered Abayi: "I deduce this from the further teaching of the Mishna stating, 'Such is also the law regarding a wine-press'; for the winepress must needs be considered unclaimed ground, as in the event of its being private ground, why should the repetition be made?" and Rabha replied: "The law regarding a wine-press is not for the sake of the observance of the Sabbath; but it means to imply, that a man may drink the wine made at the press without waiting for the tithes to be acquitted thereof." Thus also said R. Shesheth, as we have learned in a Mishna: A man may drink from a wine-press, whether he mix the must with warm or cold water, and need not first acquit the tithes thereof. Such is the dictum of R. Meir; but R. Elazar ben Zadok prohibits this, if the man mixes the must with water, because by that act he turns it into a beverage. The sages, however, hold that if he mix it with warm water he turns it into a beverage and is culpable, but if he mix it with cold water he is not culpable as it is not considered a beverage, for he can, after quenching his thirst, pour it back into the press.

MISHNA: A man may catch water dropping from a spout on the roof, within ten hands from the ground; but from a projecting spout he may drink in any manner (he chooses).

GEMARA: He may catch it with his hands but with the mouth it is not allowed! Why so? Said R. Na'hman: This is the case if the spout was less than three spans from the roof, in which it is considered as the roof itself, and consequently it is private ground. If he should catch the water with his mouth it is like carrying things from private into public ground.

We have also learned to this effect in a Boraitha: A man may stand in private ground, raise his hand upwards of ten spans to the spout which is less than three spans from the roof and drink the water out of his hand; but he must not place a cask or his mouth underneath the spout.

"But from a projecting spout, he may drink in any manner." We have learned in a Boraitha, that if such spout was four spans square he must not do this; for it is regarded as carrying from one (kind of) ground into another.

MISHNA: Should a well standing in public ground have an enclosure ten spans high, it is lawful to draw water therefrom (on the Sabbath) through an aperture (window) that is above it. On a dunghill, ten spans high, standing in public ground, it is lawful to pour water through any aperture above it.

GEMARA: Where is the well supposed to be situated? Is it near the wall, why are ten-span-high enclosures necessary? Said R. Huna: "A well is referred to that is more than four spans distant from the wall, in which case a ten-span-high enclosure is necessary, otherwise the water would be carried from private into private ground byway of public ground."' R. Johanan, however, said: The well might have been even near the wall, but the Mishna intends to teach us, that the well with its enclosures together are accounted to be ten spans (and hence a partition which legalizes the private ground).

"On a dunghill, ten spans high," etc. Is there no apprehension that the dunghill will be decreased (by removing part of it, in which case it will be less than ten spans and still they will continue to pour water on it)? Did not Rabhin bar R. Ada say in the name of R. Itz'hak: "It happened that concerning an entry which opened into the sea and into a dunghill Rabbi would neither declare the entry lawful nor unlawful. He would not declare it lawful, because it might occur, that the sea should recede and leave the land dry and also that the dunghill might be removed; yet he would not declare it unlawful because the sea and the dunghill were still partitions for the time being"? This presents no difficulty. In the case quoted by Rabhin the dunghill was the property of an individual and he could have removed it, but in the case treated of in the Mishna the dunghill is public property and there is no fear of its being removed. Mareimar erected partitions for all the entries in Sura facing the sea out of fish-nets, saying: There is danger lest the sea recede and leave the land in front of the entries dry.

MISHNA: Beneath a tree, the branches of which droop and cover the ground so that the tips of its twigs be within three spans from the ground, it is lawful to carry things (on the Sabbath). Should the roots of the tree project three spans high out of the ground it is not permitted to sit upon them.

GEMARA: R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua said: "If the space occupied by the tree is of more than two saahs' capacity, it is not permitted to carry things therein." Why so? Because an abode beneath a tree is not considered an actual abode but is merely used by such as wish to avail themselves of the fresh air, and wherever such is the case it is not permitted to carry within a space of more than two saahs' capacity.

"Should its roots project three spans," etc. It was taught: If the roots of a tree projected more than three spans and sloped to a lesser height, Rabba permits their being used because the ends of the roots are less than three spans from the ground and hence equal to the ground itself, whereas R. Shesheth prohibits their use because he claims, that the beginning of the roots being over three spans from the ground cannot be used and the ends being part and parcel of the beginning are still subject to the same prohibition."

If the roots, however, grew in the shape of a rolling sea, those protruding highest are according to the opinion of all prohibited to be used. Those growing lowest are in everybody's opinion allowed to be used; but concerning the roots that grew between the two there is a difference of opinion between Rabba and R. Shesheth. The same note applies to a tree growing out of a water-ditch and to a tree growing in a corner between the two walls of a court.

The Rabbis taught: Roots of a tree projecting out of the ground three spans or between which there was a space of three spans must not be used, though one side of them be level with the ground, because it is not allowed to climb, hang on to, or lean upon a tree (on Sabbath). One must not climb a tree on the eve of Sabbath and remain there during the entire Sabbath. The same rule applies to animals, i.e., one must not climb upon the back of an animal on the eve of Sabbath and remain there the following day. One may, however, ascend to (respectively) descend into a pit, well, cavern, or fence by scaling or holding to the walls thereof even though they be an hundred ells long. (The reason for the prohibition regarding a tree is because there is fear, lest a man might tear off a twig on Sabbath, while in the case of a pit, well, etc., there is no possibility of such a thing.)

We have learned in one Boraitha, that if a man climbed up a tree (inadvertently) on Sabbath he must not descend, while in another, we have learned, that he may! This presents no difficulty. One Boraitha holds, that it should not be allowed to descend for the sake of a precaution, lest the climbing had been done with intention, while the other Boraitha maintains, that as long as it had been done unintentionally the man is permitted to descend.

In one Boraitha we were taught, that be the tree green or dried, it is not permitted to be used, while in another it is said, that only if it is green it is prohibited, if it be dry, however, it may be used. This presents no difficulty. The Boraitha that permits the tree to be used refers to one which during the summer had lost all its fruit and leaves, while it prohibits a tree to be used in the rainy season when it is full of fruit and leaves.

Rami bar Abba said in the name of R. Assi: A man must not walk on the grass on the Sabbath, for it is written [Proverbs xix. 2]: "He that hasteneth with his feet is a sinner."

One Boraitha teaches, that a man is not allowed to walk on grass on the Sabbath and another teaches that he may! This presents no difficulty. One Boraitha refers to wet grass which is easily torn, while the other refers to dry grass. At this time, however, when we hold in accordance with the opinion of Simeon, that an act one has no intention of performing does not make one culpable, it is permitted to walk on any kind of grass.

MISHNA: The shutters of a bleaching ground or thorn bushes (as are used) to fill up breaches in a wall or reed mats must not be used to close up avenues unless they be placed a trifle above the ground.

GEMARA: The following presents a contradiction to the Mishna: We have learned: Portable shutters, reed mats, and plough-handles, if already hanging in their places, may be used to close up (avenues) on Sabbath and so much more on festivals? Said Abayi: "Providing they have hinges," and Rabha said: "Even if they have no hinges at the time but at one time did have, they may be used."

An objection was made: "We have learned: Portable shutters, reed-mats, and plough-handles if already banging in their places and but one hair's breadth removed from the ground, may be used to close up avenues?" Abayi explains this, in accordance with his former dictum, as follows: "Providing they either have hinges or are removed from the ground even one hair's breadth," while Rabha explains this, according to his former statement, namely: "Providing they at one time had hinges or were one hair's breadth distant from the ground."

The Rabbis taught: Thorn bushes, or bundles of thorns, which were prepared for filling up a breach in a wall, may, if they were tied together and already hung up, be used to close up avenues on the Sabbath and so much more on a festival.

R. Hyya taught: "A movable widow-door may not be used to close up avenues on the Sabbath." What is meant by a widow-door? Some say if it had only one board (which appears to be as a part of the wall) while others say that it may be even a two-board door but had no joints.

R. Jehudah said: Bonfires may be made on a festival provided they are ignited from the top, but they must not be ignited from the bottom, (because the flames would envelop the fuel and make it appear like a tent of fit, The same rule applies to eggs, pots, folding-beds used in the field, and casks (i.e., they must not be piled up in the form of tents and in the case of eggs they must not be cooked over a fire which has the appearance of a tent).

A Sadducee said to R. Jehoshua ben Hananiah: "Ye, (all Israelites) are compared to thorns, because it is written concerning you [Micah vii. 4]: 'The best of them is like a brier.'" Replied R. Jehoshua: "Look further into the verse, thou fool, where it is written [ibid.]: 'The most upright is sharper than a thorn hedge,' which signifies, that as a thorn-hedge is used to fill up a breach in a wall, so do the upright among us shield us from all evil."

MISHNA: A man must not, standing in private ground, unlock with a key something in public ground, nor may he, standing in the public ground, unlock with a key something in private ground, unless he had previously made a partition ten hands high (round the spot on which he stands). Such is the dictum of R. Meir; but the sages said to him: "It was the custom in the poultry-dealers' market, at Jerusalem, to lock up the shops, and place the key in the window (aperture) above the door." R. Jose said: "This was done in the wool-market."

GEMARA: The sages object to the dictum of R. Meir. who speaks of public ground, by citing an instance in Jerusalem which is unclaimed ground. Did not Rabba bar bar Hana say in the name of R. Johanan that Jerusalem, if the gates were not closed at night, would be considered public ground as far as Sabbath is concerned?

Said R. Papa: Our Mishna treats of Jerusalem after its fortifications had been razed to the ground when it became public ground, but Rabha said: The sages did not object to the dictum of R. Meir as quoted in the Mishna, but to another statement of his referring to gates of gardens, and the Mishna should read thus: "Nor may he, standing in private ground, open with a key something in unclaimed ground, or vice versa, unless he had made a partition ten spans high." Such is the dictum of R. Meir; but the sages objected: "It was the custom in the poultry-dealers' market, etc., etc."

The Rabbis taught: The doors of the gates of gardens if leading into a porter's lodge on the inside may be locked from the inside. If the porter's lodge was outside of the door, the doors may be locked on the outside, and if there were lodges on both sides of the doors they may be locked on either side, but if there were no lodges at all, the doors must not be locked at all, because they are situated in private ground and the key must necessarily be brought from public ground. The same rule applies to shops that opened into public ground. If the lock of, the door was less than ton spans from the ground, the key should be brought on the eve of Sabbath and deposited on top of the door, and on Sabbath he may take it down, lock the door, and put the key back in its place. If there was an aperture above the door, he can place the key in that aperture providing the aperture was not four spans square, for if it be four spans square it constitutes a separate ground in itself, and the man would carry from one (kind of) ground into another.

MISHNA: A loose bolt with a knob to it, is prohibited to use on Sabbath. Such is the dictum of R. Eliezer; but R. Jose permits its use. R. Eliezer said: In the synagogue of Tiberias it was customary to use such a bolt, until Rabbon Gamaliel and the elders came and prohibited it. But R. Jose replied: On the contrary, they refrained from using it as unlawful, until Rabbon Gamaliel and the elders came and permitted it.

GEMARA: If the bolt was fastened to a cord (rope) and when holding the cord the bolt was also held, all agree, that it may be used, but they differ as to a bolt that was not fastened to a cord. One master holds that if it had a knob on top it is regarded as a vessel and may be used, while the other master said: "As it cannot be held with the cord it cannot be considered a vessel and must not be used."

MISHNA: A loose bolt, that is fastened to a rope (and hangs down towards the ground) may be used to fasten with in the Temple only, but not in the country; but a bolt that is fixed to the building itself must not be used in either place. R. Jehudah said: A fixed bolt may be used in the Temple and a loose bolt in the country.

GEMARA: The Rabbis taught: What is called a loose bolt, which may be used to fasten with in the Temple and not in the country? If it be fastened to a rope, hangs down, and one end reaches the ground. R. Jehudah, however, says, that a bolt of that kind may even be used in the country, but a bolt which must not be used except in the Temple, is one that is not fastened to a rope and hangs down, but which is fixed to the building itself and when taken out is placed in a corner.

R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel said: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah concerning a loose bolt in the country but as for a fixed bolt which is not the outcome of a rabbinical law but against an actual biblical law, namely: that prohibiting building, it is not allowed to be used even in the Temple." Said Rabha: "A loose bolt is prohibited even in the country unless it be fastened by a rope to the door." This is not so! Do we not know, that it happened when R. Tabhla came to Mehuzza and saw a bolt fastened by a rope but not attached to the door, he did not object to its use? In that case it was a rope that was amply firm to hold the bolt without being attached to the door.

R. Ivia came to Neherdai and saw a man fastening a bolt with papyrus, whereupon he said, that a bolt fastened in that manner must not be used.

R. Nahumi bar Zachariah asked Abayi: "How is it if a man made a handle to the bolt?" and he answered: "Thou askest then concerning a pestle and it was taught in the name of R. Nahumi bar Ada that if he made a handle to a bolt and it looked like a pestle, it may be used."

Rami bar Ezekiel sent a request to R. Amram: "Let master tell us some of the good sayings, which he at one time related in the name of R. Assi concerning the canopies of boats." And R. Amram replied: "R. Assi said thus: If the poles upon which the canopies were put up be one span thick, or if they be less than one span thick, but are less than three spans apart, one may, on the Sabbath, bring a mat and form a tent out of such poles, because they were already at one time tents, and for the time being were also temporary tents, and it is permitted to add to a temporary tent in order to make it useful."

R. Huna had some rams which at night required fresh air and in daytime required a shady place, so he came to Rabh and asked him what to do on the Sabbath. Rabh answered: On the eve of Sabbath, when thou removest the covering of the stalls which the rams occupied during the day, do not quite remove all the covering, but leave about a span closed. Thus on Sabbath thou wilt have a temporary tent, and thou mayest then cover up the stalls entirely; for it is permitted to add to a temporary tent on the Sabbath.

Rabh in the name of R. Hyya said: One may unfold and fold up a curtain on the Sabbath.

R. Shesha the son of R. Idi said: "It is permitted to wear a black, broad-brimmed hat on Sabbath." Did we not learn in a Boraitha that it is not permitted to wear such a hat on Sabbath? This presents no difficulty. The Boraitha refers to a hat, the brim of which was one span in width. If that be the case, then it would not be allowed to let down any garment more than a span? Therefore we must say, that the Boraitha prohibits the wearing of such a hat only if it is not tied to the head and not because of its similarity to a tent, but for fear that the wind might blow it off and one would be forced to carry it more than four ells in public ground, while R. Shesheth refers to a hat that is tied to the head and there is no fear of its being blown off.

MISHNA: In the Temple the lower hinge of a cupboard-door may be refitted into its place (on the Sabbath), but this must not be done in the country. The upper hinge must not be refitted either in the Temple or in the country. R. Jehudah said: The upper hinge may be refitted in the Temple and the lower one in the country.

GEMARA: The Rabbis taught: The lower hinges of a door of a cupboard or a chest or a tower may be refitted into their places in the Temple, but in the country they may only be temporarily replaced, but not refitted. If the upper hinges had become unfastened it is not allowed to even temporarily replace them as a precaution lest they be refitted with tools, for should this be done the act involves liability to bring a sin-offering. The doors of cellars, vaults, or gables must not be refitted, and if this was done, the man is liable for a sin-offering.

MISHNA: They (priests who minister) may replace a plaster on a wound (which plaster had been taken off to perform the service) in the Temple; but this must not be done in the country. To put the first plaster on a wound on Sabbath is prohibited in either place.

GEMARA: The Rabbis taught: "If a plaster became removed from a wound it may be replaced on Sabbath." R. Jehudah said: "If it was moved up it may be moved down and if it was moved down it may be moved up, and it is permitted to remove part of the plaster and cleanse the exposed portion of the wound, then replace the plaster, remove another part, cleanse the exposed wound and again replace the plaster, but it is not permitted to cleanse the plaster because by so doing one would rub the plaster and if this was done it involves liability for a sin-offering."

Said R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah."

R. Hisda said: The statement of the first Tana to the effect that a plaster may be replaced applies only to a plaster that had fallen on a vessel but a plaster that had fallen to the ground must not be replaced.

Mar the son of R. Assi said: "It happened once that I was standing before my father and a plaster which he had on a wound fell on a cushion and he replaced the plaster. Said I to him: 'Does master not hold in accordance with the opinion of R. Hisda, who said that the first Tana and R. Jehudah differ only as to a plaster that had fallen on a vessel, and Samuel said that the Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah. How then could master have replaced it?' and my father answered that he did not agree with R. Hisda."

MISHNA: They (the Levites performing on musical instruments) may tie a string (of an instrument which had burst, on Sabbath) in the Temple; but this must not be done in the country. To put a new string on the instrument (on Sabbath) is in either place prohibited.

GEMARA: There is a contradiction! Have we not learned that if a string of an instrument had burst, they only made a loop but did not tie it into a knot? This presents no difficulty. This latter is the opinion of R. Simeon, while the Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as we have learned in the following Boraitha: If a Levite had burst the string of an instrument he may tie it; R. Simeon, however, said: He may only make a loop in the string. Said R. Simeon ben Elazar: If he merely makes a loop, the sound will be affected; hence he should loosen the string at the top and draw it down to the bottom or loosen it at the bottom and draw it taut to the top.

MISHNA: They (the priests who minister) may remove a wart from an animal on Sabbath in the Temple, but this must not be done in the country; by means of an instrument it is prohibited to do so in either place.

GEMARA: There is a contradiction. We have learned: Concerning the paschal lamb, which must be carried on the shoulders or brought from without the legal limits and the blemish of which must be removed, these acts must not supersede the due observance of the Sabbath.

R. Elazar and R. Jose bar Hinana differ: One holds, that the Mishna and the Boraitha both treat of a case where the wart is removed merely by hand and not with an instrument, but the Mishna, which permits such removal, refers to a wart which had dried and is easily crumbled, while the Boraitha treats of a suppurating wart which involves a deal of trouble to remove. The other, however, maintains, that the Boraitha refers to the removal of the wart with an instrument.

R. Joseph said: Both the Mishna and the Boraitha treat of a case where the wart was capable of being removed by hand, and they do not differ. The Mishna maintains, that any rabbinical prohibition which applies to the service of the Temple may be disregarded in the Temple, while the Boraitha holds, that any act pertaining to the service of the Temple which is generally prohibited must not be performed in the country (outside of the Temple).

Abayi was sitting and repeating the Halakha decreed by his master R. Joseph, and R. Saphra objected, saying: "Have we not learned in a Mishna [Tract Sabbath, p. 30]: that the Passover sacrifice may be turned around in the oven (on Friday) when it is getting dark, and the Passover sacrifice was not roasted in the Temple itself; hence we see, that the rabbinical prohibition was disregarded even outside of the Temple?" Abayi was silent. Subsequently he came to R. Joseph and told him R. Saphra's objection. Said R. Joseph to him: "Why didst thou not answer, that in that case the Passover sacrifice was prepared by an aggregation of men and an aggregation of men is generally very cautious?" [Why did Abayi not answer R. Saphra to that effect? Because he heard only, that the priests were very cautious, but never heard anything about an aggregation of men.]

Rabha, however, said: Our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of R. Eliezer, who holds, that any preparation for the fulfilment of a commandment supersedes the observance of the Sabbath (but the reason that the Mishna prohibits the use of an instrument for removing the wart, is because even R. Eliezer admits, that whatever it is possible to do on Sabbath in a manner different from a week-day, should so be done). Whence do we adduce that R. Eliezer admits this? From the following Boraitha: "If a priest should suddenly discover a wart on his person on the Sabbath, his companion should remove it by means of his teeth." Hence we see that the wart must be removed by means of the teeth and not by instruments, and again that the priest himself must not do it but it must be done by his companion. According to whose opinion is this? Shall we say, that it is according to the opinion of the sages and it occurred in the Temple, why should his companion be obliged to do it? He could, according to the opinion of the sages, do it himself, because a rabbinical prohibition may be disregarded in the Temple; therefore we must say, that it is in accordance with the opinion of R. Eliezer, who holds, that if an ordinary Israelite did this, he would be liable for a sin-offering, but because this is an act pertaining to the fulfilment of a commandment it may be done, but if it is possible to accomplish it in a manner different from that on a week day it should so be done.

MISHNA: A priest (ministering) who hurts his finger, may bind it up with reeds in the Temple (on the Sabbath), but this must not be done in the country. Squeezing out the blood is, in either place, prohibited. It is permitted to strew salt on the stairs of the altar (on Sabbath), in order to prevent the ministering priests from slipping. It is also permitted to draw water from the well Gola and from the large well by means of the rolling wheel on the Sabbath and from the cold well (on festivals).

GEMARA: R. Ika of Pashrunia propounded a contradictory question to Rabha: In our Mishna it is stated, that it is allowed to strew salt on the stairs, whence we see, that this may be done in the Temple only but not in the country; but have we not learned that if a court had become deluged by rain it is permitted to strew straw on the ground (so as to make it passable)? Answered Rabha: "With straw it is different! For he can eventually remove the straw and use it for another purpose.

Rabha related: "If a court had become deluged by rain, one may bring straw and spread it out on the ground (of the court)." Said R. Papa to him: "Have we not learned, however, that he should not spread the straw in the same manner as he does on a week day, i.e., through a basket, or crate, but through the sides of a broken basket." Whereupon Rabha procured an interpreter (crier) and proclaimed: What I told you previously was a mistake! Thus was it taught in the name of R. Eliezer: When he comes to spread out the straw on the ground he should not do it by means of a basket or a crate but through the sides of a broken basket.

"It is also permitted to draw water from the well Gola," etc. Ula was a guest in the home of R. Menasseh. A man happened to come along and knocked at the door. So Ula asked: "Who is it that is violating the Sabbath?" Said Rabba to him: "It was prohibited only to produce a sound by means of an instrument, but not to knock on the door." Abayi objected: "We have learned that it is permitted to draw wine by means of a siphon or drip it through a colander for a sick person on the Sabbath (and it is known that both produce a sound)." So we see, that this is only permitted for a sick person but not for a. healthy person. What purpose would it serve in the case of a sick person? To arouse him from slumber? Hence it is not: permitted to produce a sound for a healthy person? Nay; dripping wine through a colander is supposed to produce a sound similar to that of a cymbal and it is done in order to induce sleep in the case of a sick person who had dozed off in slumber.

Is not, however, the prohibition to draw water form the well Gola or from the large well instituted on account of the sound produced by the rolling wheel? Nay; it is prohibited as a precaution, lest a man take water from such a well and sprinkle his garden or his ruins (to lay the dust).

Ameimar permitted water to be drawn from the wells in Mehuzza by means of a rolling wheel, saying: "The sages prohibited it as a precaution, lest a man sprinkle his garden or his ruin with that water, but here in this city there are no gardens and no ruins." Afterwards he observed that the people used that water for the purpose of soaking flax during the week, so he prohibited the drawing of that water on Sabbath.

"And from the cold well (on festivals)." What is meant by the cold well? Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak: "That well was filled with spring-water." Whence does R. Na'hman adduce this? From the passage [Jeremiah vi. 7]: "As a well sendeth forth its waters."

We have learned in a Boraitha: It was not permitted to draw water from all cold wells but only from the one mentioned; because when the Israelites returned from exile they together with their prophets who lived in that day drank therefrom and made it lawful to draw water from that well on Sabbath forever. The prophets would not have done this either, if it t for the fact that they knew it to be an ancient custom of their ancestors.

MISHNA: Should (the carcass of) a dead reptile be found in the Temple on the Sabbath, the priest shall move it out with his belt, as an unclean thing must not remain within the Temple. Such is the dictum of R. Johanan ben Berokah; but R. Jehudah said: It should be removed with wooden pincers, in order that the uncleanness spread not further. From which (parts of the Temple) should it be removed? From the inner Temple, from the hall, and from the interspace between the hall and the altar. Such is the dictum of R. Simeon ben Nanos; but R. Aqiba said: It should be removed from every place (in the Temple) which, if entered by an unclean person intentionally, lays him liable to the punishment of Kareth (being cut off), and if entered inadvertently, makes him liable for a sin-offering. In all other parts of the Temple, the carcass of the reptile should be covered with a (copper) cooling-vessel (ψυχτήρ) till the Sabbath is over and then be removed. R. Simeon said: Whatsoever the sages permit thee to do is (not an infraction of biblical law, but) a right which is thine own; inasmuch as whatever they permit could at all events become unlawful only on account of their own enactments for the sake of the Sabbath-rest.

GEMARA: R. Tabhi bar Kisna said in the name of Samuel: "One who brings a thing, which had become unclean through a reptile into the Temple (if he does it intentionally), he becomes amenable to the punishment of Kareth (being cut off) and (if he does it inadvertently) is liable for a sin-offering; but one who brings in the carcass of a reptile itself, is not culpable." Why so? Because it is written [Numbers v. 3]: "Both male and female shall ye send out," and this refers to such as have become unclean, but by taking a legal bath (Mikvah) can become clean. The reptile itself can never be clean, however, hence one is not culpable, if he brings it into the Temple.

Shall we assume that the point of variance between R. Johanan ben Berokah and R. Jehudah in our Mishna is based upon the above Halakha of Samuel, i.e., R. Johanan, when stating, that an unclean thing must not remain in the Temple means to say, that if a man brought in a reptile, he is culpable, while R. Jehudah, who states that the reptile should be removed on account of the possibility of its spreading uncleanness, means to signify that a man who brings in a reptile is not culpable, and the reptile itself is merely a means of spreading uncleanness? Nay; both agree that a man is culpable, but R. Johanan means to assert, that the remaining of an unclean thing in the Temple is a far more grievous condition than the possibility of its spreading uncleanness, while R. Jehudah claims, that the spreading is of more consequence, hence he advises that wooden pincers be used but not the belt of the priest.

Thus we see, that whether a man is culpable or not is not the point of variance between the two teachers of the first clause in the Mishna but between the Tanaim of the second clause commencing: From which parts (of the Temple) should it be removed? He who says, that it should be removed only from the inner Temple, from the hall, etc., holds, that if a man brought in a reptile into the Temple, he is not culpable, but R. Aqiba, who says that it should be removed from every place, etc., holds that the man who brings in the reptile is culpable.

R. Johanan said: Both Tanaim, R. Simeon ben Nanos and R. Aqiba, adduced their teaching from one and the same passage, viz., II Chronicles xxix. 16: "And the priests went into the inner part of the house of the Lord to cleanse it; and they brought out everything unclean which they found in the temple of the Lord into the court of the house of the Lord; and the Levites received it, to carry it out abroad unto the brook Kidron." R. Simeon ben Nanos means to say, that because the Levites received the unclean things from the priests for further conveyance, it is evident, that only as far as the place where the transfer was made to the Levites, it is important that no uncleanness be found, and a rabbinical ordinance may be violated in order to remove such uncleanness, but from that place and further it is not of sufficient consequence to permit of the infraction of an ordinance instituted for the sake of the Sabbath-rest. R. Aqiba, however, means to say, that the finding of uncleanness in any part of the Temple is of sufficient importance to permit of the infraction of a rabbinical ordinance, and the reason that the priest transferred the unclean things to the Levites was because where Levites could carry it, the priests are exempt, but up to the place of transfer, although the priests were not permitted under ordinary circumstances to traverse the space except for ministerial duties, in that case the matter was of such importance that they were allowed to disregard that regulation.

The Rabbis taught: It is permitted for anyone to enter the Temple for the purpose of building, repairing, and also for the purpose of removing an unclean thing. It is a better fulfilment of that religious duty if a priest does so, and in lieu of a priest a Levite; but if there is no Levite on hand, an ordinary Israelite may go. All of them, however, must be (ritually) clean (notwithstanding the fact that they are about to become unclean).

"R. Simeon said: Whatsoever the sages permit," etc. What does R. Simeon refer to with this dictum? He has reference to, or in fact supplements his dictum in the fourth chapter of this tract (last Mishna) to the effect that "if a man was even fifteen ells beyond the legal limits he may nevertheless go back," and referring to this he states, that this is merely the man's own right, as the land surveyors are liable to err in the measurement.

"As whatever they permit could at all events become unlawful," etc. What would R. Simeon refer to with this part of his statement? This latter part of his dictum refers to his statement in the Boraitha concerning a new string for an instrument (previously mentioned) when he decrees, that if the string is broken the Levite may tie it into a loop, and here he supplements it by saying, that whatever the sages permitted was only such an act as could not involve liability for a sin-offering; but any act which could involve liability for a sin-offering was not permitted by the sages to be performed.

END OF THIRD VOLUME.